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Executive Summary 
This study describes and analyzes the functioning of the Danish labour market. 
Unemployment has been the single most important problem which has confronted 
policy makers during the past two-and-a-half decades. Unemployment has remained 
high and has displayed an upward long-term trend ever since the early 1970s. 
Against this background, the report focuses on the question of unemployment, 
its nature, its causes and the contents and effects of policies which seek to lower 
structural or registered unemployment, or which otherwise directly or indirectly affect 
the functioning of the labour market. The following sections summarize the 
conclusions of the study. 
The Nature of Danish Unemployment 
Danish unemployment has remained at a high level during the 1980s and the first half 
of the 1990s. There are clear cyclical elements in unemployment: The recession of 
the early 1980s resulted in an unemployment rate of 10.3 per cent of the work force in 
1983, after which a brief period of economic recovery caused a drop in unemploy-
ment to 8 per cent in 1986 and 1987. In the period from 1987 to 1993, Denmark 
witnessed a steadily growing unemployment rate, with registered unemployment 
reaching a record high of 12.3 per cent in 1993. From 1993 to 1995 unemployment 
started to decrease again at a relatively steep rate, almost reaching 10 per cent 
during 1995. As of August 1996, the unemployment rate has dropped further to 8.9 
per cent. 
Notwithstanding the cyclical elements in unemployment, the overall trend in 
the unemployment rate from 1980 has been upwards, with the unemployment rate 
unable to return to the level attained in previous economic upswings. This was most 
clearly illustrated in the economic upswing in the mid-1980s where shortages of 
skilled labour in specific sectors caused an overheating of the economy and high 
inflation, even if the overall unemployment rate was never below 8 per cent. 
In 1994, structural unemployment, defined as the level of unemployment 
which is consistent with unchanged wage and price inflation, was estimated to be as 
high as 8 to 10 per cent, implying that any attempt to reduce unemployment below 
this level would lead to accelerating inflation and hence be unsustainable. 
A relatively small group of persons carry the largest burden of unemployment 
in Denmark. Women, young persons, low-skilled workers, and persons with little or no 
education exhibit higher unemployment rates than other groups: Since 1984, the 
unemployment rate of women has remained 2.5 to 3 percentage points above that of 
men, with the result that for women a record unemployment rate in 1993 was almost 
14 per cent. Persons in the age groups 20-24 and 25-29 had the highest 
unemployment rate of all groups in the period 1990 to 1993, the unemployment rate 
in 1993 reaching 16.5 per cent for 20-24 year olds and 17.3 per cent for 25-29 year 
olds. Persons with basic schooling only or vocational education experienced an 
unemployment rate of 14.2 and 14.4 per cent respectively in 1993. In contrast, the 
unemployment rates of persons with a short-term, medium-term or long-term higher 
education was between 4.9 and 6.7 per cent. The unemployment rate for blue collar 
workers is substantially higher than for other occupational groups. Approximately 5.5 
per cent of the work force were long-term unemployed in 1993 and 1994. Persons 
with basic schooling only are overrepresented in this group of long-term unemployed. 
The Causes of Unemployment 
A number of possible explanations have been suggested for the high and persistent 
unemployment in Denmark during the 1980s. First, since the mid-1970s, one impor-
tant cause of unemployment has been deteriorating terms of trade caused by the two 
oil shocks. Secondly, macroeconomic policies have since the late 1980s and until 
1993 aimed a low level of inflation and build up a surplus on the balance of payments 
rather than reduce unemployment. There is evidence that from the late 1980s 
onwards there was room for traditional macroeconomic policy to reduce unemploy-
ment without spurring growth in inflation. 
However, it is widely agreed today that there is an important structural 
component in unemployment, and that major reductions in unemployment cannot be 
obtained without policies aimed to affect the structure and functioning of the labour 
market. The following structural problems have been emphasized in the functioning of 
the Danish labour market as partial explanations for high and persistent 
unemployment: 
First, the equilibrizing forces between unemployment rates and wage growth 
rates are weak in Denmark. This real wage rigidity is reflected in the fact that groups 
with above average unemployment rates have not experienced lower real wage 
growth rates than other groups. For instance, real wages for unskilled blue collar 
workers grew faster than for any other occupational group from 1984 to 1992, despite 
the fact that unemployment for this occupational group is higher than for any other 
occupational group. 
Second, the nature of Danish unemployment, as described above, suggests 
that there is an insider-outsider problem, where the labour force is partitioned 
between a dominant group who practically never experience unemployment, and a 
smaller group with a much higher risk of unemployment. This division means that 
during wage negotations, there are few incentives for the "insider"-group to consider 
the effects of their wage claims on the smaller, weaker group of "outsiders". 
Third, the Danish labour market is characterized by a very compressed wage 
structure, as the difference between wage levels for high-wage and low-wage groups 
is very small by international comparison. For some groups of unskilled and low-
skilled workers, there is evidence that this wage structure means that wage levels do 
not correspond to productivity levels. In other words, these groups are priced out of 
work as they cannot produce a value worth their wage. 
Fourth, there is evidence of a self-perpetuating persistence of unemployment, 
the hysteresis-effect, occurring among other things as the effect of skill deterioration 
among the long-term unemployed. This skill deterioration may again be ascribed to 
passive labour market policies, to signalling and sorting mechanisms which come 
into play when persons become long-term unemployed or to changes in the job 
search behaviour of the long-term unemployed. One major factor behind all these 
explanations of skill deterioration is the very long duration of unemployment benefits 
in Denmark by international standards. 
On balance, two factors seem most important in explaining the structural 
elements in the high and persistent Danish unemployment from 1980: Insider-
outsider effects and the long duration of unemployment benefits. 
Danish Labour Market Policy and its Effects 
To what extent has Danish labour market policy adressed the structural causes of 
unemployment? In the 1970s and 1980s, Danish labour market policy was charac-
terized by the importance of passive labour market measures: Unemployment bene-
fits and the Post-Employment Wage scheme - an early retirement scheme intro-
duced in 1979 to create job-openings for young unemployed - were the dominant 
elements. At the same time, the period until 1994 was characterized by a de facto 
growth in the duration of benefit entitlement periods. Prior to 1994, the maximum 
duration of unemployment benefits was 9 years when taking into account all 
available activation and benefit programmes. Furthermore, active elements such as 
subsidized employment schemes and education offers for unemployed had a 
"passive" nature, since in fact one of the most important informal objectives of active 
measures was to renew each unemployed person's unemployment benefit 
entitlement. On balance, Danish labour market policies until 1994 therefore 
contributed rather than decreased structural unemployment, as the long duration of 
benefits and the "passive" nature of benefits contributed to skills deterioration among 
unemployed persons. 
The Labour Market Reforms 1994-95 
From 1994, new principles have been introduced for Danish labour market policy, 
and a series of reforms have been enacted. These reforms can be divided into two 
groups: Reforms of active labour market policy and the introduction of three 
comprehensive leave schemes. 
The reforms of the active labour market policy have comprized the following 
elements: The benefit entitlement period has been shortened to a maximum of 5 
years (plus the possibility of 1 year of Child Care Leave for parents). The link 
between active labour market measures and benefit entitlements has been removed, 
creating incentives for effective active measures, i.e. measures which lead to regular 
employment. A possibility of establishing individually adapted activation programmes 
has been introduced. From 1996, young unskilled unemployed persons are required 
to undertake training or education attero months of unemployment. 
Furthermore, full-time activation of unemployed persons is gradually being 
moved forward. From 1998, every person who has experienced more than 2 years of 
unemployment will be covered by a full-time activation scheme involving subsidized 
employment, training and education or combinations thereof. Finally, the manage-
ment of active labour market policy has been decentralized, and the newly 
established Regional Labour Market Councils have been given the right to identify 
vulnerable groups of unemployed who may receive early activation and to initiate 
targeted training and education as well as job-rotation programmes to prevent 
shortages of skilled labour in the regional labour markets. 
These reforms all aim to reduce structural unemployment, as they seek to 
lower that rate of unemployment at which shortages of skilled labour occur. This is so 
in two ways: First, along with the reduction in the duration of the benefit period, 
earlier, more comprehensive and more individually adapted activation schemes for 
the unemployed seek to reduce the average duration of unemployment, so as to 
prevent the deterioration of skills among the unemployed. Second, decentralization 
of labour market activation and improved possibilities of targetted training 
programmes and job-rotation projects seek to improve and adapt the skill levels of 
the workforce to the requirements of the labour market. 
As for the leave schemes, a Child Care Leave scheme, an Educational Leave 
scheme and a Sabbatical Leave scheme came into force in 1994. The first two of 
these schemes are open to both employed and unemployed persons, the last 
scheme is only open to employed persons. Persons may obtain leave up to 52 
weeks under specified circumstances, at the same time upholding a right to an 
allowance corresponding to the maximum unemployment benefit rate for the 
scheme and 70 per cent of this rate for the Child Care Leave and the Sabbatical 
Leave scheme in 1996. 
The most important objective of the leave schemes has been to reduce 
registered unemployment through a reduction in the supply of labour. Thus, 
unemployed persons obtaining leave in one of the three schemes are removed from 
the unemployment statistics. At the same time, employed persons who obtain leave 
may be replaced for the leave period by an unemployed person - indeed sabbatical 
leave requires that the vacant position is filled by a subsitute. 
The Effects of the Labour Market Reforms 
Data on the effects of the labour reforms introduced since 1993 is still relatively 
scarce. As to the effects of the leave schemes, these schemes have indeed reduced 
registered unemployment in 1994-1995. In 1994, registered unemployment fell by 
between 32,000 and 40,000 full year persons. In this year, registered unemployment 
in Denmark was approx. 340,000 full year persons. In 1995 it is calculated that the 
immediate drop in registered unemployment because of the leave schemes was 
between 60,000 and 70,000 full year persons. These figures compare to a total 
number of registered unemployed persons in 1995 of 285,000. 
A large part of the leave schemes' effects on registered unemployment is due 
to the "reclassification" of unemployed persons as persons on leave. More than half 
of all persons on leave in 1994 and 1995 were previously unemployed. Model 
calculations of the long-term effects of the leave schemes show that the effect of the 
schemes on unemployment approaches zero over time, as decreasing labour supply 
will push up wage increase rates, to the detriment of the enterprises' international 
competitiveness and thereby employment. However, this conclusion does not take 
the possible positive structural effects of the Educational Leave into account, as 
Educational Leave may in the long term further the productivity of the work force. On 
balance, the leave schemes only appear to contribute significantly to a reduction in 
registered unemployment in the short term, and only the Educational Leave scheme 
may contribute to a reduction in structural unemployment. Indeed, the Child Care 
Leave scheme is seen to contribute to structural unemployment, as this scheme is 
extensively used by unemployed women. These women risk further marginalization in 
the labour market, as their skills deteriorate and their connection to the labour market 
is further weakened. 
As to the effects of the labour reforms since 1993 on structural unemployment, 
the number of long-term unemployed and the average duration of unemployment has 
dropped significantly from 1994 to 1995. As mentioned, a shortening of the duration 
of unemployment is indeed one of the most important means which the labour market 
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reforms seek to employ in preventing the deterioration of skills among unemployed. 
However, a significant part of the decrease in long-term unemployment from 1994 to 
1995 is due to unemployed persons' utilization of the leave schemes and the 
Transition Benefit scheme, which was a temporary extension of the Post Employment 
Wage scheme allowing the long-term unemployed to retire as early as age 50. If the 
effects of the leave schemes and the Transition Benefit scheme are excluded, long-
term unemployment did not drop faster from 1994 to 1995 than during the previous 
economic upswing in the mid-1980s. This suggests that apart from the leave 
schemes and the Transition Benefit, recent labour market reforms have so far had 
limited effects on the duration of unemployment. 
Furthermore, compared to the most recent previous economic upswing, wage 
increase rates have not yet grown as rapidly as then and shortages of skilled labour 
have occured only in public sector areas where the effects on wage increase rates 
and inflation are very limited. Training and education have been given a higher priority 
in active Danish labour market policy from 1994 onwards, and this may have 
contributed to the prevention of shortages of skilled labour. However, there may be 
several other explanations for the lower wage increase rates in the present economic 
upswing than in the previous. 
In summary Danish labour market policy since 1993 has been directed both 
towards the symptom of unemployment, that is the rate of registered unemployment, 
and some of the likely causes of unemployment, namely the deterioration of skills 
among the unemployed and the related mismatch problems of supply and demand in 
the labour market. In curing the symptoms, policies have been relatively successful, 
as labour market measures contributed significantly to a reduction in registered 
unemployment in 1994 and 1995. 
In removing some of the causes of unemployment, results so far are mixed. 
There is no evidence that recent labour market measures have reduced the number 
of long-term unemployed in a manner which prevents skill deterioriation. Rather, 
many long-term unemployed have been removed from the unemployment statistics 
through passive measures. On the other hand it does not seem unlikely that active 
labour market measures have contributed to the prevention of labour shortages in 
1994 and 1995 through targeted improvements in the skills of the work force, but 
evidence is scarce. 
The question which remains to be answered is whether the labour market 
measures which have been adopted so far since 1993 are sufficient to ensure a 
significant and lasting drop in structural unemployment. Several of the most likely 
causes of unemployment have not been adressed by policy measures until now to 
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any significant extent: Real wage rigidity, the insider-outsider problem, and the 
compressed wage structure. 
Industrial Relations and the Functioning of the Labour Market 
Looking at labour market institutions, the "Danish model", a highly organized and 
institutionalized systems of industrial relations, remains a key characteristic of the 
Danish labour market. The Danish model is characterized by the integration of 
employee and employer organizations into a system of institutionalized balancing of 
opposed interests. Furthermore, the Danish labour market organizations are to a 
large extent self-regulating and generally play a considerable role in the management 
and setting of overall economic policy. However, self-regulation is constrained by the 
potential for government intervention and the labour market parties' own interest in 
and responsibility for the long-term success of the economy. 
The organization of the labour market parties has been undergoing significant 
changes since 1989. From the traditional organization along the lines of trades 
structured in one comprehensive umbrella organization, industry-wide cartels are 
being formed, both among employer and employee organizations, gradually paving 
the way for a system of one enterprise-one collective agreement, but the process 
remains surrounded by controversy, particularly among employee organizations. 
The decentralization of organizational structures in the labour market from 
umbrella organizations to cartels has been paralleled by a decentralization of wage 
formation in the labour market. The point of balance of wage formation has moved 
away from the central organizations to the level of individual enterprises. At the same 
time there are clear limits to decentralization as the central employers organization 
attempts to control wage formation through decrees about maximum wage increases 
to its member enterprises. 
In this regard, the decentralization of wage formation has not increased wage 
flexibility discernibly. There has been little change in wage structures in recent years, 
and the relation between the unemployment rate and real wage growth remains very 
weak indeed. The Danish system of industrial relations thus holds few direct 
incentives for looking after the interests of the unemployed, as the system is 
constructed to allow for the articulation and aggregation of employed wage earners' 
interests. The risk that the Danish labour market will be characterized by an insider-
outsider problem is therefore inherent in the system, and real wage developments 
since 1987 appear to support the hypothesis on the existence of this insider-outsider 
problem. 
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The Tax System and Structural Unemployment 
The Danish tax system, which is characterized by a reliance on income tax and by 
high marginal income tax rates, among other things affects the supply of labour: High 
marginal income tax rates may limit labour supply as the marginal growth in 
disposable income earned through extra work is limited. However, decreases in the 
marginal income tax rates also correspond to an increase in hourly wages after tax. 
This may lead some to reduce their labour supply if they are content with their 
existing level of disposable income. 
In adopting the 1994 tax reform, which cut marginal income tax rates replacing 
lost revenue with a gross labour market tax to be paid by all persons in work and 
"green" resource consumption taxes, the centre-left coalition government counted on 
marginal tax rate cuts to increase labour supply. One of the wider objectives of this 
policy was to decrease the wage pressures of the economy and thereby limit 
structural unemployment. However, empirical data has revealed a limited potential for 
increasing labour supply through income tax cuts, as many other factors than pay 
clearly affect the decision among Danish employees to supply or not supply additional 
labour. 
At the same time, the 1994 tax reform exacerbated the problem of the 
unemployment trap: It has been demonstrated that the combination of high marginal 
income tax rates and high unemployment benefits for low income groups results in a 
less than optimal incentive structure for working in Denmark: For persons earning a 
gross wage less than DKK 160,000 per annum, the gain in disposable income moving 
from unemployment to employment is negligible. The unemployment trap was deepe-
ned with the tax reform of 1994. Thus, the introduction of a gross labour market tax of 
(from 1998) 8 per cent in effect serves as an 8 per cent tax on employment. 
On balance, it therefore seems doubtful whether recent Danish tax reforms 
have facilitated a reduction in structural unemployment. At best, the tax reforms have 
increased labour supply only marginally, at the same time exacerbating the 
unemployment trap problem. 
The Education System and the Functioning of the Labour Market 
The education system plays an important role in satisfying the labour market's 
demands for skilled and well-educated labour. Where the education system cannot 
supply persons with the right skills, the results are mismatches in the labour market: 
Above average unemployment for persons with certain skills and qualifications, 
shortages of persons with others. 
The Danish education system has produced a labour force with qualifications 
which to a relatively high extent match the needs of the labour market. The extent of 
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mismatch problems is limited. Indeed, analyses of the unemployment-vacancy 
relation for Denmark leads to the conclusion that the increase in unemployment since 
the mid-1970s cannot to any great extent be explained by increasing mismatch 
problems. However, one general problem of mismatch which is reflected in the unem-
ployment statistics is the above average unemployment rates for persons with little or 
no education. The disparity in unemployment risk between poorly educated persons 
and well-educated persons has increased over the last decade and is expected to 
continue to do so. In this connection, the most serious problem of the Danish 
education systems is seen to be the fact that about one out of three youth never 
completes an education that qualifies him or her for the labour market, even though a 
steadily increasing share of each form completes a higher education. A high drop-out 
rate from vocational training and education programmes has been identified as a 
problem. One reason may be an inadequate provision of courses for students who 
prefer practical issues. 
Although the quality of the Danish education system is generally assessed 
favourably, albeit on a weak basis of assessment, other problems have been 
emphasized in the education system's relation to the labour market. First of all, it is 
questionable whether adult and continuing education is targeted sufficiently precisely 
towards the needs of the labour market. In addition, much adult and continuing 
training is directed towards persons who are already well qualified, whereas fewer 
opportunities exist for persons with little or no education. The system of adult and 
continuing training may thus serve to widen the education gap with a large segment 
of the labour force being relatively well trained and another group with little or no 
education. 
Industrial Policies, Employment and Unemployment 
In relation to the functioning of the labour market, it is characteristic of Danish 
industrial policy that it has not been directed towards the preservation of jobs in 
threatened or declining industries to the same extent as other European countries. 
Rather, from its outset in traditional liberal, non-interventionist ideas, where the state 
intervened only minimally and non-selectively in order to facilitate business develop-
ment in a context of free international trade and negligible state ownership of 
manufacturing industries, industrial policies since the mid-1980s have become 
increasingly directed towards sector-specific technological development and product 
development programmes. 
Today, Danish industry policy - or business policy as it has been re-christened 
- aims to a high extent at capability development, i.e. development programmes to 
strengthen research, training and education and the provision of technological 
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services to private enterprises. By international comparison, however, the financial 
means available for business policy are limited. 
Recent trends in Danish business policy include a growing prioritization of 
support for entrepreneurs and of employment opportunities for persons with little 
education. In the Domestic Services scheme, which was introduced in 1994 as a 
business development initiative aiming to create a whole new business area, a state 
subisidy is provided to private households' purchases of domestic services. As 
opposed to similar schemes which have recently been introduced in France and 
Belgium, the Danish Domestic Services scheme does not involve the activation of 
unemployed persons. Rather, it is intended as a support scheme for the development 
of professionalized Domestic Services enterprises as a foundation for lasting regular 
employment of persons with little education. However, the number of persons 
employed in Domestic Services enterprises is low, 2,300 in June 1995, and the 
overall importance of the scheme for employment and unemployment is thus very 
limited. 
In attempting to create an overall indicator of the effects of Danish business 
policy, the Ministry of Business has constructed the "business policy success 
indicator", which measures a country's structural competitiveness, relating develop-
ments in relative wage costs to developments in OECD market shares for each 
country's exports. The business policy success indicator does not measure the 
effects of business policy on employment and unemployment. Rather it measures the 
extent to which competitiveness in the international markets is compatible with high 
wages. The business policy success indicator for Denmark has developed positively 
since the mid-1980s, indicating that Denmark has been able to hold on to or increase 
its market shares in spite of real wage levels above the OECD average. 
This suggests that there is scope for employment growth in the Danish 
economy, even if it is - realistically - assumed that there is a strong preference for 
high real wage levels among wage earners. Thus, high structural competitiveness in 
principle opens up the possibility that future real wage increases may be traded for 
employment growth while upholding a high level of real wages. 
The Future Direction of Policies Aimed to Lower Unemployment 
On most accounts, the policies which have been implemented in recent years are not 
realistically sufficient to lead to any major, lasting reducting in structural 
unemployment. Against this background, a further number of policy reforms are being 
discussed in Denmark presently. In particular, two strategies are being debated: A 
strategy which aims to further increase the productivity of the labour force, and a 
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strategy which aims to lower labour costs, in particular for low-skill low-productivity 
groups in the labour market. 
As for the first strategty, it aims to make employment of all categories of 
labour compatible with relatively high minimum wages through training and education. 
Thus, the Government and the labour movement continuously argues that a qualifica-
tions upgrade of the work force will reduce mismatch problems in the labour market 
and help the long-term unemployed gain stable employment. This strategy has the 
merit of being uncontroversial. The question is whether it is also a sufficient strategy 
to reduce structural unemployment to significantly lower levels. This has been 
disputed, as some segments of the work force cannot realistically be assumed to 
become so productive as to make them employable at the minimum wage, regardless 
of the amount of training they may receive. 
The second strategy aims to lower labour costs, either directly or indirectly. A 
direct lowering of minimum wages has been presented as an efficient way to increase 
the demand for low skill labour, but resistance to this proposal is fierce in the labour 
movement and the Social Demcratic Party. Furthermore, government economists 
have argued that a one per cent drop in structural unemployment requires an 
increase in wage differentials of 10-15 per cent, implying that a bigger reduction in 
structural unemployment would necessitate quite considerable wage reductions for 
low income groups. In addition, a lower minimum wage is difficult to enforce, as wage 
levels are a matter for collective agreements. 
A different solution which has been discussed is the introduction of tax reliefs 
for low income groups. It is argued that this would allow low-income labour to accept 
a relatively lower-paying job without losing real income. This will dampen wage 
demands throughout the labour market, in turn increasing the demand for labour. The 
problem of greater income disparities could therefore be avoided in this strategy. 
However, the lost revenue following from tax reliefs for low income groups will have to 
be compensated through significantly higher marginal income tax rates for higher 
income groups. This would be politically difficult to carry through. 
A final proposal which has been debated is the introduction of an employment 
tax allowance. This allowance will increase incentives for low income groups to work 
rather than receive unemployment benefits, thereby increasing the supply of labour 
among low income groups, leading to lower wage increase rates and stronger labour 
demand. However, as with the proposal for low income tax reliefs, considerable tax 
revenue would be lost and must be compensated through higher marginal tax rates 
for higher income brackets. 
It would appear that measures which aim to reduce labour costs share the 
feature that they are controversial. It follows that the most likely future course of 
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Danish policies aimed at lowering unemployment will be a continuation and perhaps a 
further development of those policy measures which have been implemented since 
1993: More and earlier activation of unemployed persons, perhaps further limits to 
unemployment benefit eligibility, and a continued reliance on training and education 
are likely to constitute the most important components. It remains to be seen whether 




This report concerns the Danish labour market and the functioning of the Danish 
labour market since 1980. It constitutes one of fifteen country labour market studies 
prepared for the European Commission's General Directorate for Employment, 
Industrial Relations and Social Affairs. The publication series aims to further the 
exchange of information on labour market policy and labour market practices between 
the Member States of the European Union and interested parties within the Member 
States. 
One problem has overshadowed all other problems of the Danish labour 
market throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s: The labour market has been 
characterized by persistent high levels of unemployment and its causes remains the 
main focus throughout the report. Danish unemployment is described in Chapter 2, 
and various prominent explanations for the high level of unemployment are presented 
and discussed. The second part of the chapter presents an overview of recent 
macroeconomic policies in Denmark and their consequences for employment and 
unemployment. 
There appears to be evidence that Danish unemployment is to a high extent 
the result of institutional characteristics of the Danish labour market. Historically, the 
nature of passive and active labour market policy has by most accounts contributed to 
structural unemployment. The same goes for the Danish system of industrial relations 
and of wage formation. 
Consequently, Chapter 3 describes and assesses Danish labour market policy 
in terms of institutions and passive and active policies. Particular attention is paid to 
recent developments which aim to reduce structural unemployment and registered 
unemployment. As for registered unemployment, three comprehensive leave 
schemes were introduced in 1994, creating possibilities for temporary withdrawal from 
the labour market for both employed and unemployed persons. When unemployed 
persons obtain leave, they are removed from the unemployment statistics. When 
employed persons obtain leave, the vacant positions thereby created are frequently 
filled with a person who was formerly registered as unemployed. The overall impact of 
the leave schemes has been a considerable reduction in registered unemployment. 
By most accounts, however, no lasting reduction in unemployment will result from the 
leave schemes. 
As for structural unemployment, a number of recent legislative changes aim to 
shorten the duration of unemployment benefit and provide for earlier activation of 
unemployed persons in subsidized employment schemes or training and education 
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programmes. This has been done with a view to lowering the duration of 
unemployment and preventing the related deterioration of skills. At the same time, 
possibilities for training and education of both employed and unemployed persons 
have been improved within the framework of Danish active labour market policies. 
These reforms have sought to decrease the risks of shortages of skilled labour in the 
labour market, and thereby to prevent an acceleration of wage increases to the 
detriment of both the competitiveness of business and employment levels. 
In Chapter 4 the system of industrial relations and wage formation is 
presented, also with a view to assessing the present system's consequences for 
employment and unemployment in Denmark, as the previous highly centralised 
system of organization and wage formation moves towards a higher degree of 
decentralization. So far, the decentralization of wage formation which has occurred 
since the 1980s has failed to bring about greater wage flexibility in the labour market, 
as the central employer organisation retains ultimate control with maximum wage 
increases. 
Chapter 5 contains a brief description and analysis of labour market legislation 
or regulation in Denmark as regards employment protection, the regulation of working 
time and minimum wage regulation. Again, a main focus is to assess the contribution 
of labour market regulation to employment and unemployment. The Danish labour 
market is characterized by a low level of legislative regulation and rather weak rules 
for employment protection. However, there is no evidence that liberal employment 
protection rules have affected employment significantly. 
In Chapter 6 the Danish tax system is described with a particular view to its 
effects on the supply of labour. The effects of the 1994 tax reform on labour supply is 
discussed, as is the "unemployment trap". The unemployment trap occurs where 
there are no incentives for unemployed persons in low-wage areas to obtain regular 
employment at the minimum wage level as their disposable income decreases with 
the move from unemployment to employment due to high income taxes and high 
unemployment benefits. 
Chapter 7 presents and assesses the Danish education system. Particular 
attention is given to the ability of the education system to meet the skills requirements 
of the labour market and the extent and nature of mismatch problems in the Danish 
labour market. The contents of recent Danish industrial policy is described and 
assessed in Chapter 8. Increasingly, focus in Danish industrial policy is on the 
strengthening of sectors where Danish enterprises already have a strong position, 
such as techology and product development programmes. Danish industial policy has 
thus avoided the defensive strategy of allocating substantial resources to the 
preservation of jobs in declining industries. On the contrary, Danish business policy in 
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recent years appears to have contributed to strong Danish structural competitiveness. 
This means that Denmark has retained international market shares in spite of high 
real wages. This opens up the possibility that future real wage growth may be traded 
for employment growth, even if high real wages are to be maintained. 
Finally, Chapter 9 sums up the overall direction of those Danish policies which 
are directed towards lowering unemployment. In the second part of the chapter, the 
most prominent proposals for further policy reforms aimed at lower unemployment are 
presented. The Danish debate in this respect is broadly in line with the overall 
European debate, as much attention is being paid to possible ways to reduce labour 
costs for low income groups, either by directly reducing minimum wages or by 
lowering income tax rates in the lowest wage brackets. 
In Appendix A, Β and C, a statistical description of the Danish labour market is 
provided. Appendix A describes changes in the size and structure of the population 
and the labour force from 1980. In Appendix B, the structure of the work force is 
described, in terms of the development of employment and unemployment in the 
period from 1980 to 1994. In Appendix C, nominal and real wage developments in the 
labour market in the 1980s and early 1990s are described for the different occupa­
tional groups. 
The report has been prepared by Jens Henrik Haahr of PLS Consult, 
Denmark, in cooperation with Associate Professor Peter Jensen, Centre for Labour 
Market Studies at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. Helle Ørsted Nielsen and Hans 
Henrik Hansen of PLS Consult also contributed to the preparation of the report. 
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2. Unemployment in Denmark 
In this chapter we analyze the development of Danish unemployment. The main 
emphasis is on the cyclical and structural components of unemployment, as we 
review and assess a number of possible explanations for the development of 
unemployment. A detailed descriptive analysis of Danish unemployment is found in 
Appendix B.2. 
In general, the period 1980-1996 has been characterized by high and 
persistent unemployment in Denmark. Cyclical variation in economic acticity resulted 
in a peak in 1983, where 10.3 per cent of the work force was registered as 
unemployed. From 1987 a gradual increase led to a record-high level of 
unemployment in 1993, with registered unemployment reaching 12.3 per cent. 
Recently, unemployment has started to decline again. 
Figure 2.1. The Unemployment Rate in Denmark, 1980-1996. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995, Monthly Review of Statistics 1996:3. 
On the one hand, it is characteristic of Danish unemployment that it is very 
widespread in the labour force. Temporary layoffs are quite common in Denmark, and 
they constitute 40 per cent of all unemployment spells and 16 per cent of total 
unemployment. The main reason for the high volume of temporary layoff 
unemployment is the unemployment insurance system, which in effect subsidizes this 
type of unemployment. 
On the other hand, unemployment is very concentrated on a small group of 
people: Women, young people, low-skilled workers, and those with very little or no 
education exhibit higher unemployment rates than other groups. The difference 
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between male unemployment and female unemployment increased significantly from 
1980 to 1986, and female unemployment has since then remained clearly higher than 
male unemployment. Since 1984, the unemployment rate of women has remained 2.5 
to 3 percentage points above that of men. This meant that for women the record 
unemployment rate in 1993 reached almost 14 per cent. 
Persons in the age groups 20-24 and 25-29 had the highest unemployment 
rate of all groups in the period 1990 to 1993, the unemployment rate in 1993 reaching 
16.5 per cent for 20-24 year olds and 17.3 per cent for 25-29 year olds. Persons with 
basic schooling only or vocational education experienced an unemployment rate of 
14.2 and 14.4 respectively in 1993. In contrast, the unemployment rates of persons 
with low, medium and high levels of education was between 4.9 and 6.7 per cent. The 
unemployment rate for blue collar workers is substantially higher than for other 
occupational groups. In addition, approximately 5.5 per cent of the work force were 
long-term unemployed (12 months or more) in 1993 and 1994. Thus, almost half of all 
unemployment may be considered long-term unemployment. Persons with basic 
schooling only are overrepresented in this group of long-term unemployed. 
Finally, it is characteristic of Danish unemployment that the unemployment 
rate of the 60-66 age group has been kept down artificially during the 1980s by an 
early retirement scheme. This indicates that there is a considerable amount of hidden 
unemployment. Recently this age group as well as the 55-59 age group have had a 
remarkable increase in unemployment rates. 
2.1. Unemployment and its Causes 1980-1995 
In this section, estimates of the structural rate of unemployment for Denmark are 
presented and discussed, and the most prominent possible explanations for the high 
and persistent structural unemployment in Denmark are analyzed: Deteriorating terms 
of trade since the first oil crisis, tight macroeconomic policies, real wage rigidity, the 
hysteresis phenomenon, the insider-outsider problem, a compressed wage structure, 
and skills deterioration among unemployed in connection with the long duration of 
unemployment benefits. 
2.1.1. Cyclical and Structural Unemployment 1980-1995 
As mentioned, the development of the unemployment rate over the period 1980-1995 
shows clear cyclical movements. The unemployment rate fell during the two cyclical 
upturns in the mid-1980s and from 1993 to the present. However, the overall picture 
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shows an upward trend in the level of unemployment, with the unemployment rate 
unable to return to the level attained in previous upswings. This development 
indicates that unemployment has become more persistent, or in other words that the 
structural rate of unemployment has increased over the period. 
This change in the character of Danish unemployment also means that the 
available policy measures addressing unemployment have changed. During the 
1980s it was realised that high unemployment was not merely a temporary cyclical 
phenomenon, but a permanent change in the level of unemployment. Hence, it has 
become widely agreed that the structural component of unemployment is high and 
that major reductions in unemployment cannot be obtained without structural policies. 
The initial rise in unemployment from 1980 was caused by the second oil price 
shock in 1979-1980 that had a highly unfavourable impact on the Danish economy. 
Unemployment increased until 1983 when the upswing caused it to start decreasing, 
at first slowly but from 1984 to 1986 with a rather sharp decline. As is described in 
detail in Appendix B.1 this was due to a very high growth in employment. 
The upswing in the mid-1980s was followed by overheating of the economy 
and shortages of skilled labour in specific segments of the labour market, with high 
wage inflation resulting. Private consumption also increased strongly, mainly as a 
result of a marked decline in long-term interest rates which caused house prices to go 
up. This overheating in the real estate market gave rise to a credit-financed increase 
in private consumption which, in turn, aggravated the balance of payments problems. 
During the period from 1988 to 1993 Denmark was hit by a deeper recession 
than at the international level. This was largely due to domestic economic policy, 
which was directed towards an improvement of the balance of payments. Economic 
policy was tightened with the purpose of decreasing private consumption and 
encouraging savings. Consequently, the economic growth was quite low in Denmark, 
resulting in increasing unemployment. 
The present cyclical upturn has prompted a fall in unemployment, from 1993 
first slowly since labour productivity increased instead of employment, but from 1994 
a large drop in unemployment occurred. The main reason behind this drop in 
unemployment is, however, a reduction in the size of the labour force due to the large 
number of persons temporarily taking part in active labour market measures or leave 
schemes. 
From 1980 and onwards, the cyclical movements in Denmark have been out 
of phase with international cyclical movements. The balance problems already 
present in 1980 might have been the main factors behind this shift in phases. The 
current upswing is characterized by the fact that the two imbalances that existed 
previously, inflation and the deficit on the balance of payments, had been removed 
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before the upswing started. It was partly spurred by an expansionary fiscal policy with 
an explicit goal of reducing unemployment. 
In summary, the development of unemployment shows cyclical movements 
but also a clear structural component, most clearly illustrated by the situation in 1986-
1987 when high wage inflation occurred although the level of unemployment was 
around 8 per cent. In addition, the upward trend in unemployment indicates that there 
is a problem of persistence of unemployment. 
2.1.2. Assessments of the Structural Rate of Unemployment in Denmark 
Structural unemployment has received considerable attention in Danish economic 
policy recently. Structural unemployment can be defined as the level of 
unemployment that is consistent with an unchanged wage and price inflation. The 
structural rate of unemployment reflects among other things the degree of mismatch 
between supply and demand for labour and the degree of relative wage flexibility 
between occupational groups and regions. 
If actual unemployment is reduced below the structural rate of unemployment, 
then there will be an upward pressure on wage and price inflation. In a fixed-
exchange rate system, as in Denmark, this will cause a deterioration of compe-
titiveness, resulting in increased unemployment which reduces the inflationary 
pressure. The structural rate of unemployment thus reflects an equilibrium level of 
unemployment. 
Definitions of Structural Unemployment 
The structural rate of unemployment cannot be measured directly, but an indicator has 
to be estimated based on the development of actual unemployment and wage and 
price inflation. There are several definitions of an indicator for the structural 
unemployment. One basic assumption relates to the formation of expectations about 
the inflation. 
At present, the Ministry of Finance (1995) uses two different definitions for the 
estimation of the structural unemployment: NAIRU (Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment) and ITRU (Inflation Target Rate of Unemployment). 
Binder (1994) uses a slightly more advanced definition of structural unemployment that 
also takes into account the open economy restriction implied by trade balance. His 
definition of structural unemployment is thus that level of unemployment that is 
consistent with trade balance and unchanged inflation. 
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Estimates of Structural Unemployment in Denmark 
Available estimates of the structural unemployment rate (from OECD and the Ministry 
of Finance) indicate that this is as high as between 8 and 10 per cent in 1994. The 
implication of these estimates is that any attempt to reduce unemployment below this 
level will lead to increasing inflation unless it is combined with structural policies that 
increase wage flexibility and reduce other structural problems in the labour market. 
This is widely recognized in economic policy in Denmark. Inflation in Denmark has 
been almost constant since 1990 around 2-2.5 per cent. 
Structural employment defined as the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unmployment, NAIRU, was almost constant around 8 per cent during the 1980s. 
During the beginning of the 1980s the NAIRU was thus significantly lower than actual 
unemployment. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the NAIRU 
increased to almost 11 per cent, but it decreased to 10 per cent in 1994. The ITRU 
has only been calculated by the Ministry of Finance for the period from 1987 and it 
has been rather constant around a level of 9 per cent. 
An analysis by the OECD (1990) supports this view in its estimate of the 
NAIRU for Denmark. This structural rate of unemployment has been steadily 
increasing ever since the mid-1970s, while the actual unemployment rate has not 
exceeded the NAIRU by more than a few percentage points. In fact, the results show 
that the NAIRU was higher than the actual unemployment rate in 1985-1987. During 
this period considerable mismatch problems occurred in the Danish labour market, 
leading to bottle-neck problems and overheating despite an unemployment rate as 
high as 8 per cent. Much of Denmark's unemployment is thus structural and frictional 
in its nature. 
The OECD survey observes that high structural unemployment can obviously 
have many causes. It is pointed out, for instance, that the unemployment measure 
includes temporary layoffs (as a result of the structure of the unemployment insu-
rance system), that a compressed wage structure and the unemployment insurance 
system result in an uneven distribution of unemployment across skill and educational 
categories, and that the general wage level is a factor behind the high unemployment 
level. 
The analysis by Binder (1994) shows that structural unemployment (consistent 
with trade balance) has been below actual unemployment since the beginning of the 
1980s. This indicates that traditional macroeconomic policy may be able to reduce 
unemployment without creating balance problems. The size of this reduction is 
estimated to be around 2-3 percentage points. Since the end of the 1980s this leeway 
has instead been exploited to build up a surplus on the trade balance. The analysis 
also points to a number of factors behind the increase in structural unemployment. 
25 
Since the mid-1960s the main factor has been the change in terms of trade caused by 
the two oil price shocks. In addition, the international real interest rate and the 
increase in the compensation level of the unemployment insurance benefits have also 
contributed to the increase in the structural unemployment. The tax system has not 
played any role in the increasing structural unemployment. 
The Unemployment-Vacancy Relation 
Another indication of the type of change that occurred during the 1980s can be 
obtained by considering the UV-curve. This curve shows the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the vacancy rate. Since the vacancy rate may be regarded as 
an indicator of aggregate demand, the curve can be used to distinguish between 
cyclical and structural variations in the unemployment rate. Movements along the 
curve are traditionally interpreted as representing cyclical variations, whereas shifts in 
the curve may be taken as an indication of structural changes in the labour market. 
Jackman et al. (1990) present UV-curves for most of the OECD countries. For 
Denmark their figures show that an outward shift occurred in its UV-curve during the 
1980s.1 It is remarkable, however, that the vacancy rate is much lower in Denmark 
than in the other OECD countries, including the other Nordic countries. The low 
vacancy rate suggests that the high unemployment is to some extent due to adverse 
demand shocks, but at the same time the shift in the UV-curve for Denmark suggests 
that part of the increased unemployment of the 1980s was due to structural factors 
that have caused a growing mismatch in the labour market.2 
2.1.3. Real Wage Rigidity 
The Economic Council (1995) points out that the real wage increases in the 1990s 
have been higher than the increases in the late 1970s even though the level of 
unemployment has almost doubled since then.3 Increases in real wages do not seem 
to be very sensitive to a high level of unemployment. 
A number of macroeconomic studies have analyzed the causes behind the 
high and persistent unemployment in Denmark. Andersen and Overgaard (1990) 
present results which point to a high growth rate in wages as an explanation of the 
high unemployment rates. Andersen and Risager (1990) conclude that unemployment 
' We return to the Unemployment-Vacancy relation in Chapter 7 below in connection with the 
demand and supply of skills in the Danish labour market. 
2 As was also noted by Jackman et al. (1990), there are several problems in measuring 
vacancies, and these may at least partly explain the low level of the vacancy rate in Denmark 
in comparison with the other countries. 
3 The Economic Council is an independent, government financed, advisory board of econo-
mists. 
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exerts little pressure on wages, which in their view supports an explanation of the 
high unemployment as a result of wage rigidities.4 Wage rigidities are again to a high 
degree attributed to the unemployment insurance system. 
A model of the Danish economy has been developed in a recent study 
(Economic Council, 1990). The analysis of this model shows that a permanent rise in 
employment requires structural policy measures, such as measures to increase 
labour market flexibility. Greater flexibility means a greater responsiveness to 
unemployment in wage formation. Furthermore, an improved international wage 
competitiveness will have significantly positive employment effects, and will thus bring 
about a reduction in unemployment. However, a lasting effect again requires greater 
labour market flexibility, for instance by creating stronger incentives to reduce wage 
claims in the wage bargaining. The consequences of this would be that those already 
employed would experience a fall in their real wage, while the unemployed who get 
work would experience a rising real wage. This illustrates that the problem of labour 
market flexibility is of an insider-outsider nature. 
2.1.4. Hysteresis - the Persistence of Unemployment 
The development of unemployment in Denmark over the last 15 years shows 
symptoms of the phenomenon which has been called "hysteresis". This refers to the 
situation whereby persistent unemployment occurs because adverse shocks on 
unemployment have very prolonged effects. In other words current unemployment is 
highly dependent on past unemployment. 
The dynamics and the concentration of unemployment in Denmark points to 
an insider-outsider explanation of the hysteresis phenomenon, cf. Blanchard and 
Summers (1986). When wage negotiations are limited to employers and insiders, and 
the insiders disregard the question of outsider employment, temporary shocks can 
have permanent effects on the level of unemployment. Adverse demand shocks will 
swell the numbers of outsiders, but the reduced insider corps will ignore this in the 
wage bargaining process, thereby giving rise to hysteresis. This could explain why the 
structural rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, has been increasing along with the actual 
unemployment rate.5 In this connection, the degree of unionization and the size of 
government are factors that tend to increase persistence in economies lacking a 
centralized structure of wage bargaining, seems to be relevant for Denmark during 
the 1980s (Barro, 1988). As it is described in more detail in Chapter 4, wage 
4 However, they are unable to rule out the possibility that the demand for labour is insensitive to 
changes in wages. 
5 However, Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988) point instead to persistence in wage aspirations 
and a slow rate of adjusting employment as the main sources of persisting unemployment. 
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bargaining in Denmark became less centralized during the 1980s, which may have 
contributed to the persistence of unemployment. 
The persistence effects may also have arisen as a result of various other 
mechanisms. One explanation which cannot be ruled out in the Danish case is that 
the persistence of unemployment is due to skill deterioration among the long-term 
unemployed. The very concentrated distribution of unemployment in Denmark is 
consistent with a more or less permanent mismatch between the capabilities and 
desires of workers and the available employment opportunities. The passive labour 
market policy of the late 1970s and early 1980s may have led to a depreciation of 
human capital among the long-term unemployed, thereby becoming responsible for 
hysteresis effects. The persistence of unemployment may also have been encou-
raged by signalling and sorting effects of long-term unemployment or by changes in 
the job search behaviour of the long-term unemployed. A major factor underpinning 
all these explanations is the long duration of benefits in Denmark. During the 1980s 
this allowed the unemployed to receive unemployment insurance benefits for an 
almost indefinite period (in combination with participation in various employment pro-
grammes). 
2.1.5. Other Explanations of the Rise in Unemployment 
Several other possible explanations have been suggested for the high and persistent 
unemployment in Denmark during the 1980s.6 As mentioned, and as is demonstrated 
in detail in Appendix B, Danish unemployment is unevenly distributed across various 
labour market categories, just as it is concentrated to a relatively small group of 
people. The labour force is thus divided into a dominant group of insiders who 
practically never experience unemployment, and a smaller group of outsiders with a 
much higher risk of unemployment. This split in the Danish labour market means that 
during wage negotiations there is little or no incentive for the dominant group of 
insiders to consider the effects of their high wage claims on the smaller, weaker group 
of outsiders. 
Furthermore, because of the way the unemployment insurance system is 
financed, the cost of marginal unemployment is borne not by the labour market 
participants but by the State. This means that any additional costs (in terms of 
unemployment insurance benefits) caused by increased unemployment are 
completely financed by the State through its general tax-revenue. Hence, the labour 
market participants may ignore these costs during wage bargaining. 
6 A discussion and analysis of the structural problems in the Danish labour market including a 
detailed analysis of the explanations offered below is provided by Jensen et al. (1992). 
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The outsider group consists mainly of unskilled and low-skilled workers, many 
of whom are women or young people. One of the main reasons for this is the 
compressed wage structure, which does not allow differences in productivity to be 
reflected in wage differences, and especially not for the low-skill and low-education 
levels. 
The compressed wage structure is a consequence of a number of institutional 
elements in the Danish labour market including the minimum wage and the 
unemployment insurance system, and of the wage bargaining process during the 
1960s and 1970s. During this period the labour unions adopted a wage policy of 
solidarity specifically with a view to reducing wage differences. As will also be shown 
in Chapter 3, the compensation structure of the unemployment insurance system has 
contributed to the compressed wage structure, since benefits are relatively more 
valuable to the lowest paid workers. This wage effect of the unemployment insurance 
system has been empirically demonstrated in the analysis of the wage formation in 
Denmark (Andersen and Risager, 1990).7 
2.1.6. Conclusions and Assessments 
In sum, several possible explanations have been suggested for the high and 
persistent unemployment in Denmark during the 1980s: 
• Deteriorating terms of trade. Since the mid-1970s one important cause of 
unemployment has been the change in terms of trade caused by the two oil price 
shocks. 
• Macroeconomic policies. Structural unemployment (consistent with trade balance) 
has been below the actual unemployment since the beginning of the 1980s. This 
indicates that traditional macroeconomic policy may be able to reduce 
unemployment without creating balance problems. Since the end of the 1980s this 
leeway has instead been exploited to build up a surplus on the trade balance. 
• Real wage rigidity where a high growth rate in wages explain the high 
unemployment rates. Thus, the equilibrating forces between unemployment and 
wage growth rates appears to be weak in Denmark. 
• An insider-outsider problem, where the labour force is thus partitioned between a 
dominant group who practically never experience unemployment, and a smaller 
group with a much higher risk of unemployment. This split means that during wage 
7 Andersen and Hylleberg (1993) test whether insider-outsider effects can be found in the wage 
formation and the employment relation for Denmark. They are not able to reject the existence 
of insider-outsider effects. 
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negotiations there is little incentive for the dominant group to consider the effects 
of their high wage claims on the smaller, weaker group of outsiders. A more 
decentralized wage formation structure may have contributed to this problem 
during the 1980s. 
• A compressed wage structure, where wage levels do not correspond to 
productivity levels for some categories of unskilled and low-skilled workers, 
causing high unemployment for these groups. 
• A self-perpetuating persistence of unemployment (hysteresis) due to skill 
deterioration among the long-term unemployed. This skill deterioration may again 
be ascribed to the passive labour market policy of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
to signalling and sorting effects of long-term unemployment or to changes in the 
job search behaviour of the long-term unemployed. A major factor behind all these 
explanations is the long duration of unemployment benefits in Denmark. 
No single explanation can account for all aspects of unemployment, and it is very 
difficult to draw any definite conclusions about the reasons for the Danish 
unemployment experience. Furthermore, the explanations above are to a very high 
extent complementary and not competing explanations. 
In conclusion, it is clear that some structural problems do exist in the Danish 
labour market and that they play a significant role in explaining the high and 
persistent unemployment. Aggregate demand shocks also play a part in explaining 
the rise in unemployment, but since NAIRU has also increased they cannot be the 
whole story. There seems to be a propagation mechanism whereby the shocks of the 
past have a lasting impact. However, in light of the conflicting evidence and the 
uncertainty of any conclusions which can be drawn, it is not possible to give any 
definite answers about the mechanisms which are responsible for the persistence of 
unemployment in Denmark. Even though much remains unexplained, it seems 
warranted to conclude that two of the most important factors in explaining Denmark's 
adverse unemployment experience are insider-outsider effects and the long duration 
of benefits. 
2.2. Macroeconomic Policies and Forecasts 
During the last 10-15 years macroeconomic policy has succeeded in fulfilling two 
major goals: Reducing inflation to a very low level and creating a surplus on the 
current account. Public finances have also been improved, whereas the price for 
reaching these goals has been a high and persistent unemployment. This section 
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takes a closer look at macroeconomic policies with a special view towards the impact 
on the labour market. 
2.2.1. Current Macroeconomic Policies in Denmark 
In recent years macroeconomic policy has been characterized by an expansionary 
fiscal policy in order to ignite the recovery and reduce unemployment after the long 
recession. Both in 1993 and in 1994 fiscal policy was eased, but it is now gradually 
being tightened. In 1995 the contractionary effects were around 0.25 per cent of GDP 
and in 1996 it is forecast according to the budget agreement to be 0.5 per cent of 
GDP. The Government's aim is to continue the tightening in 1997. The Government 
expects the current low growth rate to be only temporary and it expects a revival 
during late 1996. 
It is a declared target of fiscal policy that the budget should be balanced in 
1997, and thereafter it should be well in surplus such that the public debt can be 
reduced. The Government wants the public debt to be removed around 2010-2015. 
This should, among other things, be seen in relation to the increased burden that can 
be expected from ageing of the population (see appendix A). 
The Government has defined the current challenge for macroeconomic policy 
in Denmark to be to create high employment growth, while at the same time keeping 
inflation low, reducing the public and foreign debts, and retaining a socially acceptable 
income distribution. 
It is realized that there is a trade-off between continued reductions in 
unemployment and consolidation of public finances, and this trade-off might become 
more important if the moderate international growth does not pick up again in the near 
future. There is a clear recognition of the need to engage in structural reforms in 
product and labour markets, with the purpose of easing this trade-off, and thus paving 
the road ahead for simultaneous improvements in unemployment and public fiscal 
balances. 
The 1996 budget agreement also contains measures aimed at ensuring more 
flexibility in the labour market and reducing structural unemployment. Several of the 
specific elements of these labour market initiatives are described in more detail in 
Chapter 3. The Government expects these measures together with the 1994 labour 
market reform to bring down the level of structural unemployment from estimated 
above 10 per cent in 1993 to 8-8.5 per cent in 1997. The long-term goal is a level of 
structural unemployment around 5 per cent. 
The main purposes of the monetary policy are to maintain a stable exchange 
rate vis-a-vis the EU core currencies and a low inflation. The Danish Central Bank has 
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continuously been lowering short-term official interest rates during the last years. This 
is a consequence of the strong inclination to maintain short-term interest rates at a 
level that is consistent with the exchange rate objective. In practice, the DM is used 
as the anchor currency, which means that changes in the German interest rate are 
followed closely by the Central Bank. However, an interest rate differential remains 
between Denmark and Germany. 
During the first half of 1995 the Danish krone first weakened, due to unrest in 
the international markets, and then strengthened again as a consequence of the 
monetary policy geared towards maintenance of a stable exchange rate. The real 
appreciation of the Danish krone in 1995 is an important factor behind the dampening 
in economic growth. So far, no tendencies have been discovered for inflation to 
increase. 
2.2.2. Macroeconomic Targets in Relation to the EMU Criteria 
Denmark has decided not to participate in the third stage of Economic and Monetary 
Union and has notified the EU about this decision. Nevertheless, the Danish 
Government strongly relies on the underlying principles of the convergence criteria to 
create a healthy economic situation. Macroeconomic targets are to a very high 
degree set according to the EMU criteria. The Government thus pursues a macro-
economic policy of fiscal discipline and exchange rate stability. 
In 1995 Denmark already satisfied most of the EMU criteria: low inflation, low 
interest rates, stable exchange rates, and near-balance on the public budget. The 
main problem for Denmark is the EMU criterion on public debt which was not met. 
Inflation is around 2 per cent which satisfies the EMU criterion. The 
Government expects inflation to remain at this level in the coming years. Its view is 
that the structural improvements in the labour market and the temporary growth 
pause have removed the risk that actual unemployment will fall below the structural 
employment, hence no inflationary pressure will build up. Regarding interest rates and 
the exchange rate, the EMU criteria are also satisfied and the monetary and fiscal 
policies are expected to be able to maintain this situation. 





















Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995, Ministry of Finance 1995b. 
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Denmark already satisfies the convergence criterion on the public budget, with a 
deficit of 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1995 and an expected deficit of 1.0 per cent in 1996. 
However, the Government does not view fulfilment of the convergence criteria for the 
public budget as sufficient for the desired long-term development in the public debt. 
Fiscal policy should be designed to provide a surplus in public finances on average 
over the business cycle, as a prerequisite for reducing the public debt.8 
Figure 2.2.2. Required Development in the General Government Budget Surplus 
as Percentage of GDP, 1988 to 2005. 
1988 
-Overall surplus of general government as percentage of GDP 
Source: Ministry of Finance: Finansredegørelsen 1995. 
The public debt has decreased from 80 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 72 per cent of 
GDP in 1995. To satisfy the EMU criterion on public debt will require a tight fiscal 
policy in the coming years (similar to what is the case for many other EU countries). 
The tightening of fiscal policy in 1996 is planned to be 0.5 per cent of GDP. The 
Government expects the public debt to be reduced to 60 per cent of GDP around the 
year 2000. In order to achieve this reduction, substantial public sector budget 
improvements are necessary. Figure 2.2.2 shows the required public sector balance 
8 In June 1996 the EU Council of Minsisters reversed its previous decision that Denmark was 
running an excessive public deficit and had an excessive public debt quote. 
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as a percentage of GDP if public debt is to be reduced to 60 per cent of GDP by year 
2000. 
2.2.3. The Impact of Present Macroeconomic Policies on Employment 
The Government realizes (expressed e.g. by the budget report from the Ministry of 
Finance (1995)) that in the years to come continued increases in employment can 
primarily be attained through structural reforms on the labour market. 
The main target of fiscal policy is to reduce public sector borrowing 
requirements. The tightening of the fiscal policy for 1996 was planned to bring about a 
reduction in the public deficit, but due to the drop in domestic and foreign growth rates 
the Economic Council now forecasts a growth in the public deficit from 1995 to 1996. 
The deficit is, however, expected to decrease in 1997 and 1998 as an increase in 
growth will lead to growing tax income. 
The Economic Council has criticized the Government for not exploiting the 
reasonably high growth rates in the Danish economy during 1993-1995 to improve 
public balances sufficiently. It also finds the situation further aggravated by an 
increase in the structural deficit (i.e. the part of the deficit not depending on cyclical 
variations), due to the temporary Leave Schemes being made permanent. 
According to the most recent forecasts by the Economic Council (1996), 
Denmark is expected to have an output growth of 0.9 per cent in 1996 and 2.2 per 
cent in 1997, the fall from growth of 2.6 per cent in 1995 to 0.9 per cent in 1996 being 
explained by both a drop in the growth rate of domestic demand and a drop in 
international demand. The current account surplus is expected virtually to evaporate 
by 1998 due to sluggish international demand. 
The Economic Council expects employment to decrease slightly in 1996 and 
grow moderately in 1997 and 1998. In 1996 private sector employment will decrease, 
but public sector employment will expand slightly due an expected normalization of 
labour market job training in the public sector, which suffered a temporary setback at 
the introduction of the Labour Market reform in 1994.9 Registered unemployment will 
continue to decrease in 1996, but only as a result of labour market measures such as 
the Leave Schemes and Job Training, and remain unchanged in 1997 and 1998. 
The labour force is forecast to decrease in 1996 due to the labour market 
measures and increase in 1997 and 1998, with the main explanation being that a 
'J It now seems doubtful whether the expected rise in public job training will materialise in 1996. 
This is due to delays and administrative problems in the implementation of the new pool-job 
scheme, cf. section 3.3. 
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decreasing number of persons will participate in the Leave Schemes, (see further 
below in Chapter 3 regarding the Leave Schemes). 
The Labour Movement's Enterprise Council (AER) also expects the increase 
in employment to level off at the 1995 level. The main reason behind this is the low 
international growth rates, especially those of the main trade partners, which will 
cause exports to stagnate. It rules out the balanced budget in 1997 as unrealistic, but 
expects the goal to be reached instead in 1998. 
2.2.4. Forecasts for Employment and Unemployment 
The Government has presented a medium-term forecast for the period until the year 
2000 as part of the convergence programme for Denmark. It assumes that the 
structural reforms being implemented in Denmark are sufficient to reduce structural 
unemployment at a faster or, at least, the same rate as the reduction in actual 
unemployment. As a result, wage inflation in Denmark will be below foreign wage 
inflation. In addition, the forecast assumes that the participation rate increases during 
the projection period by 2 percentage points per year to a level of around 79 per cent 
by the year 2000. This is consistent with previous experiences and labour market 
measures implemented in the budget agreement for 1996. 
Economic growth is expected to be slightly below 3 per cent per year during 
the period 1998-2000. Employment is expected to grow at an annual rate of 1 per 
cent. As a consequence, unemployment will fall to 7 per cent of the labour force by 
2000. 
The budget report from 1995 (Ministry of Finance; 1995) presents a scenario 
for long-term development until 2005. It is stressed, however, that it should not be 
regarded as a prognosis. Rather, it spells out the targets for the economic policy over 
the next 10 years. It is very ambitious and entails a highly favourable development 
characterized by high growth and low inflation. Unemployment is reduced, public 
finances are improved to a surplus, public debt is reduced significantly, the current 
account surplus is retained, and foreign debt is paid off. Figure 2.2.4 below shows the 
yearly unemployment according to the Ministry of Finance in this scenario. 
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Note: The Ministry of Finance expects labour force participation to rise from 78.7 per cent to 83.0 per cent in 2005. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 1995b. 
The scenario implies that the employment frequency should increase from around 70 
per cent of the population in the age group 15­66 years in 1995 to almost 79 per cent 
in 2005. This will be 5 percentage points higher than the historically highest level, of 
74.3 per cent in 1987. Unemployment will be reduced to 7 per cent in 2000 and to 5 
per cent in 2005, the lowest level since 1975. 
2.2.5. Conclusions 
Current macroeconomic policies in Denmark are primarily targeted at reducing 
unemployment and balancing the public budget, while at the same time keeping 
inflation low and the exchange rate stable. The Danish economy has over the last few 
years been characterized by a strong improvement in public finances and unemploy­
ment has been falling, partly as a result of the measures to reduce labour supply, but 
also reflecting increases in employment. Recenty, however, the continued improve­
ment in public finances and employment, have paused due to sluggish domestic and 
international demand. Short­term forecasts show in general that employment will start 
to increase again in 1997 and 1998. 
It is widely agreed that to maintain the observed improvement in economic 
performance, further efforts are necessary. Especially the need for ensuring the 
implementation of structural reforms in product and labour markets is important to 
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reduce structural unemployment. The budget agreement for 1996 is a step in this 
direction. As will be described in more detail in Chapter 3.3, it introduces changes in 
the institutional set-up of the labour market and presumably contains some of the 
elements needed to reduce structural unemployment considerably. If implemented 
efficiently, it will improve the structures of the labour market and reduce structural 
unemployment in the long run. 
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3. Labour Market Policies 
This chapter describes and assesses recent Danish labour market policies. Danish 
labour market policy has undergone significant changes during the past few years. 
Decentralization and needs-orientation were the core elements in the Labour Market 
Reform (Arbejdsmarkedsreformen) of 1993. Both the formulation and the implemen-
tation of labour market policies were decentralized, and a greater scope was intro-
duced for individual considerations in the activation of unemployed. At the same time, 
three comprehensive leave schemes were launched, making it possible for both 
employed and unemployed persons to obtain leave for educational or child care 
purposes, just as employed persons could obtain a sabbatical leave period. 
In section 3.1 the Labour Market Reform is placed in a wider context. What were 
the most important elements in the reform and how did it change earlier principles of 
labour market policy? Section 3.2 provides a description of the most important 
institutions of public Danish labour market policy after the Labour Market Reform. 
Section 3.3 presents the nature of passive and active labour market measures, 
respectively. 
In the final section of the chapter, Danish labour market policies after the Labour 
Market Reform are assessed. As we see it, there have been two important objectives 
of the Labour Market Reform and the other labour market measures which have been 
introduced since 1993: To reduce registered unemployment and to reduce structural 
unemployment. To what extent have these objectives been fulfilled in 1994 and 1995? 
As described in section 2.1 above, the Danish labour market is characterized by 
several structural problems. Danish unemployment is to a high extent structural 
unemployment. In the assessment, the question of contribution of labour market 
policy to a reduction of structural unemployment is therefore crucial. 
3.1. The Historical Development of Danish Labour Market Policy 
The Labour Market Reform of 1993 was an imporant new beginning in Danish labour 
market policy. Both in its form and in its contents the reform differed from earlier 
labour market legislation. Furthermore, since its adoption in 1993, the Labour Market 
Reform has itself undergone significant changes. 
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3.1.1. Labour Market Policies until 1993 
Labour market policy measures until 1993 can be characterized by the following 
features: 
Danish Labour Market Policy before the Labour Market Reform 
Detailed rule-bound regulation of all labour market activation measures and the 
activities of the Public Labour Exchange. 
A de facto gradual growth in the duration of benefit entitlement periods. Prior to 
1994, the maximum duration of benefits was 9 years when taking into account all 
available activation and benefit programmes, cf. section 3.3.1 below. 
Incremental extension of the scope of subsidized employment schemes aimed at 
the prevention of long-term unemployment. 
Gradual extension of the scope of education offers for unemployed in which 
unemployed persons are trained or educated while receiving an allowance 
correponding to the unemployment benefit. 
Incremental extension of measures subsidizing exit from the labour market: the 
Post Employment Wage and the Transition Benefit Scheme. 
A persistent link between activation offers for unemployed and unemployment 
benefit entitlements. Unemployed renewed their benefit entitlements through 
participation in activation measures. In effect, this often meant that activation 
measures had a "passive" nature. 
In 1971 the first subsidized employment projects were introduced. In 1978 the job-
offer scheme (Arbejdstilbudsordningen) was initiated. In this scheme, the unemployed 
who were about to lose their benefit entitlements were given the right to a subsidized 
job offer of at least 9 months duration (7 months in public sector). In 1983, the 
unemployed were given the right to a second job offer. Education allowance schemes 
for the unemployed were introduced in 1984 to supplement the job offer schemes, 
only to be extended in 1985. In 1988 the education offer scheme 
(Uddannelsestilbudsordningen) introduced a general entitlement for long term 
unemployed to an education offer after the first subsidized job offer (Ingerslev, 1995: 
86-90). 
The Post Employment Wage scheme, which is an early retirement scheme 
allowing both unemployed and employed persons to retire at the age of 60, was 
introduced in 1979. From 1992 to 1995 it was supplemented by the Transition Benefit 
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Scheme which allowed long-term unemployed to enter an early retirement scheme at 
the age of 55, from 1993 from the age of 50. 
The incremental extension of active labour market measures, the rule-bound 
nature of unemployed persons' rights to activation, and the link between activation 
and benefit entitlements had a number of unfortunate effects. First, since the activa-
tion the of unemployed was rule-bound, there was little scope for interaction between 
activation of the unemployed and the functioning of the labour market: Activation of 
the unemployed could not be used flexibly, for instance to prevent shortages of skilled 
labour or build up reserves of skilled labour. Furthermore, there was little scope for 
regional variations in labour market policies. The rule bound nature of activation also 
meant that concerns for the individual needs of the unemployed played only a minor 
role in the decision on the type and duration of activation. 
Third, the link between activation and benefit entitlements had as a consequence 
that activation took place only after a long period of unemployment, thereby in effect 
increasing the risks of long term unemployment. Fourth, the link meant that focus in 
the activation of unemployed more than the employment effects of activation was the 
prolongation of the benefit entitlement period. 
3.1.2. The Labour Market Reform of 1993 
Against this background, the Labour Market Reform of 1993 was presented as a 
comprehensive and highly prioritized reform and a key element in the Government's 
highly ambitious overall reform package which was presented immediately after the 
2nd Danish referendum on the Treaty on European Union.10 The Labour Market 
Reform consisted of the following main elements: 
'"The reform package's various labour market measures were directed towards the supply side 
of the labour market. Other measures, first of all a more expansionary fiscal policy, were 
directed towards the demand side of the labour market. 
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Key Elements in the Labour Market Reform 
The Management Reform 
• Decentralization of authority to 14 Regional Labour Market Councils regarding 
the identification of target groups of unemployed for early activation, guidelines for 
activation instruments, guidelines for the Public Employment Service's provision 
of labour and approval of projects preventing labour shortages. 
• Increased importance of the labour market parties, counties and municipalities in 
the formulation of labour market policy, though their representation in the 
Regional Labour Market Councils. 
• The introduction of framework budgetting and management by objectives in the 
decentralized management system. The National Labour Market Council specifies 
the Regional Council's objectives and result requirements. The Labour Market 
Authority allocates a budget frame to each region. 
The Activation Reform 
• Each unemployed person's right to a binding individual action plan, directed 
towards the needs of the unemployed and the requirements of the labour market. 
• The possibility of early activation of those unemployed with a particularly high risk 
of becoming long-term unemployed. 
• The possibility of establishing individually adapted activation programmes. The 
Employment Service can choose between a range of activation measures for 
each unemployed person. Different measures may be combined. 
• The abolishment of the link between activation and unemployment entitlement 
rights. Unemployed cannot prolong the entitlement period through participation in 
activation measures. 
The key elements in the Labour Market Reform are thus decentralization and needs-
orientation. In place of the earlier rule-bound system, where job-offers and education 
offers had to be provided to each unemployed at specific intervals according to 
specified rules, it was intended to enable more flexible and tailor-suit activation 
measures for the unemployed. At the same time the reform sought to enhance the 
legitimacy and anchoring of the labour market policy at the regional level, as well as 
to improve the utilization of the knowledge of the labour market parties in the 
formulation of regional labour market policies. The instrument in this respect was 
decentralization of authority to the 14 newly established Regional Labour Market 
Councils. (Winter, Haahr and Ørberg 1995: 37-38). 
The underlying assumption was that these measures would improve the 
efficiency of labour market policy and thereby contribute to a reduction of structural 
unemployment: Faster activation of a higher quality would reduce long-term 
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unemployment and the related deterioration of skills among long-term unemployed. 
And decentralization and a more flexible activation system would reduce inflationary 
pressures of the economy, as shortages of skilled labour would be prevented more 
efficiently. 
The reform of Danish labour market policies in 1993 was supplemented with the 
introduction of three comprehensive leave schemes: The Child Care Leave Scheme, 
the Educational Leave Scheme and the Sabbatical Leave Scheme. The leave 
schemes should be seen as elements in the Government's overall labour market 
policy, as their principal aim was to reduce registered unemployment through a 
reduction in the supply of labour." Registered unemployment should fall as employed 
persons took leave and left a vacant job position behind them, hopefully to be filled by 
substitute labour.12 Since the Child Care Leave Scheme and the Educational Leave 
Scheme are available for unemployed persons, registered unemployment should also 
decrease as unemployed persons were "re-classified" as persons on leave. 
As another effect, the leave schemes could contribute to the reduction of long-
term unemployment as the number of job-openings in the labour market would 
increase, depending on the degree to which employers would employ substitute 
labour. 
In addition, the Educational Leave Scheme should serve the purpose of 
upgrading the qualifications of the labour force. An upgrade of the qualifications of the 
work force would take place directly when employed persons were granted 
Educational Leave. It would also take place through "learning by doing" as 
unemployed persons are employed as substitute labour. Where the unemployed are 
employed as substitute labour in subsidized "job training", a Job Rotation project has 
been established. 
3.1.3. Changes in Danish Labour Market Policy 1994-1995 
The Labour Market Reform was revised in certain respects already in December 1994 
and more comprehensively in December 1995. The revisions were motivated by the 
strength of the economic upswing in 1994 which created a new situation in the labour 
market where shortages of skilled labour were threatening and by experiences with 
the functioning of the Labour Market Reform during its first years (Haahr and Winter, 
1996: 108-110). 
11 Some parts of the Government have also stressed the importance of the leave schemes as 
welfare benefits for the population. 
12 For the Child Care Leave and the Educational Leave, it is not required that the employer 
hires a substitute during the leave period, cf. section 3.3.1 below. 
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Main Changes in Labour Market Policy 1994-1995 
• In 1994 it was specified that persons having been unemployed for more than 4 
years had a right and duty to full-time activation. 
• Earlier activation of unemployed. When revisions are fully implemented in 1998 un-
employed will have the right and duty to full-time activation after 2 years of 
unemployment. 
• Reduction of the benefit period to a maximum of 5 years (plus the possibility of 1 
year of Child Care Leave for parents). 
• The doubling to 52 weeks of full-time work of the period required to aquire 
unemployment entitlements. 
• The introduction of a right and duty to training or education for unskilled unem-
ployed persons below 25 years of age after 6 months of unemployment. 
• The introduction of public sector "pool jobs" for unemployed. Pool jobs are 
comparable to ordinary jobs in certain respects, cf. section 3.3.2 below: The 
Employment Service has to provide suitable labour when a pool job vacancy is 
announced, and the unemployed with more than 2 years of unemployment cannot 
decline a pool job offer. 
• The abolishment of the Transition Benefit scheme which allowed long-term unem-
ployed people above the age of 50 to enter into an early retirement scheme. 
It appears that the thrust of reforms from 1994 onwards has been towards earlier and 
more comprehensive activation of unemployed within a shortened total benefit 
entitlement period. At the same time, "needs orientation" of activation has been 
weakened as legal provisions increasingly determine the contents of activation for 
unemployed. This holds true for the special provisions for young unskilled 
unemployed, just as the utilization and scope of the public sector pool job-scheme is 
decided by Parliament and the various public sector institutions and not by the 
Regional Labour Market Councils or the Public Employment Service. The Labour 
Market Reform's comprehensive decentralization has therefore been followed by a 
period of partial re-centralization (Haahr and Winter 1996: 116-122).13 
'3 Haahr and Winter (1996: 118-119) conclude that the partial re-centralization of labour market 
policy since 1995 may lead to less efficient activation of unemployed in the future, just as the 
limitations to the authority of the Regional Labour Market Councils threaten the regional 
commitment to the labour market policy. On the other hand, partial re-centralization has 
resulted in a Labour Market Reform which is politically more viable than previously. 
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3.1.4. Measures and Objectives in Recent Danish Labour Market Policy 
An interpretation of the most important objectives and measures of Danish labour 
market policy is presented in table 3.1.4. In this interpretation, developments in recent 
Danish labour market policy have primarily been motivated by two not necessarily 
complementary objectives: To reduce structural unemployment and to reduce regi-
stered unemployment. 
Table 3.1.4: Objectives and Means in the Danish Labour Reforms 1993-95 
Objective Measure 
Reduce registered unemployment Reduce labour supply (leave schemes) 
Reduce structural unemployment 
(prevent labour shortages) 
A) Reduce long-term unemployment 
Needs-orientation of activation leading to more 
effective activation (Labour Market Reform) 
Early activation of vulnerable groups (Labour 
Market Reform) 
Earlier and more comprehensive activation of all 
unemployed (Labour reforms 1994 and 1995) 
Reduce duration of benefit period (Labour reforms 
1995). 
Increase the number of job-openings (Leave 
schemes and Labour Market Reform: Job Rotation 
Projects) 
B) Improve and adapt skill levels of the work 
force 
Decentralization of labour market activation 
leading to improved targeting of training and 
education of unemployed (Labour Market Reform) 
Improved possibilities for employed persons of 
continuing training/education (Educational Leave 
scheme) 
Improved possibilities of "on-the-job training" for 
unemployed (Leave schemes and Labour Market 
Reform: Job Rotation Projects) 
Mandatory training/education for young unskilled 
unemployed (Labour reforms 1995) 
In the labour reforms since 1993 reductions in structural unemployment are seen to 
aim at a reduction in the duration of unemployment for one purpose: To prevent the 
deterioration of skills among long-term unemployed. Naturally, from a social point of 
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view the prevention of long term unemployment is also a means to prevent human 
distress and social marginalization. 
The other element in the strategy to reduce structural unemployment is an 
improvement and a flexible adaptation in the skill levels of the work force, both 
through improved training and education of unemployed persons, through improved 
possibilities of continuing training or education for employed persons, and through 
unemployed persons' "learning by doing" as substitute labour, in ordinary replace-
ment jobs or in Job Rotation projects.14 
3.2. The Institutions of Labour Market Policy 
This section briefly describes the institutions which formulate, implement and 
administer Danish labour market policy after the Labour Market Reform in 1993. The 
administrative system of the active labour market policy is described, as is the 
unemployment insurance system. 
3.2.1. The Administrative System of Active Labour Market Policy 
Two sets of institutions are responsible for developing and implementing the active 
Danish labour market policy: The Ministry of Labour with the attached institutions and 
the municipalities. The municipalities are responsible for activating unemployed 
persons who are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The system under 
the Ministry of Labour is responsible for the activation of insured unemployed as well 
as for the functioning of the Public Employment Service. 
The municipal system of active labour market policy is a decentralized system in 
which the municipalities themselves finance the costs of activating unemployed 
persons. However, after the Labour Market reform the principles of municipal acti-
vation of unemployed are identical to those of the activation of insured unemployed. 
In the state system for the active labour market policy the main institutions are 
the Ministry of Labour, the National Labour Market Agency (AMS), the Public 
14 Evidently, other objectives or interests than the concerns for registered and structural 
unemployment have mattered in the making of recent Danish labour market policy. First of all 
public sector "pool jobs" among other things aim to satisfy a wish among counties and 
municipalities for cheap labour in the form of unemployed in activation. The systematic and 
rule-bound allocation of activated unemployed during the 1980s in effect served as an extra 
budget allocation to counties and municipalities. This systematic and reliable budget extension 
was interrupted when the Labour Market Reform introduced the principle of needs-oriented 
activation, setting off a continuous political pressure from the counties and the municipalities for 
stricter "quotas" of unemployed (Winter, Haahr and Ørberg, 1995: 137-139; Haahr and Winter, 
1996: 110). 
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Employment Service, the National Labour Market Council and not least the 14 
Regional Labour Market Councils.15 The ultimate political and legal responsibility of 
state labour market policy rests with the Minister of Labour. Through the National 
Labour Market Agency, the Minister of Labour directs and supervises the operation of 
the Public Employment Service, and the Regional Directors of the Public Employment 
Service are directly responsible to the Minister of Labour. At the same time, the 
Minister of Labour has delegated considerable authority to the National Labour 
Market Council and the Regional Labour Market Councils in respect of the active 
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Figure 3.2.1. The Management System for Danish Labour Market Policy 
15 The Ministry of Finance also plays a key albeit informal role in setting the overall direction for 
the labour market policy. 
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Consequently, the management system of Danish labour market policy consists of 
two pillars. One is a politically directed pillar in which the Ministry of Labour (AM) and 
the National Labour Market Agency (AMS) supervises the operation of the Public 
Employment Service. The other is a corporative pillar consisting of the National 
Labour Market Council and the Regional Labour Market Councils. 
Within the limits defined by legal requirements on the active labour market policy 
and the overall budget framework for the active labour market policy, which is 
determined by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Finance, these two 
institutions formulate the contents of state labour market policy. The National Labour 
Market Council plays a key role in developing the objectives and performance 
standards which guide regional labour market policy. The Regional Labour Market 
Councils define and supervise the implementation of the regional labour market 
policy. 
This means that the regional councils prioritize target groups of unemployed with 
a high risk of long term unemployment who may receive early activation, just as the 
councils prioritize and develop guidelines for the use of different activation 
instruments for unemployed. In addition, the Councils approve work places which 
may receive wage subsidies if an unemployed person is employed as part of an 
activation measures. The Councils also prioritize and approve job-rotation projects 
and projects aimed at preventing regional labour shortages, and manage and 
supervise the ordinary exchange of jobs. Finally, it is the responsibility of the Public 
Employment Service in each region to implement the policies of the Regional Labour 
Market Council. 
3.2.2. The Unemployment Insurance System 
The unemployment insurance system is separate from the administrative system of 
the active labour market policy. The unemployment insurance system consists of the 
Directorate of Unemployment Insurance (DfA), a number of independent unemploy-
ment insurance funds that are administered by the trade unions, and the Labour 
Market Board of Appeals which serves as final court of appeal regarding decisions 
and rulings issued by the insurance funds or the Directorate for Unemployment 
Insurance. These institutions administer unemployment benefits as well as other 
labour market-related transfer schemes. 
The Directorate of Unemployment Insurance, structurally placed under the 
Ministry of Labour, supervises the insurance funds and serves as a court of first 
instance in complaints regarding decisions made by the insurance funds. The 
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directorate also participates in policy development regarding unemployment benefits 
and insurance. 
The Insurance Funds manage unemployment benefits, determining eligibility and 
administering benefit payments as well as the Post Employment Wage and the 
Transition Benefit scheme. The funds also manage payments in relation to the 
various leave schemes, the Education Allowance and the Entrepreneur Allowance all 
of which are described in more detail below. Finally, it is the responsibility of the 
Insurance Funds to check whether their unemployed members are available to the 
labour market, as they must be in order to obtain unemployment benefits. 
The unemployment insurance funds are private organizations, most of them 
being associated with and administered by trade unions. However, although the funds 
are independent, the administration of benefits is bound by detailed regulations as to 
the eligibility for benefits (Ministry of Labour et al, 1989). To achieve official 
recognition an unemployment insurance fund must have at least 5.000 members. 
Currently, there are 37 such funds with a total of about 2.3 million members. Two of 
these funds serve self-employed and count about 197,000 members. Employee 
insurance funds are organized along occupational lines, although there is some 
overlapping between funds. One insurance fund, the Christian Unemployment 
Insurance Fund, covers all areas of employment. Membership of a fund is voluntary, 
but only members are eligible for unemployment benefits. Although the funds are 
administered by the trade unions, union membership is not required in order to 
receive unemployment benefits.16 The rate of insurance, that is the share of the labour 
force who are members of the insurance funds, is currently around 80 per cent 
(Danmarks Statistik; Directorate for Unemployment Insurance). 
Unemployment benefits are financed through a benefit fund, which receives its 
funding from membership fees and from earmarked labour market contributions from 
employers, employees and self-employed. In 1994, these payments covered about 40 
per cent of the total unemployment benefit payments. The remaining 60 per cent of 
the expenses for unemployment benefits are funded by state sales and income tax 
revenues (Directorate for Unemployment Insurance, 1995). 
The earmarked labour market contributions were introduced as part of an overall 
tax reform passed in 1993. Currently, the labour market contribution takes the form of 
a 6 per cent gross income tax which replaced previous regular income tax. The 
earmarked labour market contributions are aimed at strengthening the link between 
15 However, it is a generally recognized view that the close association between trade unions 
and the insurance fund helps explain why union membership rates have increased in Denmark 
during the past 20 years whereas it has decreased in virtually all other countries, cf. also 
Chapter 4. 
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unemployment benefit contributions and the actual level of unemployment. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, state financing of the unemployment insurance system may 
contribute to the insider-outsider problem of the Danish labour market: The costs of 
increasing unemployment is borne not by the labour market participants but by the 
State, and the labour market participants (i.e. the insiders) may ignore these costs 
during wage bargaining. 
However, it seems highly doubtful whether the present earmarked labour market 
contributions have to any significant extent established a link between wage bargai-
ning behaviour and the costs of unemployment insurance. It remains a (controversial) 
political decision whether a growth in unemployment should result in an increased 
labour market contribution, as there is no automaticity. Furthermore, even if a political 
decision is made to establish the link between unemployment and unemployment 
insurance contributions, this is likely to be so at an aggregate level where insurance 
contributions for all groups are changed at a uniform rate. If this is so, wage 
bargaining incentives for each group are unlikely to be affected. The costs of aggres-
sive wage bargaining in terms of growing unemployment insurance contributions will 
then be borne not by this group alone but by all groups in the labour market (cf. 
Jensenetal, 1992). 
3.3. Passive and Active Labour Market Measures 
This section contains a description of current passive and active labour market 
measures in Danish labour market policy. Passive labour market measures in 
Denmark consist of unemployment benefits, the Post Employment Wage scheme, 
which as described below is an early retirement scheme, and the Transition Benefit 
scheme which has allowed unemployed persons to enter the Post Employment Wage 
scheme at the age of 50-59 years. The Child Care Leave scheme and the Sabbatical 
Leave scheme can also be considered as passive labour market measures. 
Active labour market measures comprise a number of measures aimed at 
increasing the employment prospects of unemployed persons, i.e. job-training and 
individual job-training, which are both subsidized employment schemes, education 
allowances for unemployed, and the Enterprise Allowance scheme, which supports 
unemployed persons' establishment of their own business. The Educational Leave 
scheme could also be considered an active labour market measure. 
Active measures account for a slowly growing part of total expenses for labour 
market policy in Denmark, as this share grew from 15 per cent in 1986 to 20 per cent 
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in 1995. However, passive measures still account for approximately 80 per cent of 
total labour market policy expenses in 1995. 
Both passive and active labour market measures are to a very high extent tax 
financed. Employees contribute a flat rate membership fee to the insurance funds and 
employers contribute a percentage of their total wage sum. However, even when 
including the earmarked labour market contribution which is a gross income tax 
employee and employer contributions cover less than half of the expenses for 
unemployment benefits, the remaining part being financed through the state budget. 
Active labour market measures in the state system are fully financed out of the state 
budget, as the state budget allocates a budget frame to the active labour market 
policy.17 Municipal activation measures for uninsured unemployed persons are 
financed out of the municipal budgets. 
3.3.1. Passive Labour Market Measures 
As mentioned, passive labour market measures at present comprise the following 
schemes: unemployment benefits, the Post Employment Wage scheme, transition 
Benefit scheme, the Child Care Leave scheme, and the Sabbatical Leave scheme. 
Unemployment Benefits 
Compared to unemployment benefits in other Western countries, Danish 
unemployment insurance has two main distinctive characteristics: A high replacement 
ratio, defined as the ratio of unemployment benefits to previous wage income. And a 
relatively long duration of the benefit period. 
The benefit level during the benefit period is set at 90 per cent of the wage 
received in previous employment, but with an absolute maximum gross amount limit 
of DKK 2,615 per week in 1996, totalling a maximum gross benefit level of DKK 
136,500 per year. This amount is taxed as normal wage income, albeit unemployed 
persons do not pay the gross income tax (the labour market contribution - Arbejds-
markedsbidraget). In real terms, benefit levels have remained roughly constant during 
the past years, yearly adjustments being a function of the average blue collar wage 
increase. It follows from the maximum gross benefit level that the Danish 
unemployment insurance system is characterized by a high replacement ratio for low 
wage incomes but a relatively low replacement ratio for high wage incomes. In the 
17 This budget frame is divided into one budget frame which is available for the Regional Labour 
Market Councils' activation measures, and a second budget frame which is payment to state, 
county, and municipal institutions for wage costs in connection with the activation of 
unemployed in pool jobs and as a partial refund of wage costs in connection with job training 
positions in public sector institutions. 
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Public Sector Budget for 1996, it is expected that recipients of unemployment benefits 
will receive an average 94.5 per cent of the maximum entitlement amount. This in 
effect means that the unemployment insurance scheme approaches a flat rate benefit 
system. 
Figure 3.3.1. Average Unemployment Benefit-Wage Replacement Ratio, 1960-
91. Source: ADAM Databank (1994), quoted from Pedersen et al. (1995: 41). 
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The average replacement ratio for manual workers is currently about 65 per cent. 
Since 1960 the ratio has changed considerably, rising from about 40 per cent in the 
period until 1966 to almost 75 per cent in 1972. From 1972 till the early 1990s, the 
average replacement ratio has edged downwards towards 65 per cent (Pedersen et 
al., 1995: 38). Despite the downward trend, this is by far the highest replacement ratio 
in the OECD-area. The second highest average replacement rate in the early 1990s 
is approximately 48 per cent, found in the Netherlands (OECD 1996: 52-53). 
The duration of unemployment benefits is currently 5 years, divided into a 
"benefit period" of up to 2 years duration and an "active period" of up to 3 years 
duration. However, this duration can be extended with a total of up to 1 year, if the 
unemployed persons makes use of the right to Child Care Leave. In the "active 
period" the right to unemployment benefits is coupled with a requirement of full-time 
activation in subsidized employment, training or education, cf. section 3.3 below. 
Regulations concerning the benefit period and the requirements to qualify for 
unemployment benefits have been tightened since 1993. The definite limit of the 
benefit period to 5 years plus the possibility of 1 year of Child Care Leave for parents 
is a considerable reduction compared to earlier. However, on most accounts the 
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duration of benefit entitlements is still among the longest in the OECD area. Prior to 
the Labour Market Reform, the formal maximum duration of entitlements to unem-
ployment benefit was 2.5 years, but the effective duration was much longer. 
Unemployed had a right to a subsidized job or education offer before the expiration of 
the benefit entitlement period. Through this offer benefit eligibility was re-established 
for a new maximum duration of 2.5 years. If the person in questions was still unem-
ployed after the second 2.5 years period, a second subsidized offer was provided, 
renewing eligibility for another 2.5 years. Taking into account all available activation 
and benefit programmes, the effective maximum duration of benefit was about 9 
years.18 
As regards eligibility for unemployment benefit, until December 1996 26 weeks of 
full term employment is required within the past 3 years. From 1 January 1997 the 
qualification period will be doubled to 52 weeks. However, persons who have finished 
a higher education are directly eligible to the lowest unemployment benifit after having 
completed their education. 
The Post Employment Wage Scheme and the Transition Benefit Scheme 
The Post Employment Wage scheme ¡s a second passive labour market measure. 
The scheme was originally introduced in 1979 with a view to reducing the size of the 
older labour force and thereby create job openings for younger unemployed persons, 
but it has increasingly come to be seen as a part of the ordinary public pensions 
system. The Post Employment Wage scheme is open for both employed and 
unemployed persons in the age span 60-66 who have been members of an 
unemployment insurance fund for at least 20 years. Today, about 120,000 persons in 
Denmark receive Post Employment Wage. 
For the first 30 months, the Post Employment Wage is set to the unemployment 
benefit the recipient would be entitled to had he or she been unemployed. After this 
the Post Employment Wage is set to 82 per cent of the maximum unemployment 
benefit, equalling about DKK 110,000 per year. This income is taxed according to 
normal income tax rules. Compared to being in a full-time manual job, the income 
received in the Post Employment Wage scheme is considerably lower. The average 
replacement ratio for manual workers is estimated to about 55 per cent. However, 
compared to the maximum employment insurance, the replacement ratio is higher, 
namely around 80 per cent. Indeed this may be the most relevant replacement ratio. 
A large proportion of the unemployed individuals from the age group 60-66 have 
18 Dalgaard et al. (1996: 99-101) conclude that considering the high average replacement ratio 
and the long duration of benefits, the Danish system of unemployment benefits is probably the 
most generous in the world. This is so even after the reforms of December 1995. 
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entered the scheme, reducing the official unemployment rate from what it would 
otherwise have been.19 
From 1992 to 1995 the Post Employment Wage scheme was supplemented by 
the Transition Benefit scheme which has allowed long-term unemployed individuals 
from the age of 55, from 1993 from the age of 50, and upwards to enter into an early 
retirement scheme. However, in December 1995 the Transition Benefit scheme was 
abolished, and the final deadline for applying for the transition benefit was set to 31 
January 1996, in effect creating an incentive for all elderly long-term unemployed to 
make use of the scheme as long as it was possible. 
The Child Care Leave Scheme 
Two of the three leave schemes which were introduced in 1993 could also be 
considered as passive labour market measures: The Child Care Leave scheme and 
the Sabbatical Leave scheme. 
The legislation introducing the Child Care Leave scheme took force 1 January 
1994, but the law has been revised both in late 1994 and in late 1995. Both insured 
and uninsured wage earners, insured unemployed persons and persons receiving 
social welfare are entitled to Child Care Leave. If these requirements are fulfilled, 
recipients of the leave allowance are entitled to an amount corresponding to 70 per 
cent of the maximum unemployment benefit rate, a total of DKK 1,830 per week, 
which is taxable as normal wage income. 
The duration of the right to Child Care Leave is up to 13 consecutive weeks per 
parent for every child below the age of 9 years. If the Child Care Leave period is 
commenced before the child is one year old, the duration of the leave can be up to 26 
weeks. It the employer consents, duration may be extended to 52 weeks. It is not 
required that the employer hires a substitute during the leave period. For unemployed 
persons, the Regional Labour Market Council may decide to allow Child Care Leave 
for up to 52 weeks if conditions on the regional labour market allow it. Child Care 
Leave for unemployed does not count as a part of the unemployment benefit period. 
The present Child Care Leave scheme is modified substantially compared to the 
original legislation. In December 1994, the leave allowance was reduced from 80 per 
cent of the maximum unemployment benefit to 70 per cent of this amount. The leave 
allowance will be further reduced in 1997 to 60 per cent of the maximum 
unemployment benefit. 
In 1995 a "Partial Post Employment Wage scheme" was introduced, making possible the 
partial and gradual retraction from the labour market of 60-66 year old persons. 60 to 66 year 
old persons who have the right to enter the Post Employment Wage scheme may reduce their 
working hours and supplement their income with a partial post employment wage. 
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The Child Care Leave scheme has been widely used in Denmark during 1994 
and 1995. Approx. 31,000 full year persons made use of the scheme in 1994 and 
45,000 full year persons in 1995.20 For 1996, it is estimated that approx. 33,000 full 
year persons will make use of the possibility of Child Care Leave (Pedersen 1996: 24, 
Ministry of Finance 1996). 
The Sabbatical Leave Scheme21 
The Sabbatical Leave scheme is restricted to employed persons above the age of 25 
who are entitled to receive unemployment benefits. For these persons it is possible to 
obtain leave for a consecutive periods of between 13 and 52 weeks. The total 
sabbatical leave period cannot exceed 52 weeks. There are no requirements as to 
what the Sabbatical Leave period should be used for. However, Sabbatical Leave 
requires the consent of the employer, just as the employer must hire an unemployed 
substitute during the leave period. 
Persons obtaining Sabbatical Leave allowances receive 70 per cent of the 
maximum unemployment benefit rate. This rate was reduced from 80 per cent of the 
maximum unemployment benefit rate in connection with the legislative changes of 
December 1995. It will be reduced further to 60 per cent of the maximum 
unemployment benefit in 1997, and the scheme will be abolished entirely in March 
1998. The Sabbatical Leave Scheme has not been widely used. In 1994, only approx. 
2,400 full year persons utilised the scheme, whereas approx. 5,200 full year persons 
were on sabbatical leave in 1995 (Pedersen 1996: 24). 
3.3.2. Active Labour Market Measures in Denmark 
As mentioned, the scope for action of both the Regional Labour Market Councils and 
the individual employment consultants at the Public Employment Service has been 
limited as a consequence of the legal changes since 1994. Unemployed persons 
without an education under 25 years of age must now start an education after 6 
months of unemployment, and the decision on whether or not to activate an 
unemployed person in a pool job rests with public sector institutions, not with the 
individual employment consultant and the unemployed person in common. Yet, a 
variety of instruments are available for the activation of those unemployed who are 
20 A full year person is one person making use of the scheme for an entire year, or two persons 
who each make use of the scheme for half a year, etc. 
21 We treat the Sabbatical Leave scheme as a passive meassure, as the main element in the 
scheme is the withdrawal of a person from the labour force. However, it should be noted that 
the Sabbatical Leave scheme also contains an active element since it requires that the 
employer substitutes the employee on leave with an unemployed person. 
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not below the age of 25 and have no education. These instruments are described 
below. 
The Individual Action Plan for Unemployed 
The individual action plan for unemployed is the basic instrument in the active labour 
market policy. The individual action plan is a written and signed agreement between 
the regional Public Employment Service or the Municipal Employment Department 
and the unemployed person, specifying the activities which are to be undertaken in 
order to bring the unemployed person back to ordinary employment. 
In itself the action plan does not entail any specific activation measures. The 
contents of an action plan may be "active job seeking" or counselling by the 
employment agency to clarify the possibilities and motivation of the unemployed 
person. However, the individual action plan is the instrument which plans other 
activation measures and which commits the unemployed person to participation in 
specific measures. 
Labour Market "Job Training" 
One of the most important instruments in the activation of unemployed is labour 
market job training, an instrument of subsidized employment. Public or private 
employers receive a subsidy of DKK 43.77 (in 1996) per working hour for hiring an 
unemployed person for a duration of up to one year. If the activated person is hired 
for more than 6 months in private enterprises, the employer is obliged to offer the 
activated person training or education corresponding to 1/12th of the total job training 
period. Alternatively, the private employer may choose to offer the activated person 
regular employment for a period. 
The person receiving job training is entitled to the wage and working conditions 
stipulated by the collective agreement covering the work in question or the conditions 
which normally prevail for the work. However, the maximum wage for persons in 
public job training is set to DKK 81 per working hour. There is no maximum wage for 
persons in private job training. For the unemployed in the active period, i.e. having 
been unemployed for more than 2 years, the total salary to the person receiving job 
training cannot exceed the maximum unemployment benefit. If the salary for full-time 
job training exceeds this amount, working time is reduced, not the hourly salary, to a 
level where the working time results in a wage equal to the maximum unemployment 
benefit. 
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Labour Market Education 
The Public Employment Service may choose to offer education to the unemployed. 
This education can be education or training programmes offered in the ordinary 
education system or tailor-made training or education programmes. The unemployed 
may identify a relevant education him- or herself, or the Labour Employment Service 
can acquire a right to participation in an education programme for the unemployed. 
The Labour Employment Service may purchase entire classes in specific education 
programmes or individual participation rights. 
There are no limits to the duration of education which may be offered to the 
unemployed as an active labour market measure. However, during participation in an 
education programme, the person receiving the education offer is entitled to the 
education allowance only as long as this person is entitled to unemployment benefits. 
The size of the labour market education allowance corresponds to the size of the 
unemployment benefit, which the unemployed person would otherwise have been 
entitled to. 
The Regional Labour Market Councils may decide for which ordinary education it 
is possible for the Public Employment Service to grant a labour market education 
allowance even where these education programmes also provide entitlement to the 
ordinary public education grant (Statens Uddannelsesstøtte). However, unemployed 
persons under the age of 25 can never be granted an education allowance if it is 
possible for them to receive the ordinary public education grant. Where there are no 
possibilities of obtaining the ordinary public education grant, the unemployed under 
25 are entitled to an allowance corresponding to 50 per cent of the maximum 
unemployment benefit. Labour market education measures may also to some extent 
be financed for the unemployed through the Educational Leave scheme, as described 
below. 
The special provisions for the unemployed below the age of 25 follow from the 
obligation to training or education for unskilled unemployed below 25. The limits to the 
size of the labour market education allowance is a further strengthening of the 
incentives for young persons to obtain an education. Until the changes of December 
1995, young unemployed with a right to the maximum unemployment benefit were 
better off than students receiving the ordinary public education grant. 
Public Sector "Pool Jobs" 
Public sector "pool jobs" were introduced as a new labour market activation instru-
ment from January 1996. Pool jobs partly replace the so-called public job training 
quotas, a system in which state, county and municipal institutions receive an advance 
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allocation from the state budget which is to cover the extra wage expenses incurred 
from activating unemployed in public job training. 
Compared to the other instruments of the active labour market policy, pool jobs 
are special in a number of respects. First, the objective of pool jobs is not only to 
improve the unemployed person's prospects for regular employment. It is also to 
improve the level of service in a range of public sector areas. Second, the status of 
public sector pool jobs is comparable to that of ordinary jobs rather than job training 
jobs. The regional Public Employment Service is obliged to assign the unemployed to 
pool jobs which have been announced vacant by public institutions, and the 
unemployed are obliged to accept the job if they are not to incur the normal sanctions 
which are applied when a job offer is refused. Furthermore, employment in pool jobs 
may be of a duration of up to 3 years. Third, pool jobs are financed to 90 per cent 
from state grants to the public sector institutions (the institutions finance 10 per cent 
themselves). This means that pool jobs are financed from a separate budget, outside 
the budget of the Regional Labour Market Councils. 
Unemployed persons with more than 2 years of unemployment may be offered a 
pool job. When the policy of early activation of unemployed is fully implemented in 
1998, this means that pool jobs may be offered in the active period. The salary when 
working in pool jobs therefore corresponds to the maximum unemployment benefit. At 
the same time, the collective agreement in each pool job area must be adhered to as 
regards wage and working conditions.This means that the total working time is 
reduced until the hourly wage equals the hourly wage stipulated in the collective 
agreement. 
The Entrepreneur Allowance 
A fourth instrument in the active labour market policy is the entrepreneur allowance 
scheme. After having been unemployed for 5 months within an 8 months period, 
unemployed individuals who wish to start their own business can receive an 
entrepreneur allowance. In order to qualify for entrepreneur allowance, the 
unemployed person must have developed a business plan, which must in turn have 
been approved by the State Enterprise Promotion Agency (Erhvervsfremme 
Styrelsen). Similarly, in its assessment the Public Employment Service must consider 
whether the entrepreneur allowance or another activation measure is the most 
appropriate in terms of improving the unemployed person's possibilities in the labour 
market. The size of the entrepreneur allowance is 50 per cent of the maximum 
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unemployment benefit, and it can be received for a total period of up to 2 1/2 years, 
as long as the person in question runs their own business.22 
Job-Rotation Projects 
Job-rotation projects is an instrument of the active labour market policy which was 
introduced on a general basis in connection with the Labour Market Reform of 1993. 
Its popularity has grown rapidly, and during the period of rapid economic growth in 
1994-95 it became one of the main instruments of the Regional Labour Market 
Councils in preventing shortages of skilled labour in the regional labour markets. 
Job-rotation is an agreement between the employer and one or more employees 
of the enterprise. The contents of the agreement is to allow the employees a leave 
period for educational or training purposes and hire substitute labour among unem-
ployed persons during the educational or training period. Job-rotation projects there-
fore provide the employer with an opportunity of training a corps of substitute workers 
or a buffer of trained labour - namely those persons who are employed as substitute 
workers during the period in which permanent employees participate in training 
courses. For the unemployed persons who substitute in connection with job-rotation, 
the benefits consists of an upgrading of qualifications and improved connections to 
the labour market. 
The labour reforms of 1993 introduced advantageous possibilities of financing 
job-rotation projects, in effect through a utilization of a range of labour market 
instruments and other public allowance schemes: Training in itself of substitute labour 
prior to employment may be financed by the Regional Labour Market Council, through 
the ordinary appropriations of educational institutions (where the appropriation is 
connected to the number of students), through the public Open Education Scheme or 
from other public means. 
During training, the pay for the unemployed person is financed through the labour 
market Education Allowance or through allowance schemes related to the individual 
education. When employed in the enterprise as substitute labour, the unemployed 
may be employed in job-training. This means that the employer will receive a wage 
subsidy in 1996 of DKK 43.77 per working hour, covering a part of the wage set in the 
collective agreement. 
22 Unemployed persons who establish themselves as entrepreneurs typically do so in trades 
with low entry barriers and where competition is therefore intense and the enterprise closure 
rate high. Their average level of education is lower than for all entrepreneurs. The weak 
foundation for entrepreneurs who come from unemployment is reflected in relatively low turn 
over in their enterprises, a very low export ratio and the fact that these enterprises employ 
relatively few persons (Ministry of Business, 1996: 83-86). The positive employment effects of 
the scheme are therefore limited. 
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The training or education in itself of the enterprise's permanent employees may 
be financed through the ordinary appropriations of the educational institutions, 
through other public education allowance schemes, by the enterprise itself or by the 
Regional Labour Market Council. Payment of the employee's wage during training or 
education may take place through two different channels: Through the Adult 
Education Support scheme (VUS), which supports continuing education for adults, or 
through the Educational Leave scheme, which is described in more detail below. 
The West Funen Network Project 1 
Labour Exchange Funen 
The West Funen Network Project was a rotation project which involved 65 
unemployed persons and 125 employees in 4 enterprises in the metal industry as 
well as a number of educational institutions in the area. 
The unemployed first participated in courses in welding techniques and general 
qualifying courses, followed by a 4-week trainee period. This was followed by 6 
months' employment in the enterprises in the job training scheme. During the job 
training period, the unemployed served as substitute labour, while the permanent 
employees received training and education. 
After the project had been completed, 48 of the 65 unemployed had found ordinary 
employment 
Source: Ministries of Labour and Finance; 1996. 
The wage which may be obtain through public channels in this manner normally 
corresponds to the maximum unemployment benefit. However, if job-rotation projects 
are carried out in a sector where there is a risk of skilled labour shortages, the 
Regional Labour Market Council may decide to supplement the education allowance 
up to an amount where the total allowance equals 120 per cent of the maximum 
unemployment benefit rate. Furthermore, the enterprise itself may decide to 
supplement the education allowance, enabling the employee to receive his or her 
normal salary level. 
The Educational Leave Scheme 
A further instrument of the active labour market policy is the Educational Leave 
Scheme. This instrument is not primarily directed towards the unemployed or towards 
preventing long-term unemployment. However, unemployed persons above the age 
of 25 may obtain Educational Leave in the same ways as employed persons, and 
during 1994 and 1995 the instrument was widely used by the Regional Labour Market 
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Councils and the regional Employment Services as an alternative activation 
instrument.23 
Both employed persons, self-employed and unemployed persons are entitled to 
Educational Leave for a period of between 1 and 52 weeks. For the unemployed, 
Educational Leave from 1996 onwards counts as a part of the unemployment benefit 
period. The Educational Leave allowance equals the maximum unemployment 
benefit, both for full-time insured unemployed, employees and self-employed. For 
employed persons seeking to obtain Educational Leave, there are no requirements 
that the employer must hire a substitute during the leave period, but the employer and 
the employee must both agree to the Educational Leave. The scheme was widely 
used in 1994 and 1994. In 1994 a total of 11,600 full year persons made use of the 
scheme, whereas in 1995 the corresponding figure was approx. 26,800 (Pedersen 
1996:24). 
European Social Fund Interventions in Denmark 
The European Social Fund's (ESF) interventions in Denmark is a final instrument in 
the active labour market policy. ESF interventions in Denmark distinguish themselves 
from the national labour market system since both their financing and administration 
is separate from the overall labour market policy system. Furthermore, in Denmark 
ESF interventions are more so than other active labour market measures focused on 
the weakest groups of unemployed with the highest risks of social marginalization.24 
ESF Programmes for which Denmark is Eligible 
• Objective 2: Economic adaptation in regions suffering from industrial decline. A 
number of municipalities are included in the programme. 
• Objective 3: Reduction of long-term unemployment, promotion of labour market 
integration of young persons and groups exposed to exclusion. 
• Objective 4: Facilitating the adaptation to workers to industrial change and deve-
lopment in production systems. 
• Objective 5b: Provision of a more versatile economic structure in rural areas. In 
Denmark this programme until 1994 covered the peripheral Danish islands. In 
1994-1999 it covers a more diverse number of rural areas. 
23 The main reason was that the Educational Leave scheme is financed outside the framework 
budget for the active labour market policy, giving the Regional Labour Market Councils an 
incentive to "spend someone else's money". However, the Ministry of Finance penalized this, 
as it did not allow the Councils to transfer more than approx. 10 per cent of the unspent means 
from the 1994 to the 1995 budget. 
24 Cf. Ministry of Labour (1994). 
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The European Social Fund is an instrument aimed at reducing unemployment 
throughout the European Union by measures of qualification and employment. Since 
1993, Denmark has been eligible to support from four ESF programmes (not all of 
them financed by the ESF alone).25 
Within the framework of these programmes, the Social Fund may finance up to 
50 per cent of the expenses for specific training and education projects. The admini-
stration of ESF activities in Denmark varies for the different objectives, but regional 
involvement is substantial. For Objective 3 which is financially the most important 
Objective in Denmark, the Regional Labour Market Councils and the municipalities' 
Departments of Social Benefits are strongly represented in the Regional ESF 
Committees which develop and revise the annual social fund plan, formulate 
principles for prioritization of projects and supervise implementation. ESF funds 
equals roughly 3 per cent of the total Danish expenditure on active labour market 
measures (PLS Consult, 1996). 
3.4. Assessment of Danish Labour Market Policy 
In section 3.1.4 above, it was argued that the two most important objectives in Danish 
labour market policy from 1993 onwards have been a reduction in structural 
unemployment and a reduction in registered unemployment. In the following sections 
an attempt is made to assess the degree to which these objectives have been fulfilled 
until now. 
3.4.1. Labour Market Policy, Hidden Unemployment and the Leave Schemes 
Has Danish labour market policy reduced registered unemployment? And what have 
been the effects of the much debated leave schemes in this respect since 1993? 
Hidden and Open Unemployment 
Without doubt Danish labour market policy has hidden a considerable amount of 
unemployment. Hidden unemployment can be defined as a situation where persons 
wishing to obtain ordinary employment are unable to do so. Despite this, they are not 
registered as unemployed since they are covered by various public income support or 
activation schemes which removes them from the official unemployment statistics. 
25 Objectives 3 and 4 are the only Objectives funded exclusively by the ESF. ESF funds 
between 20-25 % of Objective 2 measures, and about 20% of Objective 5b measures (PLS 
Consult; 1996). 
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Registered unemployment in 1994 equalled 343,000 persons (full year 
equivalents), corresponding to 12.1 per cent of the labour force. Of these 343,000 
persons, 273,000 persons received unemployment benefits whereas approx. 70,000 
persons received social welfare being registered as unemployed. However, Table 3.1 
illustrates that hidden unemployment is substantial. 82,000 persons in 1994 were 
employed in active labour market programmes (job training and education). Similarly, 
112,000 persons had made use of the Post Employment Wage scheme. A significant 
part of these persons are likely to have entered the sceme due to poor prospects of 
ordinary employment. The Educational and Child Care Leave Schemes were also 
utilised extensively by formerly registered unemployed, cf. the following section. To 
this should be added formerly registered unemployed persons substituting employed 
persons who enter one of the three leave schemes. 
Table 3.4.1: The Distribution of the Population by Labour Market Participation. 
Population aged 15-66 
Receiving public income support 
Employed in labour market programmes 
Insured Unemployed 
Early retiremenfcSocial Pension 
Early retirement: Post Employment Wage 
Social Welfare 
Educational, Child Care or Sabbatical Leave 























































Sources: The Welfare Commission (1995: 267), Ministry of Finance (1995) and Pedersen (1996)æ 
Furthermore, most likely a part of the 95,000 persons who received social welfare in 
1994 but were not registered as unemployed have not voluntarily withdrawn from the 
labour market. Rather, poor employment prospects have forced these persons 
permanently out of the labour market. As for recipients of Social Pensions, some are 
likely to have lost their ability to reintegrate easily into to the labour market due to long 
term unemployment and problems which have been related to long-term 
2G Recipients of maternity leave allowance, sickness benefit and rehabilitees have not been 
included as recipients of public income support. 
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unemployment. On balance, it is estimated that hidden unemployment encompasses 
at least 250,000 persons. Total hidden and open unemployment is therefore 
estimated to be at least 600,000 persons. This equals almost 17 per cent of the 
population in the labour force active age. Compared to labour market conditions in 
1970, this development is remarkable. Even if it is assumed that all recipients of 
social welfare were registered as unemployed in 1970, total hidden and open 
unemployment was well below 100,000 persons, corresponding to less than 3 per 
cent of the population in the labour force active age. 
In sum, in combination with social policies, active labour market policies in 
Denmark and leave and early retirement schemes have absorbed a growing share of 
the labour force during the past two and a half decades. Active labour market 
measures and leave and retirement schemes may have reduced the official figure for 
registered unemployed in the short and medium term compared to what it would 
otherwise have been, but hidden unemployment has grown rapidly. 
The Leave Schemes and Unemployment 
The leave schemes are primarily an attempt at reducing unemployment through a 
reduction in the supply of labour. How have the leave schemes affected unemploy-
ment during the first two years of implementation? 
Theoretical Arguments 
A distinction between immediate, short-term socio-economic effects of the leave 
schemes and long-term effects is useful. The immediate effects have been summa-
rized as follows (Kongshøj Madsen, 1995): 
Short Term Effects of the Leave Schemes 
• Registered unemployment decreases by one each time a registered unemployed 
person enters a leave scheme. If employed persons obtain leave, unemployment 
decreases to the extent that substitute labour is hired. 
• Employment decreases when employed persons obtain leave, unless all 
vacancies which have emerged due to leave are filled with substitutes. 
• The total of registered unemployed persons and persons on leave increases when . 
employed persons obtain leave, unless vacancies are fully filled with substitutes. 
• Total public expenditure for leave and unemployment benefits decreases as 
unemployed persons enter leave schemes, to the extent that the leave allowance 
is smaller than the unemployment benefit which the unemployed was entitled to. 
• For employed persons which enter leave schemes the budget effect depends on 
the degree to which substitute labour is hired and the leave allowance as a share 
of unemployment benefits. 
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As for the long term socio-economic effects of the leave schemes, conclusions are 
less clear. Several effects are possible: 
Long Term Effects of Leave Schemes on Unemployment 
• The supply of labour may grow, reducing the immediate effects of the leave 
schemes on registered unemployment. 
• Reduced unemployment may lead to increased wage pressure, ceteris paribus 
causing decreased international competitiveness, a subsequent decrease in 
employment and a return to higher unemployment levels. 
• Labourfórce qualifications may be improved due to the Educational Leave scheme. 
Persons who obtain leave will improve their skill level, just as the substitute labour 
goes through a period of "learning by doing". This may improve productivity and 
international competitiveness, ceteris paribus reducing unemployment. 
The long-term effects of the leave schemes hence point in different directions and the 
overall effect is difficult to assess. The leave schemes both contain risks and poten-
tials. There are growing probabilities of labour market bottlenecks and increasing 
wage pressures, which may in turn lead to increasing unemployment in the long term. 
The potentials are the possibilities of improved qualifications of the labour force. If the 
perspective is broadened the potentials of the leave schemes also encompass 
growing welfare and life quality, both for those persons who obtain leave and for 
unemployed who obtain employment for a period of time. 
Empirical Evidence and Model Calculations 
The immediate effects of the leave schemes on unemployment can be calculated as 
the number of persons on Sabbatical Leave (since replacement is mandatory) plus 
the number of unemployed who obtain Educational Leave and Child Care Leave. To 
this must be added the number of unemployed persons who replace employed 
persons on Educational or Child Care Leave (Pedersen 1996: 25). 
In 1994 the leave schemes had a coverage which corresponds to approx. 45,000 
full year persons. In 1995, the similar figure was 77,500. Based on survey data on the 
degree to which employed persons are replaced by substitute labour, the Social 
Research Insitute concluded that registered unemployment fell by between 32,000 
and 40,000 full year persons in 1994 due to the leave schemes, depending on the 
degree to which employed persons' leave causes reemployment with unemployed 
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substitutes.27 For 1995 it is calculated that the leave schemes have caused an imme-
diate drop in registered unemployment between 60,000 and 70,000. These figures 
compare to a registered unemployment of approx. 340,000 full year persons in 1994 
and approx. 285,000 in 1995.28 
A large part of the leave scheme's effects on registered unemployment is due to 
reclassification of unemployed persons as persons on leave. Of the 45,000 full year 
persons on leave in 1994, more than 24,000 were formerly registered as unemployed. 
Of the 77,500 full year persons on leave in 1995, 46,000 were former unemployed 
persons. In summary, significantly more than half of the leave schemes' immediate 
effects on registered unemployment were due to reclassification of unemployed.29 
The long-term effects of the leave schemes on unemployment have been 
assessed by the Economic Council and the Social Research Institute in two model 
calculations. In 1994 the Economic Council calculated that the effect of the leave 
schemes on unemployment is very limited in the long term, i.e. after 10 years. With 
10,000 leave positions unemployment decreases with 2,000 whereas employment 
decreases with 8,000 (Economic Council, 1994). Moreover, the Council calculated 
that 10,000 permanent publicly financed leave positions require public budget savings 
or tax increases of 0.3 per cent of GDP at factor costs to avoid a growing foreign 
debt, as higher wage increases erode international competitiveness. This 
corresponds to an increase in gross income taxes of approximately 0.6 percentage 
points. This is twice as much as the direct expenditure to the leave schemes, since 
the tax increases must neutralize not only expenditures for the leave schemes but 
also the deterioration of the balance of payments. 
Based on data on the actual use of the various leave schemes and actual 
replacement rates for employed persons obtaining leave, the Social Research 
Institute has calculated that 10,000 leave positions will result in a reduction of 
unemployment of between 8,800 and 9,300 after 10 years, although the reduction in 
employment diminishes further after the 10-year period. Correspondingly, employ-
27 In the most optimistic calculations, every substitution of the person on leave is assumed to 
cause a correspondent decrease in unemployment. However, the survey data indicates that a 
large part of the substitutes taking over the jobs of persons on leave were already employed in 
the enterprise in question. Furthermore, some substitutes come from previous employment in 
other enterprises and they may not be replaced in these enterprises due to shortages of skilled 
labour. In the most pessimistic scenario therefore, only substitutes which were unemployed 
before employment in the leave position are included in the calculations (Pedersen 1996: 26-
28). 
28 The effects of the leave schemes on employment is calculated to be a drop of between 5,500 
and 12,700 in 1994 and between 7,300 and 17,800 in 1995 (Pedersen 1996: 34). 
29 Most vacancies due to the leave schemes are created in the public sector, as between 55 
and 66 per cent of employed persons who entered one of the leave schemes in 1994 were 
employed in public administration or the educational, social or health sectors. 
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ment only decreases with between approx. 700 and 2,200 after 10 years (Pedersen 
1996: 73-76). However, in this model example Danish foreign debt is allowed to 
increase with between DKK 28 billion and DKK 35 billion during the 10-year period, as 
growing wage increases leads to a deterioration of international competitiveness. 
Fiscal policy is therefore tightened less in this scenario than in the calculations of the 
Economic Council. 
In both calculations, the effect of the leave schemes approaches zero over time. 
This follows from the fact that neither of the models take the possible structural 
effects of the Educational Leave scheme into account. In sum, if the leave schemes 
are not to affect the balance of payments and the Danish foreign debt adversely, the 
long-term effects on unemployment are assessed to be limited, just as total 
employment will decrease as a result of the schemes. 
3.4.2. Labour Market Policy and Structural Unemployment in Denmark 
Probably the most important objective of the Labour Market Reform of 1993 was to 
reduce structural unemployment, or in other words: To improve the functioning of the 
Danish labour market thereby lowering that rate of unemployment at which inflation 
starts to accelerate (NAIRU). There are several means to this end. 
The Duration of Unemployment 
The deterioration of skills among long-term unemployed, which tend to generate self-
perpetuating unemployment (hysteresis), may be prevented if the duration of 
unemployment can be shortened. The average duration of unemployment may, in 
turn, be shortened in various ways: 
• Early activation may bring the unemployed person back in ordinary employment 
before skill deterioration sets in. 
• Long-term unemployment may be prevented by effective activation, that is: 
activiation which is relevant in relation to the requirements of the labour market 
and the qualifications and needs of the unemployed. 
• More comprehensive activation requirements may in themselves strengthen the 
incentives for long-term unemployed to seek ordinary employment. 
• Other measures may increase the number of job openings in the labour market.30 
30 Evidently, the shortening of the benefit period may also strengthen the incentives for long-
term unemployed to seek ordinary employment. The shortening of the benefit period is 
however only to take effect gradually from 1996 onwards and the effects of recent labour 
market policies can only be assessed for 1994 and 1995. 
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In the Labour Market Reform of 1993 needs-oriented activation was introduced as 
was the possibility of early activation of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, in 1994 it 
was stipulated that the long-term unemployed with more than 4 years of 
unemployment have a right and duty to full-time activation. Finally, to the extent that 
substitute labour is employed, the three Leave Schemes should increase the number 
of job openings in the labour market. 
Against this background, to what extent has the number of long-term unemployed 
decreased during the first years of the Labour Market reform? And to what extent has 
the average duration of unemployment shortened? Several definitions of long-term 
unemployment are used in Denmark. One definition used by the Ministry of Labour for 
international purposes is to define a long-term unemployed person as a person 
whose annual degree of unemployment is over 0.8. This corresponds to at least 42 
weeks of unemployment during the year. 
Figure 3.4.2.1 below illustrates the development in the number of long-term 
unemployed in Denmark in two periods characterized by an economic turnaround 
from recession to growth: 1980 to 1985 and 1990 to 1995. 




Source: Statistical Ten Year Review 1995 and Monthly Review of Statistics no. 4, 1996. 
In the period 1990 to 1995, the absolute number of long-term unemployed was 
significantly higher than in the period 1980 to 1985, cf. also Appendix B.2. In both 
periods, accelerating economic growth towards the end of the period was associated 
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with a decrease in the number of long-term unemployed. However, the decrease in 
the number of long-term unemployed was stronger from 1994 to 1995 than from 1984 
to 1985. In the latest period, registered long-term unemployment dropped 29 per cent 
whereas the drop from 1984 to 1985 was just 16 per cent.31 A corresponding pattern 
is found for the development in the average degree of unemployment in 1980-85 and 
1990-95. The average degree of unemployment decreases with more than 12 per 
cent to 0.37 from 1994 to 1995. In contrast, from 1984 to 1985 the decrease in the 
average degree of unemployment was 8 per cent to 0.34. 
There therefore appears to be some indications that the recent labour market 
measures affect long-term unemployment in the intended way. The average duration 
of unemployment and the number of long-term unemployed has fallen at a quicker 
pace than experienced in the most recent previous economic upturn.32 However, 
"reclassification" of long-term unemployed as persons on leave accounts for a part of 
the decrease, as approx. 10,000 full year persons on leave in 1995 were formerly 
long-term unemployed as opposed to approx. 4,500 in 1994, meaning that approx. 
5,500 more long-term unemployed were on leave in 1995.33 The abolishment of the 
Transition Benefit scheme from 31 January 1996 also caused an increased number of 
elderly long-term unemployed to enter this scheme, and thereby to leave the official 
unemployment statistics. It is estimated that the number of full year persons in the 
Transition Benefit scheme was at least 25,000 persons in 1995 as opposed to 
approx. 10,000 in 1994, and that at the scheme encompassed at least 15,000 more 
full year long-term unemployed in 1995 than in 1994.34 If the effects of the leave 
31 This was so despite the fact that the economic growth which preceeded the drop in long-term 
unemployment was higher in 1983 and 1984 than in 1993 and 1994: The annual growth in GDP 
at factor prices was 2.1 per cent and 4.0 per cent in 1983 and 1984 respectively, as opposed to 
1.3 per cent and 3.2 per cent in 1993 and 1994, respectively, cf. Statistical 50 Year Review and 
Monthly Review of Statistics no. 4, 1996. 
32Since the Labour Market Reform took force on 1 January 1994 it could be argued that its 
effects should show up already during this year. However, activation of unemployed will take 
some time before the contents of activation measures can possibly produce results. Due to 
start-up problems the number of initiated activation measures for unemployed was also at a 
very low level in the first half of 1994, and the total number of initaited activation measures was 
much lower than expected, resulting in a significant under-consumption of means for the active 
labour market policy (Winter, Haahr and Ørberg 1995: 116-117, 183-185). Third, the provision 
of a right and duty to full-time activation of persons with more than than 4 years of unemploy-
ment only took force in 1995. 
33This calculation is based on the assumption that the distribution of the duration of unemploy-
ment among unemployed persons on leave does not differ significantly from this distribution in 
the total population of unemployed. There is evidence that this a realistic assumption (Ander-
sen et al. 1996: 48). In 1993, 18.6 per cent of all unemployed were long-term unemployed, in 
1994, 20.5 per cent. From Pedersen (1996: 24) it can be calculated that the number of 
unemployed persons on leave was 45,000 full year equivalents in 1995. 
34 Estimate of the National Labour Market Agency AMS based on the total number of persons in 
the Transition Benefit scheme medio and ultimo 1994 and 1995. 
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schemes and the Transition Benefit scheme are removed from the calculation, the 
decrease in long-term unemployment was not steeper from 1994 to 1995 than from j 
1984 to 1985. 
On balance, the labour reforms have contributed to a reduction in long-term 
unemployment and the average duration of unemployment. But this reduction is to a 
very high extent due to "reclassification" of the long-term unemployed as persons on 
leave or withdrawn from the labour market altogether in the Transition Benefit 
scheme. Withdrawal of the elderly unemployed from the labour market does not 
prevent any deterioration of skills in the work force and therefore does not contribute 
to the reduction of structural unemployment.35 The "reclassification" of long-term 
unemployed as leave persons may only prevent a deterioration of skills due to 
unemployment, to the extent that long-term unemployed make use of the Educational 
Leave scheme rather than the two other schemes. 
Skills Improvement and the Prevention of Labour Shortages 
The second key objective in the efforts after 1993 to reduce structural unemployment 
was an improvement and flexible adaptation in the skill levels of the work force to 
prevent the occurrence of shortages of skilled labour. Thus, during the economic 
upswing in 1994-95, the prevention of labour market "bottlenecks" has been a key 
priority for Danish labour market policy.This is a result of experience gained over 
time. As mentioned in Chapter 2 the latest economic upswing in 1984-86 resulted in a 
wave of increasing wage pressures in 1986 due to labour shortages in a number of 
sectors with major implications for the determination of the overall wage growth rate. 
Labour shortages occurred in a situation where registered unemployment totalled 
almost 200,000 full year persons, equal to an official unemployment rate of 7,9 per 
cent of the labour force. Given a fixed exchange rate and a weak productivity 
development, the growing wage pressures undermined international competitiveness 
and the balance of payments. This made necessary a contractive fiscal policy which 
in turn marked the start of the long period of increasing unemployment which reached 
a peak in 1993 (cf. Ministry of Labour, 1989: 15-24). 
In the Labour Market Reform, skill improvements and thereby the prevention of 
labour shortages is to be achieved through among other things: 
35 On the other hand, the extended use of the Transition Benefit scheme in 1995 most likely did 
not contribute significantly to structural unemployment either: Recent data from AMS suggest 
that unemployed persons entering the Transition Benefit scheme were to a very high extent 
unskilled workers. Their withdrawal from the labour market therefore did not exacerbate prob-
lems of shortages of skilled labour. 
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• Improved targeting of the training and education of unemployed persons as 
training is tailored to suit the requirements of the labour market and the individual 
needs and qualifications of each unemployed person. 
• Improved possibilities of "on­the­job training" for (former) unemployed and the 
creation of reserves of skilled labour in Job Rotation Projects. 
• General improvements in the qualifications of the work force through the 
Educational Leave Scheme. 
To what extent have the labour reforms since 1993 achieved their objectives? The 
ultimate objective in the prevention of labour shortages is the prevention of an 
acceleration of wage increases which ­ given fixed exchange rates and constant 
productivity development ­ will undermine international competiveness and economic 
growth, to the detriment of employment. 
Figure 3.4.2.2: Yearly Increase in Labour Costs, Manufacturing Industry. 





Source: Statistical Ten Year Review 1995. Monthly Review of Statistics No. 4, 1996. 
It appears from Figure 3.4.2.2. that labour costs have not increased as rapidly from 
1993 to 1995 as was the case in the economic upswing in the mid­1980s, particularly 
in 1987. In this connection it is also noticeable that the number of registered vacant 
36 1984­89: Calculated on the basis of hourly wages for all workers in manufacturing and con­
struction. 1993­1995: Calculated on the basis of average hourly wage costs in manufacturing 
industries. 
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positions have not increased with the decrease in registered unemployment as 
compared to the situation in the mid-1980s (Ministry of Labour and Ministry of 
Finance, 1996: 31). 
In a qualitative assessment, no substantial problems of shortages of skilled 
labour have been registered in the private sector by the Regional Labour Market 
Councils during 1995. Some regions in Jutland (Ribe, Ringkøbing, Vejle) have 
registered limited labour shortages in specific areas within the field of metal 
manufacturing and construction. In contrast, in the public sector labour shortages 
have been registered in the social and health care sectors in a wider range of regions 
throughout the country (Ministry of Labour, 1996: 2-3). However, due to the centra-
lized wage formation structure in the public sector, this implies waiting lists or a 
poorer service to the public rather than growing wage increase rates which undermine 
international competitiveness. 
Labour market reforms are however just one among several explanations for the 
fact that wage increases have not yet reached the pace they did in the mid-1980s. 
Even if there is a quicker decrease in unemployment rates in the mid-1990s com-
pared to the mid-1980s (from 12.1 to 10.2 per cent of the work force from 1994 to 
1995 as opposed to a decrease from 10.1 to 7.9 per cent from 1984 to 1986) unem-
ployment remains at a higher level in the 1990s than in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the economic upswing in the mid-1980s was to a large extent 
concentrated in the construction sector, which overheated in a context where 
construction had declined for more than a decade. The economic upswing from 1994 
has not in the same way been concentrated on the construction sector (cf. Dalgaard 
et al., 1996: 170). Finally, the previous economic upturn was associated with a 
surprising drop in labour productivity which exacerbated labour shortages significantly 
(Gjerding et al., 1990). There are no indications that the same drop in productivity is 
taking place now.37 More precise evidence as to the effects of the labour reforms 
since 1993 in relation to the prevention of shortages of skilled labour is scarce and 
firmer conclusions must await further data. 
The "Qualification Twist" in Active Labour Market Policies 
It is thus difficult to isolate the effects of the labour reforms among the various policy 
measures and other developments which have affected the mix and level of skills in 
37 The Ministry of Labour itself states that the successful prevention of labour shortages "not 
least is due to the fact that the efforts of the Regional Labour Market Councils and the Public 
Labour Exchange directed against problems of bottlenecks have been improved substantially, 
among other things through the flexibility, which the Labour Market Reform has implied" 
(Ministry of Labour; 1996: 3). 
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the work force after 1993. Even if this is the case, a number of qualitative 
developments in the actucal labour market policy in 1994 and 1995 should be 
emphasized. 
First, the quality of activation of the unemployed has been given a much higher 
priority than previously. The Regional Labour Market Councils seek the highest 
possible employment effect of activation ­ sometimes at the cost of the quantity of 
activation (Winter, Haahr and Ørberg, 1995: 72­73). Two factors account for this 
development: The composition of the Regional Labour Market Councils where 
employee organizations have 1/3 of the seats, counties and municipalities another 
1/3. And the elimination of the link between entitlements to unemployment benefits 
and activation in subsidized jobs or training programmes. Thus, to prevent their 
members from dropping out of the unemployment insurance system, it is now in the 
interest of employee representatives in the Councils to ensure that activation will lead 
to regular employment. The representatives from the municipalities share this 
interest, as they must provide for unemployed who have dropped out of the unem­
ployment insurance system and revert to social welfare. 
Second, the emphasis on activation measures with a high effect in terms of 
regular employment has meant that a higher priority than previously has been 
accorded to training and education in connection with the activation of the 
unemployed. Figure 3.4.2.3. illustrates this development. 
Figure 3.4.2.3. The Relative Importance of Different Activation Instruments. 
D Training/education 
D Entrepreneur allowance 
■ Job training 
1993 1994 1995 
Source: AMS (1996) and Ministry of Finance (1995a). 
From 1993 to 1995 training and education measures as a percentage of the total 
number of activation measures grew from 29.9 per cent to 39.8 per cent in 1994, only 
to grow to 62 per cent in 1995. These figures do not include the unemployed who 
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have obtained Educational Leave. The relative importance of education and training 
for the unemployed when including the Educational Leave is even greater.38 
The emphasis in the Regional Labour Market Councils on training and education 
is also reflected in the sharp increase in the total number of training and education 
measures initiated from 1994 to 1995. A total of more than 66,000 training and 
education measures were initiated in 1995, as opposed to a total of 27,300 in 1994. If 
the number of unemployed persons who have obtained Educational Leave are added, 
143,200 training and education measures were initiated for unemployed in 1995 as 
opposed to a total number 73,400 in 1994, an increase close to 100 per cent (AMS 
1996b). 
Furthermore, Figure 3.4.2.4. illustrates the growing importance of job rotation 
projects in the active labour market policy. In 1994 approximately 17,800 persons 
participated in a job rotation project. Of these 12,200 where employed persons who 
received training or education and 5,600 were unemployed who served as 
substitutes. In 1995, the total number of participants in job rotation projects had 
increased to approx. 29,900 persons, of whom 21,000 where employed persons and 
almost 8,000 substitute labour. 
Figure 3.4.2.4. Total Number of Persons Participating in Job Rotation 










Source: AMS (1 996). 
1994 1995 
D Substitutes 
■ Employed persons 
Finally, there is evidence that the regionalization of active labour market policy in the 
Labour Market Reform of 1993 as well as the improved possibilities of flexible 
38 On the other hand, a part of this increase is accounted for by the fact that the Public 
Employment Service failed to initiate the planned number of job training measures in the 14 
regions in 1995. To some extent the growing importance of training and education from 1994 to 
1995 is therefore not a deliberate policy choice but rather a result of implementation problems, 
cf. Haahr and Winter (1996: 187­191). 
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individualized activation of unemployed has enabled a faster reaction time to threats 
of labour shortages in the Public Employment Service and the Regional Labour 
Market Councils. In the previous fully rule-bound system, there were few possibilities 
for training selected groups of unemployed in response to specific and rapidly 
emerging needs in the labour market. Rather, training took place scheduled In 
accordance with the legal rights of the unemployed. 
At the same time, decentralization of active labour market policy has improved 
the information flow to the Regional Labour Market Councils and allowed them to take 
the necessary measures in preventing labour shortages. As for the first point, this has 
followed from the strengthening of the Labour Market Councils which increased their 
standing among the regional employer and employee organizations. The Councils are 
now more than ever made up of persons who represent the most important employer 
and employee interests, and who in particular have the political backing of these 
interests and can rely on information from them (Interviews carried out in connection 
with Winter, Haahr and Ørberg, 1995). As for the second point, this follows from the 
freedom of the Councils to initiate and approve specific measures such as job rotation 
projects and targeted training programmes. This freedom remains largely intact also 
after the legislative changes of 1995. 
In summary, training and education is increasingly prioritized in Danish active 
labour market policy after 1993. It seems likely that this has had at least some limiting 
effects on structural unemployment and that it has contributed to the prevention of 
labour shortages in specific sectors. There are also indications that the decentra-
lization of labour market policy making has facilitated a more effective prevention of 
labour shortages. However, it is too early to conclude that labour shortages have 
been prevented efficiently and structural unemployment lowered significantly in 
Denmark because of the labour reforms from 1993 onwards. 
3.4.3. Conclusions 
Danish labour market policy has developed constantly since 1993. The most 
important changes are: The responsibility for the active labour market policy has to a 
high extent been decentralized. A principle of needs-orientation has been introduced 
in the activation of unemployed. A possibility of early activation of vulnerable groups 
has been introduced. The activation of long-term unemployed has been intensified. 
Activation is gradually moved forward so as to start after two years of unemployment 
in 1998. The duration of the benefit period is gradually being reduced to 5 years from 
1996 onwards. From 1996 mandatory training or education is introduced for young 
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unskilled unemployed. Three comprehensive leave schemes have been introduced, 
of which the two are also open for unemployed persons. 
The two most important even if implicit objectives of these reforms have been to 
reduce registered unemployment and to reduce structural unemployment, defined as 
that rate of unemployment which is consistent with an unchanged wage and price 
inflation. 
Labour market measures caused a significant decrease in registered unemploy-
ments both 1994 and 1995. Through reductions in labour supply the leave schemes 
in 1994 reduced registered unemployment with between 32,000 and 40,000 full year 
persons. In 1995 the reduction in registered unemployment due to the leave schemes 
was between 60,000 and 70,000. However, significantly more than half of the leave 
schemes' immediate effects on registered unemployment were due to reclassification 
of unemployed persons as persons on leave, and the long-term effects of the leave 
schemes on unemployment are estimated to be small. 
At the same time, the reduction in registered unemployment caused by labour 
market measures corresponds to a growth in hidden unemployment. Hidden un-
employment may be defined as a situation where persons who wish to obtain ordinary 
employment but are unable to do so are not registered as unemployed, since they are 
covered by various public income support or activation schemes. It is estimated that 
hidden unemployment encompassed at least 250,000 persons in 1994. Total hidden 
and open unemployment is therefore estimated to have been at least 600,000 
persons this year, equalling almost 17 per cent of the population in the labour force 
active age. 
In this connection it is noteworthy that the Economic Council has criticized the 
recurrent attempts in Danish labour market policy to reduce unemployment through a 
reduction of labour supply. International experience thus shows that the relation 
between growth in labour supply and growth in employment is approximately one to 
one. Consequently, it is not possible to reduce unemployment through reductions in 
labour supply. "To all appearances, the strong emphasis during the past 25 years of 
Danish labour market policy on measures which reduce labour supply has had no 
discernible permanent effect on unemployment" (Economic Council, 1994: 70). 
The effects of recent labour market measures on the level of structural unemploy-
ment in Denmark are difficult to assess. The number of long-term unemployed and 
the duration of unemployment have dropped significantly from 1994 to 1995. In itself, 
this should reduce skills deterioration among the unemployed and thereby the 
structural unemployment rate. A significant part of this decrease in long-term 
unemployment however is due to an increase in long-term unemployed persons' use 
of the leave schemes and the Transition Benefit scheme in 1995. Of these schemes 
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only the Educational Leave scheme may serve to prevent the deterioration of skills. If 
the effects of the leave schemes and the Transition Benefit scheme are excluded, 
long-term unemployment did not drop sharper from 1994 to 1995 than during the 
latest economic upswing in the mid-1980s. This suggest that apart from the leave 
schemes and the Transition Benefit, recent labour market reforms have had limited 
effects on the duration of unemployment. 
Also compared to the situation in the most recent economic upswing, wage 
increase rates have not yet grown as rapidly as then and shortages of skilled labour 
have occurred only in public sector areas where the effects on wage increase rates 
are limited. Training and education has clearly been prioritized to a much larger 
extent in Danish active labour market policy since 1993 than previously. It seems 
likely that this has had at least some limiting effects on structural unemployment. 
However, there may be several other explanations for the lower wage increase rates 
and the limited shortages of skilled labour in the 1990s than the recent reforms of 
labour market policy. 
In assessing the impacts of recent labour market reforms on structural 
unemployment it should be emphasized that there are potential conflicts between the 
two overall objectives of Danish labour market policy: To reduce registered unemploy-
ment and to reduce structural unemployment, cf. figure Table 3.4.3.1. and Table 
3.4.3.2. below. Measures which aim to reduce registered unemployment to some 
extent increase structural unemployment. 
Table 3.4.3.1: Measures which Increase/Decrease Structural Unemployment in 
the 1993 Labour Market Reform 
Decreasing Structural Unemployment 
Individualized activation with an emphasis on training and education 
Targeted training and education programmes, aimed at preventing bottlenecks 
Job-rotation projects, aimed at establishing a buffer of qualified labour 
Increasing Structural Unemployment 
Child Care and Sabbatical Leave schemes 
Educational Leave scheme (to some extent) 
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Table 3.4.3.2. Measures which Increase/Decrease Structural Unemployment in 
the 1994-95 Legislative Changes 
Decreasing Structural Unemployment 
Earlier full-time activation of unemployed 
Mandatory training/education of young unskilled unemployed coupled with lower benefits 
Reduced unemployment entitlement period 
Reduced allowance levels in leave schemes 
Reduced leave entitlements for unemployed 
Abolishment of the Transition Benefit scheme 
Increasing Structural Unemployment 
Public sector pool jobs39 
Delayed abolishment of Transition Benefit Scheme (to a limited extent)40 
The leave schemes are the most important examples in this respect: They may 
indeed exacerbate structural unemployment as the supply of skilled labour is limited, 
increasing the risks of labour shortages and wage growth increases. On the other 
hand, the leave schemes may increase job rotation as unemployed people are hired 
as substitutes and thereby limit the average duration of unemployment. The 
Educational Leave scheme may also increase labour productivity and the supply of 
labour with the right qualifications. 
Estimates of the effects of the leave schemes on structural unemployment so far 
do not arrive at clear conclusions (Pedersen 1996: 45-68). However, the leave 
schemes may have contributed to shortages of skilled labour particularly in the public 
sector labour market. Furthermore, the job rotation effects of the Child Care Leave 
and the Educational Leave are seen to be limited since many of the unemployed 
serving as substitutes would have found ordinary employment irrespective of the job 
openings created by the leave schemes. Actually, the Child Care Leave scheme may 
weaken the attachment of the umemployed to the labour market as it has been 
extensively used by unemployed women, increasing their risks of marginalization. 
Finally, the qualification effects of the Educational Leave scheme are difficult to 
39 Pool jobs may impede the prevention of skills shortages as it remains uncertain whether the 
prevention of labour shortages takes priority over the filling of vacant pool jobs, cf. footnote * 
above. 
40 As mentioned in section 3.3.1, the Transition Benefit scheme was abolished in a manner 
which created an incentive for all elderly long-term unemployed to make use of the scheme as 
long as it was possible, and virtually all eligible persons eventually applied. However, the 
corresponding decrease in effective labour supply and increase in structural unemployment 
most likely is very limited since most applicants presumably are lowly skilled. 
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assess: According to survey data a majority of enterprises agree that the education 
obtained by their employees during leave is useful, but a large minority, particularly 
private enterprises, indicate that the education of employed persons on leave is not 
useful. 
On balance, based on experience so far, only the Educational Leave scheme has 
the potential to contribute to a reduction in structural unemployment in the long term, 
due to its potential positive effects on labour productivity and the supply of labour with 
the right qualifications. However, this presupposes that education which is carried out 
during Educational Leave leads to job relevant qualifications. At the moment it is 
possible to obtain Educational Leave for a very wide range of training/education or 
courses. In contrast, the Child Care Leave actually increases the risk of margina-
lization of young lowly skilled women, and all leave schemes limit the supply of labour 
which may exacerbate problems of shortages of skilled labour. 
In conclusion, Danish labour market policy since 1993 has been directed towards 
the symptom of unemployment, i.e. the rate of registered unemployment, and some 
of the likely causes of unemployment, namely the deterioration of skills among 
unemployed and the related mismatch problems of supply and demand in the labour 
market. 
In curing the symptoms of unemployment recent labour market policy has been 
relatively successful, as labour market measures contributed significantly to a 
reduction of registered unemployment in 1994 and 1995. However, this cure is likely 
to be only temporary. In removing some of the causes of persistent unemployment 
results so far are mixed. On the one hand, there is little evidence that recent labour 
market measures have reduced the number of long-term unemployed in a manner 
which improves the prevention of skill deterioration. Rather, many long-term unem-
ployed have been removed from the unemployment statistics through passive labour 
market measures. On the other hand, it does not seem unlikely that active labour 
market measures have contributed to the prevention of shortages of skilled labour in 
1994 and 1995, through targeted improvements in the skills of the work force. To the 
extent that the training and education effort in active labour market policy has thus 
reduced structural unemployment, the decentralization of responsibilities for the 
active labour market policy seems likely to provide the explanation. 
Looking to the future, the question is whether the labour market reforms which 
have been adopted since 1993 are sufficient to ensure a significant and lasting drop 
in structural unemployment. On the one hand, we have yet to see the effects of the 
measures which were introduced in December 1995. In general, these measures 
should serve to increase effective labour supply and improve the qualifications of the 
work force. On the other hand, the labour market reforms since 1993 have only 
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adressed some of the likely causes of unemployment. Other likely causes have not 
been adressed: Real wage rigidity, the insider-outsider problem, and the compressed 
wage structure. 
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4. Industrial Relations and Wage Negotiations 
This chapter describes the central features of what has been termed the Danish 
model, a highly organized and institutionalized system of industrial relations. We 
focus on the institutional features of the Danish model as well as on the 
decentralization of wage formation which has taken place in recent years. 
The Danish model is characterized by the integration of two opposing parties, 
employers and employees, into a system of institutionalized balancing of opposed 
interests that allows both parties to derive advantages from their participation (Due, 
1993). Furthermore, as it has also been described in section 3.1, the labour market 
parties are extensively involved in the formulation of labour market policies, and 
historically, most labour market issues have been regulated by agreement between 
the two parties rather than by statute of law. 
4.1 . The Organization of the Labour Market Parties 
The Danish system of industrial relations in the private sector has been dominated by 
two main organizations, the Danish Employers Confederation (Dansk Arbejdsgiver-
forening, DA) and the National Federation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i 
Danmark, LO). Both of these organizations were established at the end of the last 
century. Following a lengthy conflict in 1899, which lasted three months and cost 3 
million working days, the two parties negotiated a historic agreement that institu-
tionalized the resolution of labour conflict. Since then and until recently DA and LO 
have set the direction for all major issues in the labour market by negotiating the 
framework within which lower levels of the organizations have had to negotiate and 
operate. 
Both the Danish Employers Confederation and the Federation of Trade Unions 
are umbrella organizations organized along lines of trade, industry or level of skill. 
Furthermore, both employers and employees were organized at the level of each 
enterprise or work place. This made for a rather fragmented overall structure, despite 
the existence of the main organizations. 
These structures have lasted until this decade. However, beginning in 1989, 
employers as well as employees set in motion a process in which the many trade 
organizations are being transformed into large, industry-wide cartels (Due, 1993). In 
some respects, this development signifies that the high degree of centralization, 
which has been an important feature of Danish industrial relations, is declining. 
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4.1.1. The Present Organization of Employers 
For almost 100 years the Danish employers in the private sector and their branch 
organizations have been organized in the National Employers Confederation. Its 
membership rate amounts to about 60 per cent of potential members, and the 
Confederation estimates that its members cover about 50 per cent of private sector 
employment (Due, 1993: 403, 488). Prominent employers organizations outside the 
National Employers Confederation include the Employers' Organization of the 
Finance Sector, emerging as the result of several mergers in the banking industry 
(Ronit, 1995; Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 1994), and the National Employers 
Confederation is the Federation of Employers of the Agriculture Sector (SALA), 
covering agriculture, food industries, horticulture and forestry. Both of these 
organisations conduct independent collective bargaining with the sector's employee 
organizations. However, collective agreements negotiated by the Confederation have 
typically set the standard for wages and working conditions for the entire labour 
market, including for employers who are not members. In this capacity as trend-
setter, the Confederation has yielded an influence much greater than its membership 
level would indicate. 
Employer interests in the public sector are organized according to level of 
government. The Minister of Finance is responsible for all collective bargaining with 
national government employees (Due et al., 1996). Municipal and county employers 
form a group that bargains with employees at the local and regional levels of 
government. The group includes the National Association of Local Authorities, 
representing municipalities; the Association of County Councils as well as the 
municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg. The latter two have individual 
representation as they cover both municipal and county levels (Due et al., 1996). 
Historically, private sector employers have striven for unity, recognizing that 
on their own the many small Danish enterprises could not match unions. The strategy 
has been to delegate decision-making authority to the central level of organization. 
This delegation has included a stipulation that DA must sanction any agreement 
entered into by a member organization. Although the Confederation has a centralized 
power structure for collective bargaining, the organizational structure has been 
fragmented. The existence of many small trade or branch organizations have forced 
many employers to join several employer organizations in order to match all groups of 
employees. 
By the 1980s, the rigid lines between organizations no longer matched a fluid 
labour market structure. This prompted employers' organizations to seek a structure 
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that would eventually allow for a structure of one employer-one organization and one 
employer-one labour agreement without weakening the position of the individual 
enterprise towards the unions. The idea was to form cartels that would each cover an 
industry, the goal to increase flexibility in the labour market by ensuring that 
organizational and labour market structures corresponded. 
In 1989, the two main industrial employers' organizations merged, and in 1992 
this industrial employers' organization entered into yet another merger with the 
industrial enterprise organization, the latter representing industrial interests in 
business development matters. The resulting cartel was called Danish Industry 
(Dansk Industri, DI), representing employer as well as business development 
interests. Due to this round of organizational mergers, the number of organizations in 
the Confederation of Employers shrunk from 150 to 25 during the first half of the 
1990s (Interview, DA). The resulting structure is expected to become one of large 
industrial cartels, with maybe as few as five to ten major organizations (Due, 1993). 
The structural changes have also changed power relations among employer 
organizations. Specifically, they have undermined the central position of the 
Confederation (Due, 1993). Although Danish Industry is a member of the employers 
confederation, it is now widely considered more powerful than the Confederation 
itself: D! finances the majority of DAs budget, it covers 52 percent of the total wages 
paid by DA members and has absolute majority on the board. Moreover, the 
organization has built up a comprehensive administrative and analytical apparatus 
better prepared to service its members than that of the Confederation. 
These reorganizations have also caused the locus of collective bargaining to 
move from the central level to the level of the cartel, even to the level of each 
enterprise, possibly eroding the Confederation's raison d'être (Due, 1993; Ugebrevet 
Mandag Morgen, 1995). The Confederation, however, has retained the power to veto 
the agreements negotiated by each member organization or employer. This right was 
exercised by the board in 1995 when the employers' organization for road delivery 
companies had negotiated an agreement with wage increases unacceptable to the 
Confederation. 
At this point in time, the future role of the Confederation seems unclear as the 
division of labour between the national employers' organization and the developing 
cartels is still evolving. 
4.1.2. The Organization of Employees 
The changes in employers' organizations have been paralleled by a similar move 
toward cartel organizations in the labour movement, both in the private and in the 
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public sector, but cartelization has met with more resistance among employee 
organizations. Still, employee organizations appear to have taken the process one 
step further than the employers by forming six cartels. 
The Danish Federation of Trade Unions, like its counterpart, is an umbrella 
organization for labour organizations in both public and private sectors. The 
Federation of Trade Unions has about 1.5 million members. Like DA, the federation 
covers labour organizations set up according to different principles. This means that 
there are possible overlaps in the organizational affiliations of each employee. Labour 
organizations outside the Federation, representing primarily white-collar workers, 
organize an additional 650,000 employees. 
Membership rates are high, as more than 80 per cent of all employees are 
members of employee organizations, an increase from 68 per cent in 1975. For public 
sector employees the organization rate is about 95 per cent (Due et al., 1996). One 
reason the organization rate has remained high and even increased despite economic 
recessions may be the fact that unions through their administration of the 
unemployment insurance funds administer payment of unemployment benefits. 
Although union membership is not required for being eligible for unemployment 
benefits, the connection between the two has presumably furthered labour 
organization membership rates (Due, 1993). 
The groundwork for structural change was laid with a decision at the general 
assembly of the Federation in 1989 to form five industry-wide cartels. However, due 
to strong disagreements between skilled and unskilled labour in the metal industries, 
the implementation of this structure was slow. In 1992, the organizations representing 
employees in industry joined in an cartel, CO-lndustri. By the end of 1993, a total of 
six cartels had been formed, four private sector cartels and two public sector cartels. 
These cover industry, construction, graphics, and retail, transportation and service 
industries, as well as municipal and state employees. In the public sector the cartel 
representing state employees - the Joint Comittee of Central Organizations - is made 
up of four central organizations, which are themselves coalitions of personnel 
organizations. Membership in these central organizations is determined primarily by 
the employees' level of education (Due et al., 1996). Municipal and county 
government employee organizations are joined in a cartel known as KTO (municipal 
public servants and employees appointed on a group contract basis). Member 
organizations are independent, which means that the cartel conducts collective 
negotiations, but each organization commits itself to an agreement independently 
(Due et al., 1996). 
There has been and there still is considerable resistance within the employee 
organizations toward the cartels. In particular, blue-collar workers fear that the 
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subsuming of unskilled labour into large branch organizations will affect adversely the 
relatively high level of protection and pay unskilled labour has gained by uniting in one 
organization. 
Structural changes among employee organizations have been driven by at 
least two factors. The trade unions have long been inhibited by problems of unclear 
boundaries given the different principles along which organizations were set up. As a 
result there have been areas of overlapping competencies and poor coordination. In 
general this has prevented labour from speaking with one voice to each employer 
since several labour organizations would be represented in each enterprise. In 
addition, the formation of employer cartels has put external pressure on employees to 
form structures that would adequately match employers in negotiations. Thus, the 
formation of CO-lndustri is a direct response to the earlier formation of Danish 
Industry for employers (Due, 1993). 
As is the case for employers, employee organizations are still discussing the 
division of power among the various levels of organization. However, the Federation 
of Trade Unions appears ready to move some of its competencies to the level of 
cartels. The federation has cut its administrative staff by one-third and has transferred 
a total of DKK 120 million (more than 16 million ECU) to the cartels in order to 
strengthen their administrative capabilities. The Federation sees the cartels as fora 
for the discussion and negotiation of "soft issues", i.e. education and training, working 
environment etc. On the other hand, some trade unions, particularly the Retail, 
Transportation and Service Employees are still discussing how much power should 
be transferred to the cartel. 
4.1.3. Assessment 
The changes of the past few years signify a marked shift in the organizational 
structures of the Danish labour market, possibly as significant as the institutio-
nalisation of industrial relations at the end of the last century. A decentralisation is 
taking place from the umbrella organization to the cartel level which only covers an 
industry. At the same time, the potential transfer of competencies from the branch 
organizations to the industry-wide cartels represent a centralisation of organizational 
structures. It is to be expected that the organizational structure will eventually reflect 
the level at which collective bargaining will occur since the bargaining partners must 
have an administrative apparatus at their disposal (Due, 1993). 
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4.2. The Regulatory Framework for Industrial Relations 
This section briefly describes some of the main elements in the regulatory framework 
for industrial relations in Denmark: It describes the General Agreement between the 
main organizations which has since 1899 constituted the basic framework for 
regulating industrial relations, and it describes the institutions which exist in the 
Danish labour market today for solving industrial disputes. 
4.2.1. The General Agreement 
The fundamental principles governing industrial relations were laid out in the General 
Agreement of 1899. The General Agreement institutionalized industrial conflict by 
stating that labour market issues, including wages and working conditions would be 
determined via collective bargaining between the labour market parties (Due, 
1993:78). 
The Agreement has been amended repeatedly, but the fundamental principles 
that were laid out in 1899 remain. Most importantly, the General Agreement stipulates 
employers' right to manage and allocate work (the management prerogative) and 
stipulates employees' right to form unions as well as the right not to join the labour 
market organizations. The agreement lays out the right to resort to industrial action, 
i.e. strikes or lockouts, but specifies the conditions under which work stoppages must 
take place, including a two-week notification period and a three-fourths majority in the 
decision-making body. Finally, the General Agreement stated that collective agree-
ments could only be terminated upon three months notification. 
The General Agreement was supplemented a few years later by the "Standard 
Rules for Handling Industrial Conflict", which spelt out the rules for how to handle 
disagreements about collective agreements. The Standard Rules established the 
distinction between disputes of interest and disputes of right. Disputes of interest refer 
to conflicts about issues not covered by collective agreement, most commonly occur-
ring as an existing agreement expires and negotiations over a new agreement com-
mence. Dispute of rights refers to disagreement about the interpretation of an existing 
collective agreement. Work stoppages are only allowed in the case of disputes of 
interest. For disputes of rights, conflicts must be settled via arbitration or by the 
Industrial Court. This ban on work stoppages while a collective agreement is in effect 
has been referred to as the "peace duty". 
Other amendments to the General Agreement include protection against 
arbitrary dismissals defined as dismissals not motivated in the work of the employee 
or company-specific issues. In other words, this provision intends to protect 
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employees for political or organization reasons, among other things. The Agreement 
also explicitly offers expanded protection of shop stewards. 
4.2.2. Institutions for Solving Industrial Disputes 
The establishment of three different institutions for handling labour disputes have 
been important for maintaining stable industrial relations. As a consequence of the 
distinction between disputes of interest and disputes of rights, there are two types of 
conflict resolution institutions. Disputes of interest occur in connection with the 
collective bargaining process. When this process breaks down, a Board of 
Conciliation steps in. Disputes of right are dealt with by the Court of Arbitration or by 
the Industrial Court. 
The Board of Conciliation 
In general, industrial action, i.e. strikes or lockouts, is lawful when two parties cannot 
agree on the terms of a new collective agreement or on an issue not covered by 
collective agreement. However, in 1910, a Board of Conciliation was established to try 
to settle conflicts and avoid the execution of a strike or lockout. If a notified labour 
conflict is considered socio-economically threatening, either because it is widespread 
or because it involves key sectors of society such as hospital personnel, the Board of 
Conciliation may intervene. The Conciliator has the power to postpone the conflict for 
two weeks while a proposal for settlement is worked out. The conciliator cannot force 
a solution onto the parties; both employer and labour organizations must accept the 
proposal in a referendum: To turn down the proposal, at least 50 per cent of votes 
must be against it, and at least 35 per cent of those eligible for voting must participate 
in the voting procedure. 
One important instrument used by the Board of Conciliation to make the 
proposal pass has been to link collective agreements for different areas of 
employment. This means that even if an agreement for a specific trade is rejected by 
the employer or labour organization it covers, it will be adopted if the total referendum 
endorses the agreement. This has promoted a centralization of collective bargaining 
and has prevented local strikes in limited areas. 
The Board of Conciliation is a governmental institution, but several features 
serve to give the board the character of a corporate board of arbitration rather than a 
government institution. The Ministry of the Labour formally appoints the chairman of 
the Board, the Conciliator, but the labour market parties are involved in the appoint-
ment through its representatives on the Industrial Court. Secondly, the board's legal 
mandate states that the board's settlement proposals must reflect the most likely 
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result of a labour market conflict, thus respecting the balance of industrial relations at 
any given time. Finally, the Board has developed a practice of forwarding a proposal 
only if it is accepted by both sides in the dispute. As an extension of this process, 
government intervention has often taken the form of giving the Conciliator's proposal 
the force of law. 
The Board's effectiveness stems in part from the fact that it can serve as a 
buffer between the negotiators from each organization and their memberships in case 
of a controversial compromise. When the compromise is adopted through the 
Conciliators' proposal rather than through direct compromise, the Conciliator is seen 
as the main actor rather than the negotiators (Due, 1993: 137). 
The Arbitration and Industrial Courts 
To deal with disputes of right a system of mediation and negotiation is in place. 
Initially the dispute will be negotiated among the labour market organizations, but if no 
agreements can be reached among the organizations, the agreement will be referred 
to arbitration. The Court of Arbitration consists of an equal number of representatives 
for employers and employees as well as a neutral mediator, who is often a lawyer. 
If there is an outright breach of a labour contract, such as an illegitimate work 
stoppage, the issue will be handled by the Industrial Court. The court can try to solve 
the matter in a preliminary hearing among the parties. If this is unsuccessful, the court 
settles the dispute. The Industrial Court is a court of law and consists of legally 
trained members as well as lay judges appointed by the labour market parties. 
Although a court of law, the Industrial Court resembles an arbitration institution in that 
the labour market parties are actively involved in the settlement of the conflict. 
However, the court differs from arbitration in that it has the power to impose penalties 
both as a penal sanction and as indemnity for losses suffered. 
Both arbitration awards and orders of the Industrial Court are final and must 
be abided by the labour market parties. 
4.3. The State and Collective Bargaining 
This section will focus on the strength of the State relative to the labour market 
parties. The relationship between the State and the labour market parties is described 
in terms of both the form and the level of government intervention in collective 
bargaining. 
As mentioned, the essence of the so-called Danish Model is the extensive 
involvement of the labour market parties in the regulation of labour market issues. 
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However, the Government plays the role of an invisible hand, exerting its power when 
it is considered necessary for macroeconomic reasons. 
4.3.1. Direct Government Intervention 
Government interventions in industrial relations may take direct or indirect forms. The 
Government may intervene directly and dictate by law the agreements that will 
regulate the labour market for a given settlement period, including wage increases 
and other working conditions. Danish governments have intervened repeatedly when 
collective bargaining broke down and conciliation failed, and typically the intervention 
has consisted of giving the conciliation proposal the force of law. In such instances 
the intervention becomes an extension of the collective bargaining (Due). Occasio-
nally, though, government interventions have ignored the conciliation proposals, 
including aspects on which the two parties have agreed, and have dictated wages 
and working conditions entirely according to economic policy considerations. 
Government interventions occurred regularly although not very often until the 
1970s. During the 1970s the system of collective bargaining between the central 
organizations virtually broke down. This prompted government interventions in three 
consecutive collective bargaining processes. The labour market parties then appa-
rently realized that the legitimacy of the industrial system was in danger, and in order 
to break the deadlock between opposing interests, the focus of collective bargaining 
moved from the central level of the federations to the lower level of each trade 
organization (Due, 1993: 339). 
In the 1980s direct Government intervention in collective bargaining has been 
more infrequent. In 1985, the then conservative-liberal coalition government 
intervened to end a large scale conflict after the organizations and the Conciliator had 
reached a deadlock. In an unusual move, the Government ignored a conciliation 
proposal which suggested a reduction of the working week by 1 1/2 hours without 
wage reductions, leading to a wage increase at about 4 percent per year. The 
government intervention consisted of a one-hour reduction of the working week 
without wage reductions, with the effect of a total wage increase of about 2 percent 
per year. The intervention led to massive political protests and a wave of wild strikes, 
but to no effect. 
Since then industrial relations have been relatively peaceful, and there have 
been no direct government intervention in collective bargaining until recently. In 1995 
a prolonged strike among nurses and other groups in the public health care sector 
prompted intervention. The nurses had originally demanded a large wage increase, 
claiming a wage lag compared to groups with similar education, but the Government 
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set the increase at 3.5 per cent over 2 years. However, it also set up a commission to 
study the working conditions and relative wage increases of nurses in relation to other 
similar groups. The result of the Commission's work was an extra 1 per cent wage 
increase which was to be conditioned on productivity increases. 
4.3.2. Indirect Government Intervention 
The Government can also affect collective agreements indirectly, for instance by 
adopting policies that will modify the results of negotiated wage increases. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s double-digit wage increases that were agreed upon during 
collective bargaining were virtually nullified by tax policies or by devaluations and 
subsequent price inflation that left employees with no or only marginal improvements 
in real wages. 
The Government's potential for intervention has worked as an invisible hand in 
the collective bargaining process, creating incentives for the labour market parties a) 
to reach an agreement, b) to reach an agreement that would not prompt the 
government to empty the agreement of its contents with countervailing policies. 
Consequently, it can be argued that the Government has the upper hand in the game 
of collective bargaining as the potential for government intervention forces the labour 
market parties to take into account government economic objectives. 
It has further been argued that the integration of labour market parties into 
policy-making has created an institutional interest for these organizations in main-
taining the economic system. In order to continue to play a central role in the 
management of the labour market and in the overall political proces, the labour 
market organizations have been forced to think in a longer time perspective and to 
take into account other interests than their own immediate ones. In 1987 the then 
conservative-liberal Government and the labour market organizations issued a joint 
'declaration of intent', stating the goal of keeping Danish wage increases below those 
of the countries with which Danish companies usually compete (Due 1993: 156). This 
can be seen as an example of the labour market parties' acceptance of broad social 
interests. 
4.3.3. Assessment 
In conclusion, the Danish labour market organizations are to a large extent self-
regulating and generally play a considerable role in the management and setting of 
overall economic policy. However, this self-regulation is constrained by two factors: 
First, the potential for government intervention, which influences collective bargaining 
by bringing about a willingness to compromise and by influencing the content of col-
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lective agreements. Second, the high level of integration of the labour market parties 
into economic policy-making, which confers upon the labour market parties an 
interest in and responsibility for the long-term success of the economy. Ultimately, the 
Government decides whether or not to continue this system of industrial relations. 
4.4. Collective Wage Negotiations 
Until the crisis in industrial relations in the 1970s the central organizations, DA and 
LO, would negotiate all major issues in collective bargaining and establish the 
framework within which the trade organizations would settle the details. The 
federations would define a wage scheme for the entire labour market and determine 
the major issues to be discussed, such as working time or other issues important to 
one or both labour market parties. This system was characterized by a high degree of 
centralization (Due, 1993; Ibsen, 1993). 
4.4.1. Recent Changes in the System of Collective Wage Negotiations 
During the 1970s pressures mounted for a decentralization of the collective bargai-
ning process. The impetus for change towards decentralized wage formation has 
come primarily from employers, particularly industrial employers in sectors competing 
in international markets. The international economy, characterized by volatile 
markets, exerts pressures at the enterprise level towards flexibility and adaptability. 
This again calls for flexible organizational structures and wage systems. In this 
context employers have wanted to be able to use wage differentials as a motivating 
factor for improved productivity and to attract or retain qualified labour through higher 
wages (Ibsen, 1993). 
At the same time, however, employer organizations were concerned that 
decentralized wage formation would set off spiralling wage increases. The central 
employers organization has therefore attempted to control wage formation through a 
system of mandatory wage increase ceilings. 
The current system of wage formation is thus characterized by a simultaneous 
process of allowing flexible wage structures through decentralization while also 
controlling the process by determining maximum wage increases, a system which has 
been termed "centralized decentralization" (Due, 1993; Ibsen, 1993). On the one 
hand, this implies that the centre of gravity of collective bargaining has moved away 
from the central organizations to the level of individual enterprises. Bargaining at 
enterprise level has to a large extent determined wage developments in recent years. 
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On the other hand, there are clear limits to decentralization as the central employers' 
organization attempts to control wage formation by issuing decrees about maximum 
wage increases to its member enterprises. 
The decentralization of the bargaining process has been accompanied by a 
change in the wage systems. Three different wage systems have been and still are at 
play in the Danish labour market. Under the standard wage system the organizations 
negotiate wage levels for each group of employees depending on qualifications, job 
functions and experience. These standard wages are considered fixed although they 
are regulated annually. The annual regulations cover everyone employed under a 
standard wage scheme. 
In the minimum wage system, which shall be referred to here as minimal 
wage, a minimum pay is set which serves as a base wage for everyone covered by 
the agreement. Each group of employees may then negotiate supplements or 
bonuses on top of the minimal wage. The resulting dynamic has been that any 
adjustment in the minimal wage will spread to all groups whose wages are based on 
the minimal wage. 
The third wage system also operates with a minimum wage below which no 
employee wage may drop. In this system, the minimum wage and other issues of 
general interest are agreed upon between national organizations, but most of the 
wage formation occurs locally. Since the minimum wage applies only to the groups at 
the very lowest end of the pay scale it is not considered basic pay, and in principle 
there is no relationship between the minimum wage and any other wages above this 
level. This system allows for decentralized wage formation where it should be 
possible for some groups or persons to obtain higher wages without an automatic 
spill-over into the entire labour market. 
The central organizations, including the cartels, are still trying to define their 
roles in the process of collective bargaining as wage formations has moved to more 
decentral levels. Generally, it is expected that the central organizations will continue 
to negotiate the framework within which local negotiations take place. However, it is 
unclear what those frameworks will include and how specific they will be. At the same 
time, the National Employers Confederation, DA, is likely to attempt to maintain 
control with the overall wage development through decrees about maximum wage 
increases. 
The Federation of Trade Unions sees its role as making recommendations 
and defining general demands at the outset of collective bargaining, as well as 
mediation at the conclusion of the bargaining. The Federation sees the cartels as 
forums for cooperation with employers about issues such as work environment and 
occupational health, education and other issues involving large sectors of the labour 
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market (Interview, Federation of Trade Unions). In order to support this development, 
the Federation of Trade Unions has transferred funds to the cartels to strengthen their 
administrative capabilities in these as well as in and other areas. Whether the cartels 
will take on this role is as of now not clear. 
4.4.2. The Flexibility of Wage Formation 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1, a rigid wage structure has been emphasized as an 
important explanation for unemployment in Denmark, particularly among low skilled or 
unskilled workers. In this connection, there has been little change in wage structures 
in recent years despite the movement toward decentralized bargaining (Ibsen, 1993; 
Economic Council, 1994), and real wages do not appear to have been affected by 
the growing unemployment rates from 1987 onwards. In the Danish labour market 
there seems to be little downward pressure on wages for groups with a high risk of 
unemployment. 
Figure 4.4.2: Real Wage Development by Employment Status 1980-1992. 
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Thus, as is shown in Figure 4.4.2. unskilled blue collar workers who have a higher 
unemployment risk than other groups have actually experienced a higher real wage 
growth rate than other groups from 1980 onwards. Furthermore, and as it is descri­
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bed in more detail in Appendix C, wage increases have been fairly uniform across 
skill levels despite high unemployment rates for specific groups. 
Finally, statistical evidence indicates a higher wage increase rate for unskilled 
labour in companies where employment is decreasing. In one interpretation, this is 
explained by the emphasis of the enterprises on retaining well-trained, productive 
employees rather than taking the risk that they will leave the company because of 
poor wages (Ibsen, 1993: 111). 
On balance, decentralization of wage negotiations starting in as far back as in 
the 1970s has not increased the flexibility of wage formation in Denmark. On the 
contrary, the weak relation between overall unemployment and unemployment rates 
for specific groups on the one hand and real wage growth rates on the other hand 
may serve as evidence of the existence of an insider-outsider problem in the Danish 
labour market. 
4.5. Conclusions 
The Danish system of industrial relations remains a highly institutionalized system. 
The labour market parties continue to play a very significant role in the regulation of 
labour market affairs in a wide range of areas. However, direct and particularly 
indirect state intervention in the labour market constrains the freedom of action of the 
labour market parties and forces the parties to take overall societal objectives into 
account in their bargaining behaviour. 
Both the organization of the labour market parties and the system of collective 
bargaining is presently being restructured. As for the organization of employers and 
employees, a system of branch related cartels is being formed, providing the basis for 
a one enterprise one collective agreement system. In the medium and long term this 
is likely to improve possibilities for a more efficient and flexible organization of 
production at the level of the individual enterprise. 
As for collective bargaining on wages, decentralization has occurred during 
the 1980s. A system of "centralized decentralization" has emerged, in which wage 
formation is to a high extent decentralized to the branch or enterprise level, but where 
the central employers organization retains ultimate control with the maximum wage 
increases. 
The system of industrial relations, in particular the institutionalization of conflict 
resolution, has formed the basis for stability in the labour market. Compared to other 
labour markets in the European Union, the level of conflict has been low in recent 
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years when measures in terms of strike days per 1000 employees, cf. figure 4.5 
below. 
However, the system holds few direct incentives for looking after the interests 
of unemployed. The system is constructed to allow for the articulation and 
aggregation of employed wage earners' interests, and the rules and regulations 
emerging from the collective agreement system serve to protect working and wage 
conditions of the employed. 
Figure 4.5. Strike Days Per 1000 Employees, Denmark and EU-15,1988-1994. 
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The fate of the social chapters in the most recent collective agreements illustrate this 
fact. Prior to the latest round of collective bargaining the centre­left Government 
coalition urged the labour market parties to include agreements that would ease the 
access to the labour market for persons who are unable to fulfil prevailing 
expectations for job qualifications and productivity, either because of physical­mental 
handicaps or because of lacking relations to the labour market, for instance as a 
result of long­term unemployment. However, in the collective agreements this only 
resulted in vague statements of intent, as the social chapters do not oblige the parties 
to any specific effort other than information campaigns or the formation of work 
groups to determine the future effort. So far it appears that the introduction of the 
social chapter has had little effect in measurable terms, i.e. in terms of protected jobs 
(Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs, 1995. Interview, Danish Confederation of 
Employers). 
Consequently, the risk that the Danish labour market will be characterized by 
an insider­outsider problem is inherent in the system. The existence of a significant 
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insider-outsider problem appears likely when it is considered that high unemployment 
rates for unskilled workers have not caused lower wage growth rates for employed 
persons within these groups. On the contrary, unskilled blue collar workers have 
experienced higher real wage increases than other occupational groups during the 
1980s. 
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5. Labour Market Legislation 
The implication of the Danish model as outlined in the previous chapter is that only 
few labour market issues are regulated by law. By and large, labour market issues 
have been regulated by collective agreement. This also holds for the determination of 
working time and other issues that will be treated in this chapter. This being said, 
however, there are a few statutes regulating labour market issues, some of them 
occasioned by EU directives. 
5.1. Employment Protection Schemes 
This describes the current regulation in Denmark on individual and collective 
dismissals, as well as the regulation and the frequency of fixed-term or temporary 
employment. Finally, the effects of the Danish employment protection scheme on 
employment are assessed. 
5.1.1. Individual and Collective Dismissal 
Among European countries Denmark has rather weak rules for employment 
protection, particularly for employees paid on an hourly or weekly basis (Employment 
Outlook, 1994; Economic Council, 1988a). Protection against collective dismissals 
one labour market issue regulated by statute of law. The law implements the EU 
directive 92/56/EEC, stating that in case of collective dismissal employees must 
receive a four-week notification. Furthermore, the employer must inform the employee 
organizations about the number of employees to be laid off and the reason why and 
must enter negotiations about measures to prevent or reduce the layoffs or to 
alleviate their consequences for employees. 
Until recently, Danish employers could lay off workers and provide little or no 
compensation. But in 1989 the unemployment insurance law was amended to require 
that employers pay the first day of unemployment for each insured employee who is 
dismissed. Since 1993, employers have been obliged to pay for the first two days of 
unemployment for each insured unemployed person (Ministry of Finance, 1993). 
The reasoning behind relatively weak job protection measured in terms of low 
costs of dismissal has been that an open economy dominated by smaller companies 
needs flexibility in its employment patterns. Companies cannot sustain high labour 
cost when demand slows down (Economic Council, 1988a). However, two factors 
seem to have been prerequisites for this low degree of job protection: The high 
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unemployment benefit replacement ratio (on average unemployment benefits 
correspond to a high percentage of previous wages) and the fact that dismissed 
employees were entitled to benefits from day one of unemployment. In combination, 
these factors mean that the cost to employees of being laid off is relatively low, 
facilitating the acceptance of low employment protection. 
Despite the liberal legislation, it appears that Danish companies practice some 
restraint in laying off employees, as employment patterns have been rather stable 
(Economic Council, 1988a). One reason may be that frequent layoffs waste the 
resources put into the training of employees. In other words, there seems to exist an 
informal job protection stemming from the employer's interest in retaining a stable 
workforce, and in particular the skills developed in the company (Economic Council, 
1988a). 
One exception to this pattern has been the frequent practice of temporary lay-
offs due to shortage of work or bad weather conditions. Such dismissals are 
deceptive since there often exists a quasi-contractual relationship between employer 
and employee about continued employment. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
temporary lay-offs account for a considerable share of total unemployment spells. 
One estimate has assessed temporary layoffs at 40 per cent of all unemployment 
spells (Jensen and Westergård-Nielsen, 1990). Temporary layoffs help employers 
retain employees while passing the cost of the work shortage onto the unemployment 
insurance system. 
This has prompted a change of the law so that the employer must now pay for 
the first two days of unemployment for those dismissed (Statute on Unemployment 
Insurance, 1996). The change was implemented in two rounds. Estimates of the 
effect of employers paying the first day of unemployment for each employee indicate 
that short-term lay-offs were reduced by about 20 per cent (Ministry of Finance, 
1993). 
Regarding individual dismissal, the General Agreement between the labour 
market parties protects employees from arbitrary dismissals, that is dismissals not 
related to the employee's work or to company-related issues. If the employee has 
worked for the employer for more than nine months, the employee can demand 
written information about the reasons for the dismissal (General Agreement). If the 
employee considers the dismissal to be unreasonable, that is arbitrary, he may take 
the issue to the labour market organizations who will negotiate the case or set up a 
Board of Dismissal. The board may reinstate the employee in his job or order the 
employer to pay an indemnity (General Agreement). 
Individual dismissal is regulated for white-collar workers in the Salaried 
Employers Act, and for blue collar workers by collective agreement. Collective 
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agreements often offer protection on similar terms to the Salaried Employers Act, 
which spells out rules for notification of dismissal which increase with seniority and, 
redundancy payments. (Schömann, 1995). After three months of employment, the 
white collar worker is entitled to one month of notice, increasing with seniority to six 
months' notice after nine years of employment (Law on White Collar Workers). Blue 
collar workers often have a shorter period of notification. 
Finally, special dismissal protection is offered under the law or the General 
Agreement to pregnant employees and to shop stewards (Schömann, 1995). 
5.1.2. Temporary and Fixed Term Contracts 
The use of temporary work is currently unregulated, and regulations for fixed term 
employment are considered liberal. There are few limitations to the amount of such 
temporary employment, although employees under both these employment forms are 
entitled to the same level of protection as any other employee. 
Temporary employment is limited to three months with the same employer. 
Exceeding this, the employer must offer permanent employment including notification 
periods. Fixed term contracts may be renewed, but in the case of several renewals 
this may be considered a circumvention of seniority rules and the contract may be 
declared void, making the work relationship permanent so that general termination 
rules apply. (Jacobsen, 1993). Seasonal workers or day labourers are offered special 
protection by collective agreements. 
In the early 1990s, almost 12 percent of the Danish labour force was 
employed in non-permanent jobs, either temporary or fixed term. This was slightly 
above the EU average (Employment Observatory, 1994). Many of these are in the 
construction business. 
5.1.3. The Effects of Employment Protection on Employment 
No estimates are available as to the precise effect of employment protection or the 
level of temporary employment on employment levels. However, it is possible to 
identify some trends in the relationship between job protection and employment 
levels. 
It has been argued that high job protection leads to higher unemployment 
because a) companies who have to pay high costs to dismiss people are less inclined 
to hire and b) high job security leads to higher wages as those who are insiders in the 
labour market will be in a stronger bargaining position (Bertola, 1990). However, 
empirical evidence did not bear out these relationships. In a comparative study of un-
employment levels and employment security, Bertola concluded that medium and 
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long-term unemployment appeared unrelated to job security. Denmark and the United 
States who were ranked most liberal in terms of job security legislation did not have 
lower unemployment in the long-term than countries with high job security. 
Companies in the latter countries may hire fewer employees during economic 
upswings but also lay off fewer during downturns, but in the long-term they do not 
appear to generate fewer jobs. 
Likewise the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that insiders, 
due to high job protection, are able to negotiate higher wages or maintain higher 
wages in economic downturns thereby contributing to lower employment. In fact the 
study found the opposite relationship: In countries with strong job protection laws, 
wages dropped more in response to unemployment than they did in low job protection 
countries like Denmark. Bertola concludes from this that wages are more affected by 
other factors than by job security provisions (Bertola, 1990). 
5.2. Regulation of Working Time 
This section describes legal and contractual limitations to working time in Denmark, 
and presents recent developments in the flexibility of work schemes. The final section 
provides an assessment of the effects of working time regulation on employment. 
5.2.1. Legal and Contractual Limitations to Working Time 
There are no legal limitations to working hours in Denmark, except a statute speci-
fying that all employees are entitled to 11 hours of rest between periods of work 
(Jacobsen, 1994:96). Holiday and night-time work is permitted. Other legislation 
includes the holiday provisions which grant employees five weeks of paid vacation 
every year. 
As with other labour market issues, working time has been regulated by 
collective agreements. In this connection, Denmark has witnessed a very significant 
drop in the normal total yearly working time from 1950 until today. In the early 1950s, 
normal total yearly working time exceeded 2,300 hours. By 1990, normal total yearly 
working time as regulated by collective agreements had dropped to 1,676 hours 
(Dansk Metal and Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, 1994). A reduction in working 
time was among the major issues of collective bargaining during the 1980s, and from 
1990 the weekly work time was set at 37 hours. This applies to the entire labour 
market. 
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5.2.2. Flexibility in Work Schemes 
Flexibility in work schemes, including rules for overtime pay or time off in lieu, is also 
spelled out in collective agreements. This issue has been a matter of contention 
between the Danish labour market parties. Labour organizations have traditionally 
opted for relatively inflexible work schemes, while employers have argued that inflex-
ible working hours like other measures decreasing the flexibility of production will 
reduce employment. 
Until the late 1980s an increasing number of Danes were employed under 
fixed-hour schemes, and more and more employees worked during the daytime, 
indicating decreasing flexibility in working hours (Mogensen, 1993). However between 
1988 and 1991, the number of employees working daytime hours only decreased, 
and more employees had entered some form of flexible work schedules such as 
staggered working hours, rotation and shift work. It has been estimated that about 80 
per cent of the labour force work regular daytime shifts, seven to eight hours a day, 
five days a week. (Mogensen, 1993: 55). However, it also appears that most of the 
labour force deviates from this pattern at least occasionally. 
Many of the collective agreements concluded in 1991 opened up possibilities 
for a more flexible planning of the working week. Whereas before, any working time 
beyond 37 hours in a given week would set off overtime pay at higher rates, it is now 
possible in many work places to negotiate variable work schedules, for instance 
concentrating the work week on fewer days or working a mix of longer or shorter 
weeks. Specific arrangements are negotiated locally, but in many cases they must be 
approved by the national labour organizations. Most such agreements require that the 
working week over a specified period of weeks averages 37 hours so as not to pre-
empt the option of overtime pay. 
Moreover, studies asking employees about their actual working hours indicate 
much greater flexibility than collective agreements show. According to these studies 
nearly twice as many people actually work under some form of flexible work schedule 
as formal contracts indicate. (Mogensen, 1992: 34). For instance, during the 1980s 
the share of employees who worked overtime increased from about 4 per cent to 
almost 7 per cent of the labour force. Another study cited in Mogensen roughly 
estimates that about 10 per cent of wage earners work flexitime, that is they set their 
own work hours and frequently work overtime without direct overtime compensation. 
This applied primarily to white collar employees Mogensen, 1992:p. 54). 
Finally, working time flexibility may be increased by people working extra jobs. 
In 1984, about 4 per cent of the those employed earned an income from a 
supplemental job. In 1990 this share had increased to more than 5 per cent of the 
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labour force. Particularly white collar employees and self-employed work extra jobs. 
Including also moonlighting work, it has been estimated that up to 22 per cent of the 
labour force takes work in addition to their regular jobs. 
People working extra jobs may serve as a reserve pool of qualified labour. For 
instance, the frequency of people working extra jobs jumped during the economic 
boom in the mid-1980s. Likewise overtime work increased during this economic 
boom. This is an indication that flexibility in working time may be greater than appears 
from collective agreements (Mogensen, 1992:38). 
5.2.3. Assessments: Working Time Regulation and Employment 
Fixed working time schemes supposedly produce an inflexible labour market, as it 
becomes difficult for companies to adjust to fluctuations in demand. Other possible 
socio-economic drawbacks include inefficient use of the production capacity and the 
concentration of transportation around work time, increasing travel-to-work time. Yet 
this appears to be of decreasing significance as work schemes are generally 
becoming more flexible. 
In terms of working time, employee organizations tied this demand to the 
curbing of unemployment. It was argued that work would be distributed among more 
people if general working time was reduced. This would again entail lower 
unemployment rates. 
However, studies show that reduced working hours may reduce cyclical 
unemployment, but working time reductions do not significantly affect long-term 
structural unemployment as they tend to spur inflation through increased demand for 
substitute labour. This reduces the room for manoeuvre for increases in demand and 
production, just as the room for manoeuvre for expansive macroeconomic policies is 
limited (Welfare Commission; 1995: 351-353). Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that the reduction in formal working time does not necessarily lead to a corresponding 
reduction in actual working time. As outlined above, it appears that the number of 
people working in flexible work schemes, overtime and extra jobs has increased 
simultaneously with the reduction in the working week. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is the Economic Council's assessment that 
measures which reduce labour supply, including working time reductions, has had no 
discernible permanent effect on unemployment during the past 25 years (Economic 
Council, 1994: 70). However, the Enterprise Council of the Labour Movement AER 
has estimated that a 2-hour working time reduction may result in a reduction of 
unemployment by 45,000 persons after a 5 year period. However, these calculations 
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rest on an assumption that the wage growth rate will not be affected by decreasing 
unemployment, no wage compensation is paid. 
5.3. Minimum Wage Regulation 
There is no statutory minimum wage in Denmark but the labour market parties 
determine a minimum wage during collective bargaining. This means that minimum 
wages may vary among the 600 collective agreements that cover the Danish labour 
market, although the variation is rather small. A review of the most recent collective 
agreements shows that minimum wages in 1996 vary between 9.60 ECU and 10.3 
ECU per hour (DKK 70 to DKK 80). 
At its peak in 1977, the minimum wage amounted to 80 per cent of the 
average wage. By 1990, this share had fallen to about 70 per cent of the average 
wage. This level appears to be stable (Albæk et. al, 1992). 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a compressed wage structure caused by among 
other things a high minimum wage has been emphasized as one factor underlying 
structural unemployment in Denmark. High minimum wages particularly affect 
adversely the employment of low-skilled workers or employees whose productivity 
does not match the minimum wage. According to one estimate, the effect of the 
minimum wage on unemployment amounts to about 0.7 percentage points of male 
unemployment and 1.7 percentage points of female unemployment. (Economic 
Council, 1994). The Council considers this estimate conservative. 
Other studies have shown that the minimum wage reduces the chances for 
employment of those least qualified, creating an entrance barrier to the labour market 
(Smith, 1993). The minimum wage hence primarily works to the benefit of those who 
are already employed, and who possess the qualifications to hold on to employment 
(Sørensen, 1992). 
5.4. Conclusions 
The Danish labour market is characterized by a low level of legislative regulation. 
Most labour market issues are left for the labour market parties to decide by collective 
agreements. 
Denmark has rather weak rules for employment protection, particularly for 
employees paid on an hourly or weekly basis. Despite the liberal legislation, Danish 
enterprises practice restraint in laying off employees, as employment patterns have 
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been rather stable. One exception is temporary lay-offs due to shortage of work or 
bad weather conditions. However, such dismissals are deceptive since there often 
exists a quasi-contractual relationship between employer and employee about 
continued employment. 
There is no evidence that the liberal employment protection rules in Denmark 
have affected employment significantly. Comparative studies indicate that medium 
and long-term unemployment appeared unrelated to job security, and neither does 
empirical evidence support the hypothesis that insiders due to high formal job 
protection are able to negotiate higher wages thereby contributing to lower 
employment. 
There are very few legal limitations on working hours. As with other labour 
market issues, working time has been regulated by collective agreements. In this 
regard, Denmark has witnessed a very significant drop in the normal total annual 
working time from the 1950 until today. 
During the past decade, there has been a considerable focus on reductions in 
working time as a possible means to reduce unemployment. However, by most 
accounts reduced working hours may reduce cyclical unemployment, but they do not 
significantly affect long-term structural unemployment as they tend to spur inflation 
through increased demand for substitute labour. This reduces the room for 
manoeuvre for increases in demand and production, and the room for manoeuvre for 
expansive macroeconomic policies is limited. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
Economic Council indeed assesses that measures which reduce labour supply, 
including working time reductions, have had no discernible permanent effect on 
unemployment during the past 25 years. 
By most accounts, the minimum wage level and the compressed wage 
structure in Denmark contributes to unemployment, in particular for low-skilled or 
unskilled workers whose productivity does not match the minimum wage. Other 
studies have shown that the minimum wage reduces the chances for employment of 
the least qualified groups, creating an entrance barrier to the labour market. The 
minimum wage hence primarily works to the benefit of those who are already 
employed. 
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6. The Tax and Benefit System and the Functioning of 
the Labour Market 
This chapter describes the Danish system of taxes and welfare benefits as it affects 
the supply of labour. The effective supply of labour directly affects structural 
unemployment: The higher effective labour supply, the lower the inflationary 
pressures of the economy, as labour shortages occur less frequently. A growth in 
effective labour supply thus lowers that rate of unemployment at which inflation starts 
to accelerate. 
The first section presents the main features of the tax system including 
marginal tax rates, rate of progressivity and allowances in order to show how these 
factors determine the level of disposable incomes for the unemployed and low-
income employees. The second section describes the mechanisms through which the 
tax and benefit system may actually decrease the disposable income of an 
unemployed person taking on a job - a phenomenon labeled the unemployment trap. 
Finally, the third section assesses the effects of the system of taxes and benefits and 
of recent tax reforms on labour supply in the Danish labour market. 
6.1 . The Danish Tax System in Relation to the Labour Market 
Traditionally, Denmark has gained a large share of its tax revenue from high taxes on 
work income. In 1993, income taxes made up 26 per cent of Danish GDP (Ministry of 
Finance, 1995b: 248). This corresponded to 52 per cent of the total Danish tax 
revenue, whereas the average European OECD-member country generated about 27 
percent of its total tax revenue from income taxes. Indirect taxes, primarily VAT, 
accounted for another 32 per cent of Danish tax revenues. 
Personal income forms the basis for state income taxes as well as municipal 
taxes. The income-based tax system is composed of a proportional municipal tax, 
which varies among municipalities, and a state income tax which is progressive, 
including three tax levels. Finally, a labour market tax earmarked for unemployment 
insurance, activation and sickness benefits is based on work income. Figure 6.1 
illustrates the progression in the tax system for 1997. 
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Note: Incomes are gross incomes. However, they do not include deductions for labour market 
tax, employee deduction or other deductions. Muncipal tax rate set at the 1995 average level of 
29,5 per cent. Source: Ministry of Finance, 1995b, and interview data. 
As shown in the above figure, the personal tax allowance for 1997 will be DKK 
30,800, the level at which income taxes kick in. All income above this level in 1997 
will be taxed at 10 per cent in addition to the municipal tax, which has been set at the 
1995 average of 29,5 per cent. The state intermediate tax tier is 6 per cent, levied on 
all income above DKK 136,300, and the state top tier is 15 per cent which applies to 
all income above DKK 246,300, adding up to a marginal tax rate of 60,5 percent on 
income above this level. However, there is a tax ceiling of 60 percent.41 The labour 
market tax amounts to 8 per cent levied on the full work income, yet this amount is 
deductible against personal income. In 1998, upon full implementation of the 1994 tax 
reform, the bottom tax will drop to 8 per cent, lowering the marginal tax rates further. 
Overall, the 1994 tax reform should reduce the marginal tax rate on average income 
by 12 to 14 percentage points from the highest previous level, by 1998. 
Unemployment benefits are taxed like any other income, as is all other 
transfer income in Denmark. However, transfer incomes are exempt from the labour 
market tax. In 1996, the unemployment benefit amounts to about DKK 136,000. 
Assuming, realistically, that this amount will not increase considerably in 1997, the 
The tax ceiling does not include church taxes. 
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unemployed will pay state taxes at the lowest rate of 10 per cent, decreasing to 8 per 
cent in 1998. Thus, including municipal taxes the typical unemployed person, with no 
capital income, will face a marginal tax rate of almost 38 per cent in 1998, depending 
on the level of municipal taxes. This is a decrease in the marginal tax rate at this 
income level from a level of 51,5 per cent before the tax reform of 1994. 
The 1994 tax reform has shifted the focus of the tax system some. In 1998, 
income taxes are expected to make up 42 per cent of the tax revenue, compared to 
52 per cent in 1993. The tax reform lowered marginal tax rates on income and instead 
increased indirect taxes, specifically green taxes, i.e. taxes on energy and water 
consumption, industry's carbon dioxide emissions and automobiles. This means that 
a greater share of the tax revenue was made more dependent on consumption, less 
so on income. 
The intention behind shifting the tax structure toward consumption-based 
taxes, has been to increase effective labour supply, arguing that this will increase 
competition for vacant jobs and limit the risks of labour shortages, thereby reducing 
wage growth pressures in the economy and structural unemployment. Thus, the 
Danish government expects that the decrease in marginal tax rates will have the 
following effects (Ministry of Finance, 1995b: 249, 254): 
• increase the incentive to work more hours as employees will be able to keep a 
larger share of the earnings on the extra hours worked than previously, 
• increase the incentive to seek work at all 
• increase the incentive to move for better paid jobs, which will improve labour 
market mobility and thereby decrease structural employment, 
• increase the incentive to upgrade skills, likewise improving labour market mobility 
• increase the incentive to supply labour in the white labour market rather than in the 
black labour market. 
The tax decrease on incomes in the 150,000 DKK and 250,000 DKK range is seen as 
particularly important since 60 per cent of the full-time employed fall within this 
income range (Ministry of Finance, 1995b). 
6.2. The Unemployment Trap 
It has been argued that the Danish system of high marginal taxes and unemployment 
benefits creates an unemployment trap in the sense that it may be economically more 
beneficial to the individual to remain unemployed rather than to accept a job. When 
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net-income from working is equal to or below the net benefits, the supply of labour will 
be minimal, that is the benefit level determines a wage floor. The precise level of the 
wage floor depends on the tax system. In the case where unemployment benefits and 
income are taxed in the same manner, the wage floor must be at or near the level of 
benefits. This means that persons, whose earning potential, i.e. their productivity, is 
below that demanded at the wage floor, will tend to be unemployed (Ministry of 
Finance, 1995c). The problem is exacerbated by high marginal tax rates, as these 
reduce the incentive to seek employment at or near the wage floor. 
The Danish Unemployment Trap 
Danish unemployment benefits compensate up to 90 per cent of the income in the previous 
job although there is a maximum benefit. This means that for most people in low-paying 
jobs, unemployment benefits equal 90 per cent of their wages. In this case, the following 
mechanisms work to set up an unemployment trap low-skilled labour: 
• the high marginal taxes erode the relatively small difference between benefits and low 
wages, 
• the problem of high marginal taxes is compounded by the phasing out of state subsidies 
such as means-tested housing and childcare allowances. Such a composite marginal tax 
implies an effectual increase in tax rates for people who move from unemployment 
support to a higher paying job 
• there are costs associated with holding a job that do not apply to not going to work, 
including transportation costs and, possibly, child care costs42 (Smith and Pedersen, 
1995) 
• finally, the labour market tax of 8 per cent kicks in with employment; although this tax is 
also deductable against the income tax, it still causes a sudden leap in taxes of up to 4 
per cent percentage points when a person moves from unemployment to employment. 
In 1995, a government calculation concerning the effect of the tax reform showed that 
people making an annual income of up to DKK 141,000, i.e. about DKK 11,000 more 
than the unemployment benefit for that year, would have no gain in disposable 
income from being employed. This was due to the labour market tax, which presents 
an entrance cost to the labour market (Ministry of Finance, 1995). Table 6.1 shows 
the net gain in disposable income as work income increases. 
The table illustrates the unemployment trap: Only at relatively high wages 
does it pay to work, considering the cost of working. Regarding the reduction of 
means-tested public subsidies with increasing income, the Ministry of Finance 
concludes that this constitutes only a marginal problem. The composite marginal tax 
affects primarily single parents who represent a small share of the labour force, and 
42 However, Danish parents often continue to make use of public child care schemes during 
unemployment spells, partly to provide social contact for the child, partly because labour 
market eligibility rules require that a person can take on a job with a day's notice. 
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consequently, the problem amounts to a few percentage points of the work force in 
tax rates applying to the DKK 75,000 to DKK 200,000 income range (Ministry of 
Finance, 1995b). 
Table 6.2 Gain in Disposable Income, Moving from Unemployment to Employ-
ment 
Taxes, at full implementation of 
1994-reform, Dkk 1,000 
Disposable income 
Net gain over unemployment 
benefit 
Gross income, 1,000 DKK. 1995. 













Source: Ministry of Finance, 1995b. 
As to the effect of the overall unemployment trap, few estimates are available. One 
survey including about 600 unemployed persons, asked these about their 
expectations regarding the impact on disposable income from getting a job, including 
the reduction in means-tested subsidies. While 69 per cent of the respondents 
expected an improvement in disposable income, 22 per cent expected no change and 
9 per cent actually anticipated a smaller disposable income if they took a job 
(Pedersen and Smith, 1995). Respondents were also asked about their expected net 
gain from making an extra DKK 1,000, taking into consideration taxes and reductions 
in means-tested benefits. While employees generally expected a smaller net gain 
than the unemployed, a significantly larger share of the unemployed, 13 per cent, 
expected a 70 per cent composite marginal tax rate on the 1,000, compared to about 
3 per cent of the employees (Pedersen and Smith). 
These results give no indication as to the exact number of persons who are 
trapped in unemployment for financial reasons alone, but they are a sign of a less 
than optimal economic incentives structure for the low-skilled portion of the Danish 
labour force. 
6.3. Assessment of the Effects of Income Taxes on Labour Supply 
Income taxes may affect labour supply in two opposite directions. Income taxes 
correspond to a decrease in wages. Correspondingly, a cut in marginal tax rates, 
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which is the more relevant case to consider here, represents an increase in wages 
relative to previous tax levels. A higher wage means that the cost of an hour of leisure 
increases relative to working an extra hour. This mechanism, referred to as the 
substitution effect, will result in an increase in labour supply. The other mechanism in 
operation, the income effect, implies that a person can earn the same net-income by 
working fewer hours, thus possibly resulting in a reduction in labour supply. 
The question then becomes which effect is stronger. The Ministry of Finance 
argues that the substitution effect will prevail, that is the labour supply of the 
population as a whole will increase. This is because a lower marginal tax rate, given 
an assumed government preference for a revenue-neutral tax reform, would likely 
entail cuts in public subsidies and services. The population's overall increase in net 
income because of lower marginal taxes would therefore be offset by the decrease in 
public subsidies, that is the population as a whole would not experience an increase 
in the net income unless they increase their labour supply, the Ministry of Finance 
argues (1995b). 
Yet empirical studies give only mixed support to the latter argument, showing 
that income as well as substitution effects are at work in the Danish labour market. 
One empirical study of the relationship between hourly wages and labour supply, 
found that a 1 per cent increase in post-tax wages resulted in an increase in the 
labour supply of 0.1 per cent (Smith, 1991, cited in Ministry of Finance, 1994). 
Consequently, the higher the marginal tax rates, the smaller the net increase in 
wages and the smaller the increase in labour supply. A later study (Pedersen and 
Smith, 1995: 105-106), based on statistical analyses of register data, produced 
similar results. In distinguishing between men and women, this study also found that 
while wage elasticity was positive around 10 per cent for married men, meaning that a 
1 per cent increase in post-tax wages would increase their labour supply with 0.1 per 
cent, wage elasticity was close to zero for both married and single women. These 
figures indicate a relatively inelastic labour supply for the labour force as a whole. 
A survey was carried out to validate these conclusions. In the survey 
respondents were asked how a potential tax cut would affect their labour supply.43 
The survey results are included in table 6.3. The table shows that more than half of 
the employed would not increase their labour supply in response to lower marginal tax 
rates. For women, the net effect is nill, as roughly equal shares would work more and 
work less, respectively. Men would increase their labour supply overall, as nearly one 
43 This methodology has its shortcomings, as respondents may not be able or willing to answer 
correctly. Nevertheless the method may serve as a supplement to the statistical estimations. 
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third of the men surveyed indicate they would work more while 15 per cent would 
work less. 
Table 6.3. Proportion of Employed Who Would Change their Labour Supply with 




































































Source: Pedersen and Smith, 1995. Parentheses indicate that the number of respondents is too small for reliable 
calculations. 
Another noteworthy feature appearing from the survey is the fact that labour 
supply varies across income levels. For both men and women there is a clear 
tendency that respondents in the lower income-brackets are more inclined to increase 
their labour supply in response to lower marginal taxes than employees in the higher 
income ranges. While 40 per cent of men earning less than DKK 100,000 in annual 
taxable income indicate they would work more at the prospect of a greater net 
income, only 26 per cent of those making more than DKK 400,000 would work more. 
Among women 14 per cent of those in the low income range would work less in 
response to a tax-induced higher net income, and nearly 37 per cent of the women 
making between DKK 200,000 and 300,000 would work less. Overall, these results 
suggest that the substitution effect of a lower marginal tax rate would be stronger 
than the income effect among employees in the lower income ranges, while the 
opposite is true for employees in the higher income ranges.44 
The income elasticity estimations combined with the survey indicate an 
empirical picture much less clear than the theoretical axioms regarding the 
relationship between income taxes and labour supply. The conclusion appears to be 
44 The survey analysis by Pedersen and Smith (1995) also suggests a limited potential for 
switching black labour supply to legal labour supply by cutting taxes, although theory would 
have that people generally would be more inclined to do so. Furthermore, even if a tax cut 
resulted in a lower supply of black labour, only married men would as mentioned increase their 
supply of legal labour and only by a relatively small amount. 
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that labour supply in Denmark is generally relatively inelastic, but also that the 
relationship varies with income primarily, and with gender and marital status. 
In this connection it should be pointed out that there may by a number of 
factors which the individual cannot control in determining his or her labour supply, 
including union agreements. The complexity of factors determining labour supply in 
the Danish labour market is also illustrated by the fact that many persons continue to 
supply labour even though they reap no economic benefits from it. Thus, Pedersen 
and Smith (1995:88-90) carried out an analysis combining information from 
administrative registers for 1992 with survey information on hours worked and costs 
of work, including transportation and child care. Based in this information the gain in 
disposable income for employed was calculated. The calculations showed that 3.6 per 
cent of men and 8.5 per cent of women in the labour market work full-time although 
they have no economic gain from it. Additionally, about 18 per cent of the labour force 
work although they gain only up to DKK 500 per month by working as opposed to 
receiving unemployment benefits. 
Again, the figures indicate that the theoretical relationship between marginal 
tax rates and labour supply does not predict labour behaviour to a very high degree. 
Other reasons than monetary issues clearly affect the decision to supply or not supply 
labour. The same survey offers insight into what job qualities Danish employees 
value. For men and women, the top three qualities are good collegues, job security 
and challenges on the job. "Good pay" ranks fourth among men, but does not figure 
at all among women (Pedersen, 1995b: 68).45 
6.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has described the Danish system of taxes and benefits. It has been 
shown that the combination of high marginal tax rates and high unemployment 
benefits for low income groups (a high replacement ratio) results in a less than 
optimal incentive structure for working. For the unemployed, this system entails the 
risk of being trapped in unemployment because there is little economic gain or 
possibly even economic loss associated with taking a job. The labour market tax, 
introduced with the tax reform of 1994 to make labour market insiders responsive to 
high unemployment, exacerbates the problem of the unemployment trap, as the 
45 The survey results quoted in this section were based on respondents already employed. It is 
quite possible that an unemployed person would be more inclined to increase his labour supply 
in light of tax decreases than someone already employed, since the marginal cost of work 
relative to leisure would would be higher in the latter case. 
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unemployed who takes on a job from 1998 immediately faces a 4 per cent tax 
increase. For those employed, the high marginal tax rates may work to restrict their 
supply of labour, because the net gain from supplying another hour of work is too 
small to make up for losing an hour of leisure. 
According to economic theory, a cut in marginal income taxes could increase 
the supply of labour as the net wage for each hour supplied increases. Alternatively, 
labour supply may drop because employees can make the same wage in fewer 
hours. In adopting the comprehensive 1994 tax reform which emphasized lower 
marginal tax rates, the centre-left coalition government in Denmark counted on the 
former effect. Thus, lower marginal income tax rates should serve to increase 
effective labour supply. One of the wider objectives of this policy was to decrease 
wage pressures of the economy, and thereby limit structural unemployment. An 
increase in the effective labour supply would thus limit that rate of unemployment at 
which inflation starts to accelerate, enabling a lower sustainable rate of unemploy-
ment. However, empirical data has revealed a limited potential for increasing the 
supply of labour through income tax cuts. Among Danish employees, factors other 
than pay clearly affect the decision to supply or not to supply additional labour. 
Furthermore, individuals do not have full control over their supply of work; labour 
demand may be lacking, or union agreements may determine whether they can work 
more hours. 
It should also be noted that the 1994 tax reform, while decreasing marginal tax 
rates across the board, comprised relatively larger cuts for the higher income 
brackets. Several analyses referred in the above have suggested that low-income 
labour is more responsive to cuts in the marginal tax rate than higher income labour. 
Hence there would be a greater potential for increaseing effective labour supply in 
cutting marginal tax rates for the low income brackets. We shall return to this debate 
in the final chapter. 
On balance, it therefore seems doubtful whether recent Danish tax reforms 
have facilitated a reduction in structural unemployment. At best, the tax reform seems 
likely to have increased labour supply only marginally. At the same time, it 
exacerbated the unemployment trap-problem as the labour market tax on gross wage 
income in effect works as a tax on employment, thereby increasing the relative value 
of unemployment benefits. 
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7. The System of Education and Training and the 
Functioning of the Danish Labour Market 
In this chapter we review the Danish system of education and training, describing 
how this system influences the composition of the labour force. The first section of the 
chapter will outline the structure of and rates of participation in the education system 
proper as well as in the system of adult and continuing education. The second part of 
the chapter presents the results of recent mis-match analyses, i.e. analyses of the 
relationship between supply and demand for labour. The issue of mismatch 
represents an important aspect of how well the education system is attuned to the 
labour market. This leads into an assessment of the education system's overall 
functioning in relation to the labour market, which will be the subject of the final 
section of the chapter. 
7.1 . The Structure of the Education System 
This section briefly outlines the structure of the Danish education system, describing 
each level in terms of purpose, duration of programme, admission criteria, and 
participation rates. Figure 7.1 illustrates the overall structure of the system. 
Figure 7.1 : The Structure of the Danish Education System 
Years of school 
attendance 
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7.1.1. The Ordinary Education System 
The Danish education system consists of an elementary school system (comprising 
primary and lower secondary schools), which almost every child attends; a two-
pronged system of upper secondary education, which allows students to choose 
between an academic path and a vocational path. From these youth programmes, the 
pupils may enter vocationally qualifying educations, either higher educations or 
educations which have the character of vocational training. 
Elementary School 
The foundation of the Danish education system is the Folkeskole, the public school 
for primary and lower secondary education, spanning pre-school through 10th grade. 
Danish law stipulates an obligation for each child to receive nine years of education, 
and an optional Leaving Examination of the Folkeskole may be taken at the end of 
the 9th grade. About one per cent of a given form do not complete basic school. 
About 89 per cent of the school-age population attend the public school system. The 
rest attend private schools. 
The public schools are based on a principle of comprehensiveness, in the 
sense that pupils stay with the same class throughout at least primary education, 
regardless of performance and intellectual ability. This principle was strengthened in 
the 1993 reform of the public schools, which also established the principle of 
differentiation, requiring the teacher to taylor educational challenges to each student. 
Upper Secondary Education 
About 95 percent of the pupils continue in the education system or enter a vocational 
training programme. The upper secondary education system has two paths. One is 
the general upper secondary education schools, high schools and the higher 
preparatory examination (HF), the primary function of which is to prepare the pupils 
for further studies in higher education. Admission is generally open, but the applicant 
must have passed the Leaving Examination of the Folkeskole. The higher preparatory 
examination is a two-year programme, oriented primarily toward individuals who have 
left the education system and wish to return. 
The other path consists of the higher commercial and higher tecnical 
examinations, which serve both as vocational programmes and as preparatory 
programmes for higher education. Whereas the higher commercial examination 
focuses on commerce and business classes, the higher technical examination 
concentrates its curriculum in the fields of science and tecnology. Like the high 
school, these are three-year programmes. 
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Other Programmes at the Upper Secondary Level 
A number of programmes are aimed at students who prefer a vocationally oriented 
education. These programmes include proper vocational training, several basic social 
and health studies, and, as the most recent additions, basic vocational education and 
the free youth education. All programmes aim to impart to the students a level of 
practical skills and a theoretical basis that improves their standing in the labour 
market while at the same time meeting the labour market needs for skilled labour. 
The system of vocational education and training offers practically oriented 
courses, all involving a mix of alternating theoretical and practical education. The 
practical training components take place either with an employer as part of a practical 
training programme or at a school, although the latter option is generally considered 
less desirable. 
The vocational education and training courses are designed in cooperation 
between the Ministry of Education and the labour market parties in order to ensure 
continued correspondance between graduate qualifications and the needs of the 
labour market. This system is intended to create a flexible and adjustable labour 
force. Admission to vocational courses is generally open although it is possible to 
restrict intake to some courses based on overall labour market trends (Ministry of 
Education, 1996: Fact sheet no. 3). 
EGU (erhvervsfaglig grunduddannelse, basic vocational education) and free 
post-compulsory education are two new programmes established in order to retain 
more youth in the education system. Each is planned as an individually designed two-
year programme to accommodate those youth who are dissatisfied with or 
unmotivated by the ordinary education system. The basic vocational education 
targets youth who have performed poorly in elementary school and are now in a 
dissatisfactory job or education situation, only where all other options seem unviable 
for the person. The curriculum is concentrated on practical training, but also includes 
a minimum of 20 weeks to a maximum of 40 weeks of theoretical schooling. The 
objective is to equip these students with personal, social and vocational qualifications 
which will facilitate their stable participation in the labour force or further education. It 
is therefore possible to receive credits for parts of the programme upon enrollment in 
other vocational programmes. 
The free post-compulsory education offers youth an opportunity to put 
together their own course of education that may involve courses at ordinary 
educational institutions, participation in projects, associations, work or international 
travel. The focus is on development of personal skills rather than vocational 
qualifications, although counsellors in the programme find that participants through 
the experience they gain develop a maturity and independence that makes them well 
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prepared for academic studies (Information, July 13-14, 1996). But currently the free 
education does not formally qualify the participants for admission to higher 
educational institutions. The programme is expected to draw 2,000 students this 
year, a doubling from the first year of operation. Drop out has been low at 5 per cent. 
Higher Education 
There are about 130 institutions of post-secondary education, which can be divided 
into three levels of education. The five universities and university centres offer 
programmes in traditional academic disciplines. As a rule, a university programme 
now includes a three-year bachelors programme, a subsequent two-year master's 
degree programme and a three-year Ph.D. programme. Since establishment of the 
bachelor's degree a small portion of university students leave university upon 
completing this degree. In the Humanities students also have the option of a four-year 
degree (cand. phil) or a six-year programme, leading to the degree of master of arts. 
In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon university system, the bachelor programmes 
specialize within a single academic discipline. However, the university centres offer a 
more interdisciplinary approach. 
The research-oriented post-graduate programme, leading to a Ph.D. degree, 
has been given higher priority and formalized as a regular component of the 
education system. Other university-level programmes offered at educational 
institutions separate from the universities include engineering, architecture, music, 
art, and various business courses. Medium- and short-term programmes are offered 
at professional schools, covering mainly the fields of technology, education, social 
work and health (Ministry of Education, 1994). 
Admission to the institutions of post-secondary education is restricted to those 
who have passed an examination at the upper secondary level, although some non-
academic institutions may admit students who do not meet this entrance qualification 
(Ministry of Education, 1994. Fact Shhet). However, as the number of applicants in 
many fields surpass the number of openings, admission criteria in many cases are 
more rigourous than the basic requirement. Applicants may be assessed solely on 
their academic merits at lower level examinations or on broader criteria, including 
work experience. A few educational institutions pick their applicants based on specific 
entrance examinations for each institution. In 1995, 72 per cent of a total of 60,000 
applicants were admitted (Ministry of Finance, 1995). 
Participation Rates in the Regular Education System 
About half of the adult Danish population has a vocationally qualifying education, but 
among 25-49-year-olds this share has increased to more than 60 percent. As shown 
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in table 7.1, current behaviour suggests a continuation of this trend toward increasing 
education levels. Thus, the education profile for 1993 projects that 69 per cent of 
current 8th graders will complete a vocationally qualifying education. 
Table 7.1.1 Education Profile, 1993. Percentages.46 
Level of Education 
Elementary School 
Upper Secondary Education 
- vocational orientation 
- academically preparatory 
Vocationally Qualifying Education 
- short-term higher education 
- medium-term higher education 
- long-term higher education 
- commercial/clerical training 




















Source: Ministry of Education, 1996. 
Another important trend in the education profile is an increasing share of each form 
completing a higher education. Danes who are now in their 30s are more likely to 
have completed a university or other higher education than Danes in their 40s, whose 
education level overall is higher than the plus-50 group (Economic Council, 1995). 
Despite the general increase in education level, about one out of three youth 
never completes an education that qualifies him or her for the labour market (Ministry 
of Education, 1995). This represents a relatively large share of the labour force who 
will be increasingly vulnerable in the labour market as all prognoses indicate 
unemployment will be increasingly concentrated among those with little or no 
education.47 
46 The numbers in the figure indicate the flow of students through the education system. Based 
on the complete flow in the 1993 education system, the percentages should be interpreted 
simply as the eventual profile that year's 8th graders will achieve in 25 years, if they behave 
like the students of 1993. 
47 Among the 31 per cent of the 1993 8th-grade population who according to projections will not 
complete a vocationally qualifying education, 9 per cent will receive no schooling beyond 
elementary school, 11 per cent will complete high school and another 11 per cent will 
participate in some courses (Ministry of Education, 1996). 
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Furthermore, the general level of education of the Danish education level is 
higher than that of other European countries such as France and Italy. (Economic 
Council, 1995: 101). The relatively low ranking is due particularly to the large share of 
the population holding a higher education degree is on a par with the higher ranking 
countries.48 A different comparative survey placed Denmark in the top-five among 40 
countries in terms of supply of skilled labour and labour with higher educations and 
professional experience (World Competitiveness Report, 1994, cited in Ministry of 
Education, 1995). 
7.1.2. Adult and Continuing Education 
In addition to the regular education system, Denmark has a comprehensive system of 
adult and continuing education which offers upgrading of skills for all in the labour 
market or a delayed opportunity for education for those who dropped out before 
getting a vocationally qualifying education. 
In 1993, continuing and adult education involved about 2 million participants 
(Economic Council 1995). This does not necessarily mean that 2 million employees 
received education as some may have participated in more than one course. 
Computed in full-year persons, adult education comprised about 103,000 participants 
in public courses and 34,000 participants under the auspices of private companies, cf. 
Table 7.1.2.49 
Private adult education accounts for about one fourth of the total adult 
education participation. Such courses may be company-level courses in specific skills 
or courses in management and organisation (Ministry of Education, 1995). These 
courses involve a large number of employees, about 1.3 million, but they tend to be of 
a short duration. 
The public system of adult and continuing education varies significantly in 
terms of content, qualification level and duration. Adult education (VUC) offers 
opportunities for completing the Leaving Examination of the Folkeskole for those with 
little of no education. They also offer single-subject courses at the upper secondary 
level. As such the adult education centres serve particularly those most in need of 
48 This comparison should be interpreted cautiously since classification of different educations 
vary among countries. Furthermore, while the Danish data are based on registered 
participation, statistics for most other countries in the comparison are derived from 
questionnaire data, which presumably results in an overestimated level of education (Ministry 
of Education, 1995:44). 
49 A recent survey estimated that about 80 per cent of all Danish employers, private and public, 
make use of adult education programmes. The companies surveyed spent about 3 per cent of 
the total work time on such courses (Ministry of Education Newsletter, May 4, 1996). 
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upgrading their skills to be able to compete in the labour market. About 23 per cent of 
the full-year participants in public adult education attend such basic adult education. 
The open education and labour market education systems represent a directly 
vocational approach. Open education offers adults the opportunity for completing a 
degree at the higher education level while maintaining in business- and finance 
oriented courses. The only other category that stands out is liberal arts courses, 
which accounted for nearly 12 per cent of the full-year participants in 1993. Many of 
the participants in open education programmes have already completed some other 
form of education. 
Table 7.1.2: Adult and Continuing Education. Participation, 1993. 
Private courses 
Public courses 
Adult education (VUC) 
Open education 
Labour Market (AMU) 


































Source: Ministry of Finance, 1994 in Economic Council, 1995. Ministry of Education 1995. "Other includes among 
others adults participating in the ordinary educations and continuing education for teachers. 
The labour market courses (AMU) are short-term courses aimed at upgrading the 
qualifications of semi-skilled and skilled labour, often blue-collar workers. Participation 
in the courses often enable semi-skilled workers to receive certification or obtain 
status as skilled labour and thereby increases their chances for employment. 
A different segment of the education system consists of a traditional Danish 
form of education, the folk high schools. These orginally sprung out of the 19th 
century enlightenment circles, operating on the idea that education should be an 
ongoing undertaking that enriches the life of the individual and prepares citizens for 
democracy. The folk high schools offer courses of every form, some parallel to any 
other schools. As such they may serve to improve the general educational level of the 
population. In recent years a similar system of day high schools for the unemployed 
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has been established. Their students typically include people in their 20s, many of 
whom are outside the labour force. 
By international standards the Danish level of participation in adult and 
continuing education is high. A 1989 survey of the EC countries found that about 16 
per cent of the Danish labour force had participated in vocational training within the 
preceding four weeks, compared to the EC average of 6 per cent (Ministry of Finance, 
1993). However, the survey concluded that the unemployed in Denmark constitute a 
relatively small share of the participants compared to other countries, indicating that 
much adult and continuing education is organized through the work place. This may 
reinforce the insider-outsider problem (Ministry of Finance, 1993). About two-thirds of 
participants in adult and continuing education are employed, while unemployed or 
individuals not in the labour force account for the last third of participation.50 
7.2. The Relation Between Supply and Demand of Skills 
A labour market characterized by unemployment in some parts of the labour market 
and vacant jobs in others suffers from mismatch problems. Mis-match can be seen as 
an indication of a labour market with insufficient mobility. During times of increasing 
employment, mismatch problems may cause wage increases and inflation, thus 
causing a relapse in unemployment. Mismatch probles therefore contribute to 
structural unemployment. 
Mismatch and the Beveridge Relation 
One commonly used indicator for mismatch problems is the Beveridge-relation, which 
pairs the number of unemployed with the number of vacant jobs over time. Increasing 
mismatch problems occur with a simultaneous increase in the number of unemployed 
and the number of vacancies (Economic Council, 1992) In the diagram this shows as 
an outward shift of the Beveridge-curve. The development in the Danish labour 
market is illustrated in Figure 7.2.1. 
Generally, the Beveridge curve shows a decline in the number of vacancies 
and an increase in unemployment. Yet since the mid-1980s, vacancies have 
50 To give some measure of the effect of adult and continuing education, the Economic Council 
estimated that adult and continued education of about 60,000 full-year persons in vocationally 
qualifying course would result in an increase in the average education level from 12,5 to 12,9 
years over 20 years. By comparison, the same report estimated that investments in the 
education system proper has increased the education level of the average Dane from 9,3 years 
to 11 years between 1940 and 1993. 
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increased, but some of this may be explained by a change in the registration method 
of vacancies. 
Figure 7.2.1: Beveridge relation 1972-1990, Denmark. 
100 150 200 250 
Unemployed (1000s) 
350 
Source: Economic Council 1992b. 
International surveys have concluded that the Danish Beveridge curve follows the 
pattern for an economy suffering demand problems. (Jackman et al, 1990; Bjørn and 
Pedersen, 1992 in Economic Council, 1992).51 Yet, the Council warns not to draw firm 
conclusions because of uncertainty about the data. Furthermore, the shift in the 
Beveridge curve suggests that some of the increased unemployment during the 
1980s was caused by structural factors, resulting in a growing mismatch in the labour 
market. 
Mismatch and the Education System 
Although mismatch may not be among the most important causes of rising 
unemployment in the case of Denmark, it would be misleading to conclude, that the 
Danish labour market suffers no mismatch problems. 
51 One premise for the validity of the Beveridge measure is the reliability of the statistics on 
vacant jobs; this premise may not be met in the case of Denmark, partly due to a change in 
registration methods of the Public Labour Exchange. The shift upward in the number of vacant 
positions from 1989 to 1990 can be explained by this change in registration methods 
(Economic Council, 1992b). 
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One general problem of mismatch in the Danish labour market, which has 
been referred to previously, is the uneven distribution of unemployment across 
education levels. Persons with short­term or no education have a significantly higher 
risk of unemployment than those with higher education (cf. tables B.9 and B.10 in 
appendix Β below). Thus, there is a clear negative relationship between 
unemployment and level of education, although long­term higher educations deviate 
slightly from this pattern. This disparity in unemployment risk has deepened over the 
last decade and is expected to continue to do so (Welfare Commission, 1995b). 
Figure 7.2.2: Differences in Unemployment Rate from the Average by Category 
of Education, 1980,1986,1992. 
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Source: Ministry of Finance 1994. 
One prognosis has estimated the distribution of mismatch by education categories in 
the Danish labour market by the year 2000 (Committee on Adult and Continuing 
Education, 1994). In an optimistic scenario, it is forecast that unemployment will drop 
overall and the prognosis shows lower unemployment across all education 
categories. However, the report concludes that one fourth of the labour force will have 
serious unemployment problems, involving primarily those individuals with elementary 
school or a basic vocational education. At the same time, shortages of skilled labour 
are anticipated in the areas that employ labour with higher educations. Particularly the 
health sector and those employing graduates from the natural sciences will 
experience a shortage of labour, according to the prognosis. 
In a less optimistic scenario, widespread unemployment will affect those 
groups of the labour force who have not completed a vocationally qualifying 
education: fully half the labour force will continue to face high unemployment rates. 
Under this scenario, bottleneck problems will be limited to the health sector primarily. 
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7.3. Strengths and Weaknesses in Relation to a Well-Functioning 
Labour Market 
Education affects the functioning of the labour market through labour force 
productivity and mobility. This section will look at the strengths and weaknesses of 
the education system in two respects: a) the overall quality of the education system 
as this is one of the crucial determinants of labour force productivity, and b) the 
attunement of education to labour market needs for specific types of labour as this 
affects labour market mobility. 
7.3.1. Quality of the Danish Education System 
Denmark traditionally prides itself on a high quality education system, and the Danish 
education system generally has fared reasonably well in international comparisons. 
For instance, the World Competitiveness Report 1994 placed Denmark sixth out of 40 
countries on the issue of how well the education system meets the requirements for 
bringing about a competitive economy (Ministry of Education, 1995: 55). Despite this, 
there is growing concern that the education system may not adequately meet the 
future needs of the labour market (Welfare Commission, 1995b). 
Several studies have pointed out the need for quality reviews of the Danish 
education system to assess whether objectives are being achieved and whether 
achievements match the resources put into the education system (Welfare 
Commission, 1995b; Economic Council, 1995). Such reviews have been set up in the 
higher education system and to some extent in the youth educations, but systematic 
quality assessment in the elementary schools have not yet been undertaken.1 
In place of such systematic reviews the Ministry of Education in a background 
report to the Welfare Commission attempted to piece together quality assessments 
for each level of education, measuring outcome by international comparison and by 
the number of students progressing into the higher educations (Ministry of Education, 
1995). Following are the main conclusions of this and other more general reports. 
Elementary School 
The level of spending per pupil is high compared to other countries, but due to the 
lack of overall quality assessments it is unclear whether the quality of education is 
correspondingly higher. An international comparison of reading competency, one of 
the few such studies in which Danish pupils have participated so far, found that 
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Danish third-graders are among the poorest readers in the industrialized world 
(Ministry of Education, 1995: 82).52 
Notably, Danish pupils showed a greater dispersion in scores than pupils of 
other country in the study, as the top 10 per cent of Danish students were on a par 
with the best students of other countries, while the middle and lowest ranking Danes 
placed poorly in the international comparison. However, at the 8th-grade level Danish 
pupils ranked higher, above countries such as Germany, Canada and Norway, and 
the dispersion in scores equalled that of the other nordic countries. Even so, it is 
questioned whether reading skills are too poor, and whether the Danish students 
reach the international level of reading at too late an age (Ministry of Education, 
1995:83). 
Based on this background report, the Welfare Commission recommended a 
greater effort aimed at academically weak students, particularly by strengthening the 
practical and creative subjects in the schools in order to motivate these students to 
learn. The Commission also recommended more in-class lessons. 
Post-Secondary Education (Youth Education) 
An OECD report concluded that Danish post secondary education is generally of high 
quality (Ministry of Education, 1995). The vocationally qualifying educations were 
praised for their objectives, methods, physical facilities, breadth and relevance in the 
labour market, but the report also criticized the high level of dropout. Dropout is 25 
per cent from technical schools and 11 per cent from commercial schools, whereas 
only 3 per cent of those who begin the academically preparatory schools drop out. 
Futhermore, a large share of students begin more than one programme before 
settling on one, resulting in inefficient utilization of education resources. 
Several studies have analysed the causes for dropout, showing that the level 
of teaching and a theoretical orientation in the course play a large role for those who 
leave and educational programme. Based on these studies, the Commission 
recommends renewal of the courses to better accommodate practically inclined 
students as well as improved education and job counselling in order to steer students 
toward the right education. 
One step in this direction may be the new basic vocational education (EGU). 
So far, the programme appears successful. From 800 participants in 1994, the first 
year of the programme, participation is expected to increase to 1,800 this year 
(Politiken, 30.6.96). In most municipalities, the completion rate has been about 90 per 
52 According to news coverage, the Ministry of Education is expecting an equally poor ranking 
for Danish pupils in a similar math competency test for which the scores have not yet been 
released (Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, July 31, 1996 "Math education faces low mark". 
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cent, although it is lower in the capital, namely about 75 per cent. And importantly, 
nearly all of those who have completed the programme have obtained employment or 
have continued in the youth education system.53 
Higher Education 
Reviews of the higher educations systems report varying quality, but generally the 
reports have rated education quality as satisfactory (Ministry of Education, 1995). 
Several engineering schools, for instance, were found to generate candidates whose 
qualifications were ranked between adequate and strong, and the weighting of 
different skills in the programme tended to correspond with employers' weigting of 
skills. 
Other quality indicators cited by the Ministry of Education (1995) include an 
improved and relatively high rate of completion by students; the fact that most Danish 
students pass their courses when they study abroad, and the fact that candidates 
from the higher educations have high employment rates. There are only few 
examples of Danish companies passing over a Danish candidate to recruit abroad. 
The OECD in its "Review of Denmarks Science, Technology and Innovation 
Policies" expressed satisfaction with the establishing of a bachelor-master-doctoral 
structure in the Danish education system (Ministry of Education, 1995). However, the 
OECD reviewers, concurring with the Danish business and education community, 
raised concerns about the level of funding for research. Likewise the Welfare 
Commission expressed concern that Danish research and education would fall behind 
internationally, as funding of higher education as per cent of GDP is less than the 
international average.54 
Adult and Continuing Education 
Denmark spends relatively many resources on adult and continuing ducation, and 
ranks at the very top internationally measured in terms of the share of the population 
participating in continuing education. Furthermore, a committee established recently 
to review the system of adult and continuing education concluded that the planning of 
53 A 1994 survey of 3,900 rendomly sampled enterprises showed only 40 per cent of these 
being satisfied with the vocational educations. Another 38 per cent expressed neither 
datisfaction nor dissatisfaction while the remaining companies were dissatisfied with the 
educations. More than half the enterprises said the programmes needed to give higher priority 
to the vocational aspects of the courses (Welfare Commission, 1995). In particular the younger 
enterprises were critical of the vocational educations. 
54 The previously mentioned survey among Danish enterprises found that nearly half the 
companies were satisfied the higher educations. Only 13 per cent were dissatisfied, while the 
remaining respondents were neither (Welfare Commission, 1995). 
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the course supply is generally satisfactory, although there is room for improvement 
(Committee on Adult and Contiuning Education, 1994). 
Specifically, the committee recommended a better coordination of continuing 
education programmes at the local and regional levels and a greater flexibility in the 
courses offered in order to make the programmes more responsive to labour market 
needs. The review praised the large number of course offers and the numerous 
opportunies which exist for funding continuing education, but also pointed out that 
the many opportunities make it difficult to survey the market for the most appropriate 
options for employees. Furthermore, the review identified as a problem an inadequate 
offer of relevant courses for members of the labour force with little or no education.55 
Finally, the review committee recommended improved education planning at 
company level and better information and counseling about the continuing education 
system. 
Partially in response to these recommendations the Danish Government has 
sought to increase information and counseling about continuing education, but there 
has not yet been any evaluation of this recent effort. Additionally, admission to adult 
and continuing education has become unrestricted in the sense that the course offer 
is based on demand and anyone can apply for admission in courses in all accredited 
programmes. The reform also ties public financing for each course or institution to 
demand for the course. 
7.3.2. Mobility 
Education can improve mobility and thereby prevent or remedy structural problems in 
the labour market. As regards mobility across trades and sectors, one indicator is the 
general level of education in the labour force, particularly the share who holds higher 
education, because labour with higher education have general skills, which can easily 
be transferred from one job to another. As mentioned the labour force share with 
higher education has increased over time, presumably facilitating mobility.56 
The question is whether this increased level of education has been directed 
toward the needs of the labour market. In general, the fact that the Danish labour 
market suffers only moderate mismatch problems can be seen an indicator that this is 
to a high extent the case (cf. section 7.2). However, mismatch analyses show that the 
55 This finding corresponds with the results from the previously cited survey of Danish 
companies. One third of the respondents in the survey found the continuing education offers 
not relevant for their employees (Welfare Commission, 1995). 
56 Indeed, a statistical analysis carried out by the economic Councils reveal a relatively high rate 
of mobility across trades among graduates with higher educations. This may be interpreted as 
a sign that the institutions of higher education produce graduates whigh enough human capital 
to allow mobility (Economic Council, 1992: 135) 
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health sector as well as those sectors of the economy which employ natural science 
graduates will experience future shortages of labour. In general, there will be a need 
for labour with higher education, which suggests a need for continued improvement of 
the education level. 
Specifically as regards the system of adult and continuing education it seems 
more questionable whether this meets the needs of the labour market. For instance, 
vocationally qualifying continuing education is used to a large extent by employees 
who already hold degrees of higher education. This solidifies the education gap and 
hardly improves mobility in the labour market significantly. Furthermore, many 
employees as well as unemployed persons participate in continuing education which 
is not vocationally qualificing. Thus, almost half of the participants in the Educational 
Scheme scheme have chosen courses that are not vocationally qualifying (Economic 
Council, 1995:128). The Economic Council in this connection proposes an improved 
targetting of the continuing education effort toward those members of the labour 
force, who either hold no vocationally qualifying degree or who hold a degree in an 
area with high unemployment. In order to ensure that continuing education does meet 
the needs of the labour market, the Economic Council also recommends that any 
effort in the area of continuing education should obtain the approval from the labour 
market parties as vocationally qualifying. 
7.3.3. Conclusions 
This final section summarizes the main strengths and weaknesses of the Danish 
education system as it affects the labour market. Looking at the outcome of the 
education system, the Danish education system has produced a labour force with 
qualifications which to a relatively high extent match the needs of the labour market. 
Thus, the extent of mismatch problems are moderate. 
Based on existing evidence, it also appears that the quality of the higher 
educations and vocational educations is satisfactory although there are concerns 
about future quality. The quality of elementary school education has not been 
adequately assessed, but international comparisons show a poor ranking in reading 
skills at the lower grades, but a competitive level in the higher grades. 
One accomplishment of the education system overall has been the continued 
improvement in the population's education levels, although the level attained is still 
inadequate, cf. below. It should also be considered a strength of the education 
system that more than 90 per cent of students continue from elementary school into 
the upper secondary educations. Likewise, extensive participation in adult and 
continuing education reveals a general orientation toward and interest in education. 
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The recent reforms in the elementary schools and higher educations are 
important. The elementary school reform emphasizes differentiated education to 
better meet the needs of each individual pupil. The purpose is to improve the perfor-
mance of all students, not least of which the academically weak and eventually to 
increase the interest of each student in continuing toward a vocationally qualifying 
education. It remains to be seen whether teachers are fully equipped to implement 
such individualized teaching, and whether resources are sufficient for this purpose 
(Welfare Commission, 1995). The reform of higher educations has instituted a 
bachelor-master-Ph.D.system, which should facilitate the internationalization of the 
Danish education system. 
The main weakness of the education system remains an insufficient level of 
education. One third of the students of each form never complete a vocationally 
qualifying education, and labour market parties complain of too few graduates with 
higher education. In continuation of this, drop out from the vocational education and 
training has been identified as a problem. One reason for this drop out rate may be an 
inadequate offering of courses for those students who prefer practical rather than 
theoretical courses. 
The result of the high drop out rates is an education gap with a large group of 
the labour force being relatively well-educated and another goup with little or no 
education. This education gap is further widened through the system of continuing 
education which tends to reach the well-educated rather than those lacking 
education. 
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8. Industrial Policies, Employment and Unemploy-
ment in Denmark 
This chapter provides a brief description of Danish industrial policies. The level and 
nature of state intervention in the economy is described, as is recent trends in 
business policy. This is done with a view to analysing the relation between industry 
policy (or business policy), employment and unemployment in Denmark. 
Industrial policy may be defined in different ways. In one prominent definition, 
industry policy is that policy which aims to increase the volume and efficiency of 
production in manufacturing, i.e. industry policy is allocation policy. However, the 
short-term prevention of job losses in industry may also be considered an element in 
industry policy, meaning that industry policy is an economic stabilisation policy 
(Brøndum 1987). 
8.1. The Level and Nature of State Intervention in the Economy 
Often, the description and evaluation of industrial policies in different countries focus 
on the juxtaposition of to opposed positions: The liberal, non-interventionist approach 
and the interventionist approach. In the liberal, non-interventionist approach, industrial 
policy is directed towards removing barriers for competition and market failures. This 
should enable society to reap the full benefits of the economic market, as monopoly 
rents are eliminated and only effective production is allowed to survive. Economic 
support to private enterprises, limitations to competition and state management or 
intervention in the private sector are seen to have only counterproductive effects on 
economic growth in the longterm, as it allows ineffective production to continue and 
monopoly rents to spread. 
In this argument, state intervention in the markets may possibly serve to 
increase employment and decrease unemployment in the short term, but only at the 
costs of decreasing economic growth and international competitiveness in the long 
term. To avoid the damaging effects on employment of decreasing international 
competitiveness, states may have to turn to protectionism. However, this will only 
exacerbate problems in the long term, as protectionism shields private enterprises 
from competitive pressures for effectivisation and rationalisation. 
In the interventionist approach, the state intervenes directly to affect the 
behaviour of private enterprises in a desired manner. In this approach it is held that a 
well-functioning market is not in itself a sufficient precondition to ensure economic 
growth, welfare and low unemployment. Targeted measures directed towards the 
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private sector and joint public-private measures are needed, for instance to facilitate 
the spread of information on new technologies among enterprises or to increase the 
risk-taking prospensity of private enterprises in research and development. State 
intervention may also be defensive, aimed at preventing the closure of loss-making 
enterprises and job losses. Instruments for intervention may thus range from 
subsidised loan schemes, loan guarantee schemes, technological development 
support programmes, to direct economic support to enterprises in the form of crisis-
support to selected sectors or support to individual enterprises, limitations to 
competition or public ownership of enterprises in a range of sectors such as for 
instance the finance sector or selected parts of manufacturing industry. 
Traditional Characteristics of Danish Industrial Policy 
Danish industrial policy is dominated by liberal, non-interventionist ideas. The 
following traditional characteristics can be emphasized (Brøndum, 1987; Sidenius, 
1989): 
Traditional Characteristics of Danish Industrial Policy 
1. The ends of industrial policy are broad and vague, while modest financial means 
make up the most important means. 
2. State intervention is minimal and non-selective. 
3. Industrial policy is subordinate to general economic policy, which among other 
things aims at improving international competitiveness. 
4. Indirect subsidies in the form of tax reliefs for industry are relatively more 
important than direct financial assistance, loans and guarantees. 
5. The implementation of industri policy primarily takes place as a reaction to 
enterprises' applications for support, while more advanced industrial cooperation 
projects are rare. 
6. State owned industry is negligible. 
7. Industrial expertise in the state administration is poorly developed.57 
There are several historical explanations for this. First, a strong and independent 
class of peasants has historically limited the strength and scope of direct state 
intervention in the economy (Grønbæk, 1991). Second, ever since the 1930s industry 
policy has been shaped by an implicit compromise between liberal and interventionist 
57 Brøndum (1987: 64, 89) thus argues that Danish industrial policy can be described as 
"demand oriented subsidy policy". 
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(social democratic) forces. According this implicit compromise, the labour movement 
was allowed to ameliorate the effects of a pure market economy through the 
construction of a comprehensive welfare state. In return, the state was not to 
intervene directly in the private sector through public ownership of the means of 
production or other direct forms of intervention (Esping-Andersen, 1985). 
Third, the small size of the Danish economy has affected the direction of 
industrial policies In a confrontation on direct state support to industry, larger states 
can provide more comprehensive subsidies to individual enterprises with relatively 
smaller consequences for the public budget. At the same time, the potential costs of 
trade wars triggered by direct state support to selected industries are much larger for 
a small state as Denmark than for larger states, since the small size of the economy 
is associated with a large dependency on international trade and on a limited number 
of export markets (Katzenstein, 1985: 81-87; Brøndum, 1987: 184). 
Prioritizing Technology Development 
During the 1980s industrial policy was gradually given a more interventionist shape, 
as a number of relatively large time limited technological support programmes have 
been launched from 1984: The Techological Development Programme (TUP), a 5-
year programme initiated in 1984, the Material-Technological Development Program-
me (MUP), launched in 1987 and extended in 1994 to last until 1997, the Bio-
technological Research and Development Programme running from 1988 through 
1995, the Networking Programme from 1989, the Product Development Programme 
for Agriculture and Fishery launched in 1989, and the Danish Research and 
Development Programme for Foodstuff Technology (FØTEK), launched in 1990 as a 
4-year programme and extended through 1997. 
These programmes signified that the traditional general subsidy schemes 
were increasingly being supplemented with selective initiatives directed at specific 
sectors of industry, that more direct and more advanced public-private sector 
cooperation on research and development was given a higher priority, and that public 
agencies were given a larger direct role in shaping the direction of research and 
development efforts.58 
Thus, although Danish industrial policy has historically been dominated by the 
liberal, non-interventionist approach, the state not been passive in its relations with 
58 In 1990 the then centre-right coalition government obtained Parliament's support for a com-
prehensive downscaling of the direct enterprise-related export and technology promotion 
schemes. In return industry obtained a relief in general company taxation. In addition, the 
business-promotion framework law, which replaced the proliferation of individual support 
schemes directed at individual enterprises, has allowed a continuation of sector-related 
research and technology development programmes. 
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the private sector. Only the means in industrial policy have avoided the most direct 
forms of intervention. Furthermore, since the mid-1980s, growing priority has been 
accorded to sector specific technology development programmes entailing a higher 
degree of state intervention at sector level. 
Figure 8.1: A Classification of Western European Industrial Policies 
Policy Instrument 
Economic support: Subsidies, 
loans, tax breaks 
Limits to competition: Monopolies, 
regulation 
Capability development: 
Research, training and education, 
techological services 
Opening of the economy: 














Source: Erhvervsudviklingsrådet (1992) with own amendments. 
Figure 8.1 in this connection illustrates the development in Danish industrial policy, 
just as it compares it to the policies of a number of other Western European coun-
tries. This is so in terns of the policy instruments which are most commonly used and 
in terms of the target group of enterprises or sectors. In the figure, the distinction 
between non-interventionism and interventionism is thus replaced by a continuum of 
policy instruments aimed at affecting the development in the market-governed sector. 
Traditionally, Danish industrial policy has thus aimed at a broad range of 
enterprises, the only exception being a number of credit support schemes introduced 
in the 1960s and 1970s specifically aimed at the shipbuilding sector. The preferred 
policy instruments for industrial policy have been relatively "soft" instruments of 
intervention: Interest rate subsidies and export credit guarantees have been promi-
nent, but the financial means allocated for these schemes have been limited 
compared to other Western European countries (the "Denmark 1 "-position in the 
figure). 
From 1984 onwards, technological support schemes consisting of co-financing 
schemes, heavily subsidised loans for technology investments and public subsidies 
for technological consultancy services within development programmes became 
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increasingly important. The growth of technological support schemes also comprised 
a growth in funding for targetted research, training and education acitivities in 
connection with the introduction of new technologies, both under the auspicies of the 
Ministry of Industry (from 1993 the Ministry of Business), and under the Ministry of 
Education. The latest development in this connection has been an increased 
emphasis on the establishment of joint public-private research and development 
centres in which private enterprises and public research institutions cooperate on 
targetted development projects. This is illustrated in the "Denmark 2"-position.59 
In an international context a liberal trade policy has exposed many other 
sectors of the Danish economy to international competitive pressures. Ever since the 
1950s free trade has been official Danish trade policy, and even before membership 
in the European Community in 1972, tariff barriers and several other barriers to trade 
were low in Denmark. Perhaps among other things as a consequence of this the 
process of eliminating barriers to competition has not until recently played any very 
significant role in industrial policies at the national level. A number of large regulated 
public or semi-public monopolies have been allowed in areas such as passenger air 
transport, mail and delivery services, telecommunications, power supply, and railway 
transport. Even if it has remained in private ownership, the finance sector has 
traditionally also been highly regulated. 
8.2. Recent Trends in Danish Business Policy 
The traditional characteristics of Danish industrial policy have been described above, 
along with the movement from the mid-1980s onwards towards sector specific 
technology development programmes. Industrial policy has undergone a further 
number of changes most recently, in particular since the change of government in 
1993. Total financial means available for business promotion activities have not 
increased significantly in this period, but a new order of priorities have emerged: A 
broadening of the focus in industry or business policy, an emphasis on a further 
strengthening of "resource areas" in Danish business, an emphasis on employment 
creation for persons with little education, and a growing concerns for entrepreneurs. 
59 Many elements of the traditional industrial policy (the "Denmark 1 "-position) remain important 
today. However, their relative significance has decreased, among other things as a 
consequence of the 1990 reform, referred to in footnote * above. 
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From Industry Policy to Business Policy 
From 1993, and coinciding with the replacement of the Ministry of Industry with the 
Ministry of Business, the concept of industry policy has been broadened and 
redefined as general business promotion policy. Thus, when the centre-left coalition 
government took power in 1993, industry policy was redefined to encompass not only 
measures such as export credit guarantees and other credit subsidies, industry 
related research, and technological services. It was also defined to include areas 
such as public-private cooperation, public regulation and service, education, 
infrastructure, access to capital, and, the creation of new markets (Ministry of 
Business, 1995b). 
Furthermore, the focus in business policy was broadened so as to be directed 
not only towards sectors competing in international markets, i.e. manufacturing, but 
also the private service sector, the activities of which are directed primarily towards 
the domestic market. This was related to the new priority given to the fight against 
unemployment in business policy from 1993, cf. below. 
With the formation of the centre-left government in 1993 the Ministry of 
Business was thus from many sides intended to take over the role as a ministry of co-
ordination for all business related public measures and activities, just as the ministry 
should function as a safeguard for business interests. 
Resource Area Analyses 
Starting already before the change of Government in 1993, and as a logical 
continuation of the growing sector-orientation, focus in Danish business policy has 
increasingly been on sectors or areas where Danish enterprises have specialized and 
acquired particular competencies. These areas have been defined as "resource 
areas" in which Danish enterprises are in a particularly strong position. 
Inspired in particular by the theories of international competitive advantages 
put forward by the group of researchers surrounding the Harvard economist Michael 
Porter, a comprehensive analysis of the Danish private sector from the viewpoint of 
the private sector itself, its comparative strengths and weakness, has been carried 
out in the framework of the Ministry of Business in 1993-95.60 These analyses are now 
being followed up in a system of dialogues between the Ministry of Business and 
representatives of each of the resource areas, the aim being to create the best 
possible framework conditions for the further strengthening of each resource area, 
60 A total of 8 resource area analyses were carried out, covering the areas of foodstuffs, 
construction and housing, the medical and health industry, transport and communication, 
consumer goods, tourism, environment and energy and services. 
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among other things through the implementation of the recommendations contained in 
each resource area analysis (cf. Ministry of Business, 1996b). 
Employment for Persons with Little Education: Domestic Services 
Also from 1993, employment and unemployment has been given a much more 
prominent role in Danish business policy. First of all, the Domestic Services Scheme 
has been defined and implemented as a business development programme, seeking 
to create a new market for domestic services through improving professional 
domestic service enterprises' possibilities of competing with black work and do-it-
yourself activities. At the same time, the Domestic Services Scheme has as an 
explicit objective to increase the possibilities of employment for persons with little or 
no education in the service sector. The Domestic Services Scheme will be described 
in more detail in section 8.3. 
Gradual Privatisation and Deregulation of Specific Sectors 
A gradual opening up of the economy through privatizations and deregulation has 
occurred in recent years, first of all due to the effects of the implementation of EU 
Single Market directives. Prominent examples include passenger air transport, some 
aspects of banking and insurance, and telecommunications. 
Major recent privatizations include Tele Danmark, which formerly was 
comprised of 5 regionally based semi-public telephone companies, Copenhagen 
Airport, and Giro Bank, the banking division of the national mail service. DSB, the 
national public railroad, ferry and bus transportation system, and Post Denmark, the 
mail delivery service, has been turned into several separate state-owned limited 
companies as a preparation to partial privatization. 
It should be recalled that state ownership of industrial enterprises has always 
been very limited in Denmark. The impacts of privatizations on employment and 
unemployment have thus so far been very limited. The question of privatization has, 
however, remain high on the political agenda, continuously being surrounded by 
controversy. Along with the opposition parties to the right, the centre parties in the 
coalition government continue to press for more privatizations or contracting out 
where it may provide benefits in the form of better value for money, whereas the 
Social Democratic Party remains internally divided on the question. 
Entrepreneurs and SMEs in Danish Business Policy 
Compared to the EU average, the Danish industrial structure is characterized by 
many small and medium-sized enterprises. For this reason, and since SMEs account 
for most of the creation of new employment, cf. Appendix B, table B1.5, most 
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business support measures have formally aimed to strengthen SME development, 
perhaps as one among several objectives. In reality, however, larger enterprises have 
often been in a better position to exploit public support schemes as they possess 
more administrative ressources. 
Support for small and medium-sized enterprises has remained a formal 
priority since 1993,61 and the concern for SMEs is mentioned in connection with much 
business related legisation, but is questionable whether SME development takes up a 
more prominent position in Danish business policy now than earlier. However, one 
recent initiative can be emphasized: In order to improve SMEs acces to capital, a 
1994 law created incentives for the establishment of development enterprises, 
defined as private enterprises which provide risk willing capital to SMEs on market 
conditions. The state covers 50 per cent of any losses on the credits which have been 
provided. 
In addition, growing attention is being paid to entrepreneur support. Along with 
the other Nordic countries, Denmark displays an enterprise start-up frequency and a 
self employment rate below the EU-average, cf. Table 8.2 below. 



























Source: Ministry of Business, 1996a. 
Against this background, the Entrepreneur Allowance scheme for unemployed 
mentioned in Chapter 3 was supplemented in 1994 and 1995 with "Iværk-
61 In Business Account 95 (Erhvervsredegørelse 95), the Ministry of Business lists for special 
priority areas, which shall supplement general business policy: 1) Measures which will reinforce 
identified Danish industrial strength positions, 2) measures directed towards new and small 
growth oriented enterprises, 3) measures directed towards large industrial enterprises 
(industrial locomotives), and 4) employment for persons with short education (Ministry of 
Business, 1995b: 18). 
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sætterklippekortet" in which entrepreneurs were given a lump sum to purchase 
various consultancy and training services on business planning etc. However, the 
scheme has been abolished in 1996 as the Government is reviewing and planning a 
general overhaul and strengthening of support policies for entrepreneurs, cf. Ministry 
of Business (1996a). 
8.3. The Domestic Services Scheme 
The Domestic Services Scheme deserves particular attention. This scheme has been 
one of the major new initiatives of the centre-left government, which took office in 
1993, and it explicitly seeks to improve employment prospects for specific groups. 
The weight of the scheme is illustrated by the financial means which have been made 
available to it. In 1994, DKK 105 million was spent on the Domestic Services Scheme. 
This amount rose to DKK 598 million in 1995, and the budget allocation for 1996 is 
set at DKK 414 million. In comparison, the total annual budget allocations to 
technological instrastructure and technological development programmes amounted 
to DKK 500-600 million in the period 1994-1996. 
The Domestic Services Scheme 
The Domestic Service scheme came into force on 1 January 1994, as the new 
centre-left coalition government's first initiative aiming at business development in the 
area of consumption services. 
From late 1996 a state subsidy of 50 per cent of the total bill including VAT (from 
1994-96 DKK 85 per working hour) is provided to consumers' purchase of services 
from professional Domestic Services-enterprises. Through this, consumer payment 
for domestic services such as cleaning, cooking, washing, shopping etc. is reduced 
to a level which makes Domestic Services-enterprises more competitive with black 
work and do-it-yourself work. 
The Domestic Services scheme was initiated as a time-limited experiment, but with a 
law of June 1996, the scheme was made permanent. 
The Ministry of Business views the scheme as an attempt to create a new market and 
an entirely new business sector. As opposed to similar schemes which have recently 
been introduced in Belgium and Finland, the aim of which is activation of unemployed, 
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the scheme aims to develop professionalized Domestic Services enterprises as a 
foundation for lasting ordinary employment of persons with little education.62 
After a slow beginning both the demand for subsidized domestic services and 
supply has increased. The number of enterprises registered and approved as eligible 
for subsidies has increased steadily from approx. 1,600 to almost 4,000 from January 
1995 to June 1995. As it appears from Figure 8.3, the number of persons employed in 
domestic services has increased from a few hundred at the outset in January 1994 to 
about 2,300 in June 1995.63 Overall, the societal importance of the Domestic Services 
scheme for employment thus remains limited. 
Figure 8.3. The Development in the Number of Full-Time Positions in Domestic 
Services 1994 - June 1995. 
2500 
1994/95 
Source: Ministry of Business, 1996. 
The Domestic Services scheme has been characterized by a number of development 
problems. The large majority (77 per cent) of enterprizes are very small (0-1 employ-
ees apart from the owner), and the owner lacks experience in running an enterprise. 
Business development and innovation occurs only to a very limited extent. At the 
same time larger, professionalized service enterprises find the market for domestic 
services too small and not profitable enough to be attractive (PLS Consult, 1995). 
There are, however, certain signs of an increasing professionalization of Domestic 
62 In France and Germany domestic services schemes which are more similar to the Danish 
model have also been introduced recently (Ministry of Business, 1996: 334-336). 
63 The total number of employed persons in Domestic Services is considerably higher, as many 
are part time employed. 
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Sen/ice enterprises. A group of relatively large enterprises has recently formed a 
trade organization, and with the continuing growth in demand for domestic services 
and the fact that the scheme has been made permanent, the market should now 
become more attractive to professionalized enterprises (Ministry of Business, 1995b: 
350). 
8.4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Danish Business Policy 
This section contains a brief analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Danish 
business policy, particularly in relation to employment and unemployment and the 
functioning of the labour market. 
Precise assessments of industry policies or business policies are notoriously 
difficult to arrive at, among other things since the employment effects of some types 
of measures cannot be expected to show up until several or even many years after 
their implementation. For instance, this goes for measures aimed to strengthen 
research and development in private enterprises, or private enterprises' utilization of 
research undertaken in the public sector. 
The Ministry of Business has, however, recently attempted to create an 
aggregate success indicator for business policy, a measure of "structural competi-
tiveness". This success indicator relates developments in relative wage costs to 
developments in OECD market shares for Danish exports. 
A normal relation between a country's relative wage costs and OECD market 
shares is calculated.64 A country's structural competitiveness is positive when it has 
higher than expected market shares at a given level of relative wage costs or higher 
than expected relative wages with a given market share. Thus, the higher relative 
wages a country can afford without losing market shares, the more competitive its 
enterprises are. 
A country's structural competitiveness increases when the enterprises 
manage to retain their market shares in spite of growing relative wage costs, or when 
enterprises increase their market share with constant relative wages. Positive 
movements in the business policy success indicator can therefore be ascribed to all 
conditions which either makes it possible for the enterprises in a country to increase 
64 Through a regression-analysis of the relation between different countries' GDP-size and their 
OECD market shares, an expected OECD market share for each GDP-size is projected. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that wage increases of 1 per cent will lead to price increases of 0.6 
per cent, and that a 1 per cent wage increase will lead to a drop in expert values of 0,6 per 
cent. 
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productivity faster than in other countries, increase the quality of export goods and 
services or direct supply towards those market segments which allow the highest 
price increases (Ministry of Business, 1996: 229-238). 
Indirectly, the success indicator may therefore be seen as a measure of the 
quality of the framework conditions of business and thereby of the quality of business 
policy. 
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Source: Ministry of Business (1996). 
It appears from Figure 8.4 that Danish structural competiveness decreased from 1975 
to 1985. From 1985 to 1995 structural competiveness has improved significantly. 
Compared to Germany and the United States, Danish structural competitiveness has 
been lower than the German but higher than the American. The Ministry of Business 
(1996) ascribes the improvement in structural competitiveness from 1985 to improved 
enterprise earnings, a documented increase in registered research and development 
activities and to macroeconomic stability, which has given the enterprises good 
planning opportunities. Furthermore, from 1985 onwards Denmark has to a high 
extent avoided structurally conserving subsidies to declining industries, a type of 
subsidies which has been more common in other industrialized countries. 
The business policy success indicator does not measure the effects of 
business policy on employment and unemployment.65 Rather, it measures the extent 
6 Actually, an initiative such as the Domestic Services scheme may lead to a drop in the 
business policy success indicator as the employment of more persons in low wage areas 
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to which competitiveness in the international markets is compatible with high wages. 
Even if an economy can "afford" a high and growing relative wage level without 
loosing international market shares, it may be characterized by a persistent high 
unemployment rate. Where employed persons reap all benefits of increased 
productivity in the form of real wage growth, the business policy success indicator 
may thus grow without any decrease in the unemployment rate. This situation 
presupposes high real wage rigidity where employed persons' real wage development 
is only to a small extent affected by developments in the unemployment rate. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, real wage rigidity and an insider-outsider 
problem has indeed been emphasized as two important causes for the high and 
persistent Danish unemployment during the 1980s, and the strengthening of 
structural competitiveness from 1985 onwards has coincided with a growth in Danish 
unemployment rates from 1987 to 1993. 
Nevertheless, the figures of the business policy success indicator suggest that 
there is scope for employment growth in the Danish economy, even if it is -
realistically - assumed that there is a strong preference for high real wage levels 
among wage earners. The relatively high structural competitiveness of Danish enter-
prises indicates that higher than expected market shares have been maintained in 
spite of relative wage costs above the OECD average. In priniciple, it should therefore 
be possible to trade future real wage increases with employment growth, at the same 
time upholding a relative high real wage level. In this sense, overall Danish business 
policy must be assessed positively. Good framework conditions for business have 
made possible a high level of structural competitiveness. 
With the available data it is not possible to assess the employment effects of 
individual business policy measures.66 Overall, however, it seems important that the 
preservation of declining industries has not played a very significant role in the 
industrial policies of the past decade. The stabilization element in industrial policy 
has, in other words, played a minor role in Denmark, whereas the allocation element 
has grown in importance since 1984. 
The Domestic Services scheme seems to have contributed to employment for 
low-education groups, but at a modest scale, and the overall importance of the 
decreases the average wage rate without corresponding increases in international market 
shares. 
66 There is little precise evidence as to the employment effects of the technological develop-
ment programmes initiated since 1984. However, only 10 per cent of the enterprises which 
have taken part in the Material Technological Development Programme (MUP) indicate that 
their participation has created new employment (PLS Consult 1996b). For the Føtek-
programme from 1990-94 18 per cent of the involved enterprises answer that employment has 
been increased, but it should be considered that Føtek primarily aims to further long-term 
development through research support. 
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scheme for employment and unemployment remains limited and dependent on 
continued public subsidies.67 
67 24 per cent of the owners of Domestic Service enterprises were previously registered as 
unemployed. Furthermore, the Domestic Service scheme has not just lead to a registration of 
black employment: less than 1/4th of the consumers of services in the Domestic Services 
scheme previously purchased black domestic services (PLS Consult, 1995). 
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9. The National Debate on Strategies for Limiting 
Unemployment 
This chapter first summarizes the direction of present Danish policies aimed to lower 
unemployment. It then focuses attention on the future: Which further measures are 
currently being debated with a view to a further permanent and sustainable reduction 
in unemployment? The debate has revolved around two key issues: First, an increase 
in labour productivity through training and education, which will enable a reduction in 
unemployment for low skill groups without lowering minimum wages. Second, various 
measures which would lower labour costs, particularly for unskilled labour. 
9.1. The Direction of Present Policies to Lower Unemployment 
As has been described in the preceeding chapters, present national policies for 
lowering unemployment consists of the following elements: 
Stability-Oriented Macroeconomic Policy 
The government pursues stability-oriented macroeconomic policies, targeted at 
reducing unemployment and balancing the public budget while at the same time 
keeping inflation low and the exchange rate stable, cf. Chapter 2. An expansionary 
fiscal policy in 1993 and 1994 to stimulate economic growth, demand and thereby 
job-creation has been followed by a gradual tightening of fiscal policies in 1995 and 
1996. 
Towards Policies which Increase Effective Labour Supply 
Increasingly, policies are moving away from the traditional policy of reducing labour 
supply as a way to reduce unemployment. Rather, policies are to a growing extent 
directed towards increasing effective labour supply. An increase in the effective 
labour supply is seen to lower the inflationary pressures of the economy as shortages 
of skilled labour occur more rarely. In other words, an increase in the effective labour 
supply lowers structural unemployment: The rate of unemployment which is con-
sistent with unchanged wage and price inflation (NAIRU-definition). 
The most prominent examples of the new official emphasis on an increase in 
the effective labour supply are found in the active labour market policy itself and in tax 
policy. As it is described in Chapter 3, intensified activation of unemployed, tightened 
rules for benefit eligibility, the shortening of the total benefit period, and the abolish-
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ment of the Transition Benefit Scheme are measures which all serve to increase 
labour supply. Furthermore, the possibility of individually adapted training program-
mes, job-rotation projects and targeted training programmes should serve to make 
supply more effective, i.e. directed towards the demands of the labour market and 
areas where there are potential risks of labour shortages. 
The Tax Reform of 1993 similarly contains a number of elements which aim to 
increase effective labour supply: A decrease in marginal personal income tax rates 
coupled with an increased use of resource consumption taxes ("green taxes"). 
Limiting Labour Supply through the Leave Schemes 
A number of policies are increasingly directed towards increasing effective labour 
supply. At the same time the three comprehensive Leave Schemes launched in 1994 
serve to limit labour supply and thereby to reduce registered unemployment in the 
short term. The leave schemes are, however, gradually being scaled down. The 
Sabbatical Leave Scheme will be abolished entirely in March 1998 and the Child Care 
Leave allowance will be reduced to 60 per cent of the maximum unemployment 
benefit in 1997. The inconsistency in Government labour market policy is thus likely to 
become less significant during 1997 and 1998, even if it is not dissolved entirely. 
Increased Labour Demand through Increased Labour Productivity 
A fourth element in recent policies aimed to lower unemployment consists of a 
growing emphasis on increasing the demand for labour through an increase in labour 
productivity. Two different paths are followed. 
First, a key component in the 1993 Labour Market Reform was early activation 
of unemployed, an element which was strengthened in the subsequent reforms in late 
1994 and late 1995. Early activation shall not only serve to increase effective labour 
supply, it shall also prevent that deterioration of skills which is associated with long-
term unemployment. Labour productivity is, in other words, to be preserved with early 
activation, in order to improve unemployed persons' employment chances. 
Second, in the 1993 Labour Market Reform and to an even higher extent in 
the actual labour market policies which have been implemented by the Regional 
Labour Market Councils much emphasis is placed on an upgrade of the skills of the 
labour force. As it appears in Chapter 3, training and education has been given a 
significantly higher priority than previously by the Regional Labour Market Councils. 
The implicit presumption is that this will allow for a growth in labour productivity, 
entailing a growth in the demand for labour without changes in the agreed level of 
wages. 
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Increased Labour Demand through Subsidised Labour 
Fifth, wage subsidy schemes have played a prominent role in Danish labour market 
policy ever since the early 1970s, and they continue to play an important role after the 
1993 Labour Market Reform in the Job Training and Individual Job Training Schemes. 
However, a recent salient element in Goverment policy has been the Domestic 
Services Scheme in which a 50% subsidy is provided to private households for the 
purchase of cleaning services etc. The scheme is presented as a business 
development initiative, but its most prominent objective is to improve employment 
prospectives for persons with no or little formal education. The overall importance of 
the scheme for employment and unemployment does, however, remain limited. 
9.2. The Debate on the Future Direction of Policies 
The current Danish debate on strategies for limiting unemployment revolves around 
three themes: the issue of labour productivity, and the issue of labour cost, particu-
larly for low-skill groups. 
9.2.1. Increasing Labour Productivity 
Increasing labour productivity as a means to reducing unemployment repeatedly 
appears on the Danish public policy agenda. Increasing productivity in this context 
means upgrading the skills of the labour force, particularly of the low-skill group who 
has above average unemployment. 
The current government has made education one of its main strategies for 
reducing unemployment. The Social Democrats and the small social-liberal govern-
ment partner, supported by the labour movement, have been among the strong 
proponents of this strategy. Thus two government slogans illustrate the education 
strategy: "Education for AH", signals the intent to increase the number of youth who 
complete a vocationally qualifying education, "Education for Life" indicates the 
principles of strong adult and continued education. 
The effort to increase education levels so far includes expansion of the 
number of education places. Two youth educations have been established to provide 
new entryways to the education system, particularly for those who are vocationally 
rather than theoretically inclined. Finally, the incentive to enter education inherent in 
the unemployment benefit system has been sharpened for youth who are 
unemployed. 
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Regarding adult and continuing education, one of the main changes is free 
admission to continuing education. This is accomplished by funding education 
institutions based on the number of students being admitted, that is demand-based 
education planning, as opposed to the previous planning . A grant system has been 
established to encourage companies to do more planning of employee continuing 
education; each company can receive 50 per cent, up to 50.000 DKK, of the cost of 
mapping out employees' qualifications and needs for more education. Other reform 
elements include increased financial support for participants in adult education and an 
effort to improve local cooperation among suppliers of labour market courses. 
One focus of the changes has been to increase participation by people with 
little or no education. In addition to increased financial support for adult education, 
this effort involves an exemption for this group from the newly introduced user fees 
and an effort to plan the course offering so that it better accommodates those with 
only little education. 
The changes that have been implemented in adult and continuing education 
fall short of the comprehensive reform the government originally announced as its 
goal. The intention was to improve accessibility of the system by making uniform 
admission, financing and courses. But a review committee concluded that no single 
reform could be all encompassing, and that a uniform system would become too 
inflexible to accommodate the different needs of the many participants (interview, 
Ministry of Labour). But most of the proposals made by committees have been 
implemented, although in a piecemeal fashion. Until later evaluations of the system, it 
appears to be too early to tell whether the changes will be sufficient. The litmus test of 
the reform will be whether the participation rate of those with little or no education 
increases, and whether labour market parties feel the system become more 
responsive to their needs. 
The rationale behind the education strategy is that the compressed wage 
structure that characterizes the Danish economy requires high productivity - that is 
high skill labour - in order to sustain employment at the relatively high minimum 
wages (Denmarks Employment Programme, 1995). The government repeatedly has 
argued that a qualifications upgrade of the Danish labour force will reduce mismatch 
problems in the labour market and help longterm unemployed gain stable 
employment. Similarly, the labour movement argues that the education strategy 
creates an upward spiral as opposed to the low-wage strategy, because investments 
in new technology also requires highly qualified labour. A large education gap in the 
146 
labour force means that parts of the labour force will be stuck in the no-growth 
outdated technology sectors of the labour market (Information, May 20, 1996.)68 
The education path also happens to be the least controversial path. There is 
general consensus in Denmark that the qualifications of the labour force need to be 
upgraded to increase productivity. The disagreement concerns whether this strategy 
is enough. Some, including the liberal and conservative opposition, argue that edu-
cation must be accompanied by other strategies that address incentives to work. 
The Economic Council in an analysis of the issue of education concluded that 
the Danish labour force needs a skills upgrade, but also stressed that an increased 
effort in adult and continuing education must target youth because the labour market 
will benefit from the upgrade for more years from a young person's education, and 
that continuing education should focus on vocationally qualifying educations. Further-
more, the Economic Council argued that despite increased education, structural 
unemployment must also be addressed through changes in the incentives structures 
(1995). 
Several participants in the debate have argued that education may not be the 
answer for parts of the labour force. The director of the dominant employer cartel, 
Danish Industry, argued recently that some members of the labour force are so poorly 
qualified that continuing education will never suffice to make them competitive in the 
labour market (Information, January 11, 1996)69. These poorly skilled persons will only 
find work by accepting a wage that matches their productivity. Given the resistance to 
lowering the income levels of lowwage Danes, the director suggests lower taxes to 
allow for lower wages. We shall return to this debate later in the chapter. 
Even inside the coalition government there are voices who question whether 
education is the answer for all. The Danish Minister of Business agrees with those 
who say there will be some labour force participants whose skills cannot be upgraded 
to high productivity jobs. For these labour, she proposes a greater emphasis on 
service sector jobs, and she has also supported a low wage tax allowance, cf. 
below.70 
68 Interview with economist Henrik Hofmann, the Labour Movement's Economic Council (AE). 
"Rustet til fordelingskampen" (Armed for the distribution struggle). 
69 Interview with Director Hans Skov Christensen of Danish Industry. Information, January 11, 
1996. "Dl: Lavere skat skal skabe job til restgruppen" (DI: LOwer taxes will create jobs for 
those left out). 
70 Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, 31.5.1995. "Vejen til Fremtidens Velfærdssamfund" (Paths to 
the welfare society of the future). Mimi Jacobsen. 
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9.2.2. Reducing Labour Costs 
A second issue which also continue to be debated concerns a reduction in labour 
costs in order to increase labour demand. This line of thinking has been well-
represented in the Danish debate on, reflected in the many different proposals which 
are being considered. 
Some of proposals aim to affect employers' demand for labour directly, for 
instance through lower minimum wages. Other proposals aim to increase labour 
demand indirectly through the labour supply function, as a reduction in income taxes 
for low income groups will increase labour supply among these groups, and as lower 
wage demands are seen to result since disposable income can be maintained at 
lower nominal wage levels. Thus it becomes economically feasible for employers to 
demand also iow skilled labour, whose productivity does not warrant high wages. 
Finally, a proposal on an employee tax allowance has aimed at increasing labour 
supply among low income groups as this allowance would decrease the importance of 
the unemployment trap. This would also lead to lower wage demands among low 
income groups. 
Lower Minimum Wages 
Much debate continues to be centered around a lowering minimum wages. The 
argument first goes that lower minimum wages will increase wage differentials 
thereby encouraging employment of labour whose skill and productivity level was too 
low to make them employable at the previous wage level. Second it is argued that 
lower wage costs in particular for low skill groups will increase labour demand in 
labour intensive sectors of the economy. In particular this demand effect is seen as a 
method to create an entrance for low-skilled youth or to increase employment in the 
service sector, for instance in various domestic or consumer services where current 
wage levels have not allowed a high demand. It is also argued that lower minimum 
wages will serve to transform much black labour to registered employment, as in the 
black sector the absence of taxes compensate for lower wages. 
This proposal is much disputed. The trade union movement strongly opposes 
a lower minimum wage. Labour movement representatives argue that a lower 
minimum wage would create a downward pressure on wages resulting in poverty -
the phenomenon known as the working poor from the United States. Comparing 
unemployment statistics, the labour movement argues that despite a low entrance 
minimum wage, youth unemployment in the United States is twice the average rate of 
unemployment and higher than the rate of youth unemployment in Denmark. The 
same trend is true for the United Kingdom (Det Fri Aktuelt, 1 January 1995). 
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Furthermore, it appears that low minimum wages have not signifiantly reduced 
structural unemployment. The labour movement's economic analysis institute AER 
also disputes the assertion that the service sector market will flourish once wages 
drop, referring to the relatively small employment effect of subsidising Domestic 
Service, cf. section 8.3.1. 
Government economists also generally argue that the employment effect is 
limited, pointing to an international comparison indicating that a one-per cent drop in 
structural unemployment requires an 10-to-15 per cent increase in wage differentials. 
Consequently, a significant drop in structural of unemployment would require quite 
considerable wage reduction for the low-income groups. Furthermore, economists in 
the Ministry of Finance find support for their view in American studies, showing that a 
10 per cent drop in minimum wages would increase employment among youth under 
19-years-old by maximum 3 per cent, while the effect of minimum wages on 
employment of labour in their 20s or older appears negligible (Ministry of Finance, 
1995b). 
Standardbearers for a lower minimum or entrance wage are employers and 
the opposition parties to the right in the Danish political spectrum. They receive some 
support from the Economic Council. The proponents for a lower entrance wage argue 
that it will help poorly qualified labour gain access to the labour market. The direct 
effect on employment of lowering entrance wages is multiplied, the Council argues, 
because the greater competition for jobs and the greater wage dispersion will rubb off 
on wages above the entrance level thus leading to overall wage restraint. This, in 
turn, will lower company costs, improve competitive strength and finally, create even 
more jobs. According to Council estimates, some 25 per cent of men and 15 per cent 
of women in the labour force do not have adequate education to qualify for jobs at the 
typical entrance wage. Based on this, the Council has estimated the effect of reducing 
entrance wages by 10 per cent relative to average wages (Economic Council, 1994). 
Regarding the employment effect of such a wage cut, the Council's 
calculations show a net improvement in employment of 6,500 persons, concealing an 
increase among poorly qualified labour of 53,000 persons, but offset by a decrease 
for the higher educated of 46,500 persons, because the former become more 
competitive for some jobs that do not require much education. Including the 
secondary employment effects, the net increase in employment would amount to 
23,000 full time employees. This corresponds to an increase in total employment of 
0.9 per cent or a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the 1994 registered unemployment 
rate. 
As for social and distributional effects, the Council concludes that a lower 
entrance wage will have limited adverse effects, possibly even positive ones. This is 
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because many employees whose relative wages decrease will increase their 
employment, consequently compensating for the relative fall in the annual income. 
Furthermore, those who gain employment will increase their annual income. 
Finally, the Council takes into account studies that show a rather high wage 
mobility. This means even if a person starts out at a lower entrance wage, his 
accumulated lifetime income will not be significantly affected, because studies show 
that most of those in the lowest 10 per cent of incomes at a given point will move out 
of this group and into higher income groups rather quickly. On the contrary, a person 
who gets a job and presumably improves his skills will rise through the wage 
hierarchy to land at a higher accumulated lifetime income than he would have by 
staying unemployed because noone would hire him at the current entrance wage. 
This means that only those who will hold the low entry-wage jobs permanently, will 
come out worse from lower minimum wages.71 
A final issue that requires consideration concerning lower minimum wages is 
the means by which such a minumum wage could be enforced, given the lack of a 
statutory minimum wage, and further given the fact that entrance wages often exceed 
the collectively negotiated minimum wage (cf. section 5.3). The debate has centered 
around how to create incentive for the social partners to negotiate a lower minimum 
wage, possibly a separate lower entrance wage for youth. One suggestion has been 
to lower unemployment benefits, which would create incentive for labour to take jobs 
at lower wages than they would under the current system. The Ministry of Finance 
estimates that this option would require a lowering of unemployment benefits and 
other transfer incomes much greater than the positive effect on wage dispersion it 
might entail. 
Another instrument put forward is to set up a mechanism that will force the 
social partners to take responsibility for unemployment levels. This was one of the 
formal purposes of the labour market tax, which finances part of the unemployment 
benefits, cf. section 3.1.2 in Chapter 3. The thinking is that labour market insiders will 
be directly affected by increasing unemployment through higher taxes, which should 
encourage them to show wage restraint. Finally, the Economic Council points out that 
minimum wages in the public sector exceeds the minimum wage in the private labour 
7' Mobility calculations show that out of the 10 per cent of the population who had the lowest 
wages in 1981, less than half were in the lowest income decile one year later, and after nine 
years 20 per cent remained in the lowest income decile (Economic Council, 1994). However, 
since many of the individuals in the first income deciles are retirees and students, who have a 
high probability of moving up or simply disappearing frorm the statistic, this may not be the best 
indicator for mobility. Unfortunately, the Council has not calculated mobility for those in the 
second and third deciles. 
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market, implying that a lowering of public sector minimum wages might have a 
beneficial effect on the entire labour market. 
The Government generally cites concerns about increasing social inequities 
by lower wages or transfer incomes, and has not yet pursued policies in this regard. 
However, government members have occasionally speculated publicly about the 
feasibility of a simultaneous drop in low incomes/unemployment benefits and marginal 
tax rates for low income groups. We shall consider the issue of tax reliefs for low-
income groups in the following section. 
Tax Reliefs for Low-Income Groups 
Opponents of lower entrance or minimum wages are motivated by concerns for 
growing inequality. In response to this concern, several economists and policymakers 
have suggested that a lower entrance or minimum wage be accompanied by a low-
income tax relief. A low-income tax relief allows low-income labour to accept a 
relatively lower-paying job without losing real income. Consequently, employers will 
demand more low-skill labour and the labour market would approach market 
clearance. Additionally economists expect new job creation in sectors whose earnings 
could not previously pay the wages, particularly in the service sector. 
Proponents argue therefore that such a simultaneous change would lessen 
structural unemployment problems without resulting in greater income disparities. 
Although this proposal has circulated widely with much positive response, the Ministry 
of Finance warn that it may create a poverty trap: as the tax relief is phased out with 
increasing income, marginal tax rates will take a leap for income in the income range 
where the tax relief is phased out, thus reducing incentive for those in the lower-
income groups to take better paying jobs. Again, this will decrease labour market 
mobility and possibly increase structural unemployment (Ministry of Finance, 1995b; 
Welfare Commission, 1995). 
Furthermore, Government economists argue that the tax allowance for low-
income labour would have to be compensated for through higher marginal tax rates 
on income levels above that affected by the tax allowance. The level of such an 
increase would depend on the income level at which the tax relief applies as this 
determines the volume of lost tax revenue, but it would be considerably smaller than 
in the case of tax deduction applying to all employees. However, the Minister of 
Taxation maintains that there is no room for a tax relief for low-income wage earners 
(Politiken, 4 February 1996). 
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The Proposal for an Employment Tax Allowance 
Finally, a proposal to offer an employment tax deduction has also been on the public 
agenda. An employment tax allowance would not apply to the unemployed, and it 
would thus decrease the relative value of unemployment benefits.72 According to 
proponents of the proposal this would increase incentive for the unemployed to 
accept a job even at lower wages than they would have accepted otherwise. Thus, 
the tax allowance would offset the costs of obtaining employment which create 
disincentives to work for some low pay groups, such as the possible loss of public 
subsidies and transport costs or other costs of working. In this way, an employment 
tax allowance would help overcome the phenomenon of the unemployment trap, cf. 
Chapter 6. 
The line of argument regarding the effects of this on labour supply is the same 
as that described in connection with lower minimum wages. The employment tax 
allowance will increase labour supply among low income groups, leading to lower 
wages or wage increase rates among low income groups. This wage restraint effect 
will spread to higher income groups leading to overall relative wage restraint. This will 
in turn strengthen enterprise competitiveness, contributing to job creation. 
One specific proposal, being supported by the Minister of Business, would 
offer a tax deduction equal to 10 per cent of work income up to DKK 130,000 a year 
(Politiken, 4 February 1996). An employment tax deduction in this form would apply to 
all employed, regardless of income, thereby decreasing tax revenues considerably. 
Assuming that an employment tax deduction would have to be revenue neutral, the 
proposal would most likely result in higher marginal rates on all income above DKK 
130,000 (assuming that this is the upper limit for the deduction). Thus, according to 
one calculation, a 1 per cent tax deduction on incomes up to DKK 130,000 would 
require a 2 percentage point increase in marginal tax rates (Welfare Commission, 
1995).73 
In this connection, the recent tax reforms in Denmark, which have lowered 
marginal tax rates by 12-14 per cent, may have created some maneuvering room for 
a tax deduction as opposed to the tax rates before the tax reforms. At the same time, 
72 The Employment Tax Allowance may also decrease the absolute value of unemployment 
benefits if the tax revenue which is lost through the Allowance is compensated for through 
consumption taxes. 
73 In a different example it was assumed that gross minimum wages were lowered to DKK 
100,000 per year. In this instance, the Welfare Commission calculated that tax rates would 
have to be lowered to 12 per cent on the first DKK 100,000 to fully compensate low-wage 
labour. As a result marginal tax rates on all income above DKK 130,000 would increase by 27 
percentage points on top of the 1998 tax rates. The Commission concludes that an 
employment tax deduction would intensify the rate of progression in the Danish tax system 
markedly (Welfare Commission, 1995). 
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however, it seems likely that reactions to an increase in marginal tax rates will be 
stronger in an economy like the Danish with high marginal tax rates than in an 
economy with low marginal taxes (Ministry of Finance, 1995; Welfare Commission, 
1995).74 
9.3. Perspectives 
This section briefly assesses the likely development in policies directed towards 
lowering unemployment in the years to come. In this assessment it is important to 
keep in mind the character of the Danish political system and labour market. 
Most importantly, the Danish political system is consensus-oriented. Because 
Danish governments traditionally are coalitions with a narrow or no majority, most 
major policy reforms are adopted by broad coalitions that span both sides of the 
ideological divide. Furthermore, it is most often sought to involve and obtain the 
consent of the labour market parties as regards major and minor reforms affecting the 
functioning of the labour market directly. 
Secondly, reforms in Denmark is in every pluralist political system generally 
follow the path of least resistance. This means that reform proposals will be shaped 
or amended so as to create the least possible controversy. Finally, following from the 
first two points, any significant reform to deal with structural unemployment in 
Denmark must gain the support of the Social Democratic Party and the labour 
movement, because of their size and central position in the labour market. On this 
basis the following prospects seem likely for future unemployment policies: 
• It can be expected that proposals which are perceived as significantly affecting the 
income distribution will meet significant resistance. 
• It appears likely that the education strategy will continue to be given high priority in 
the attempt to lower structural unemployment. This strategy is the least 
controversial of the proposals being debated, and it generally resonates with 
cultural values. 
• In the same vein are measures that would increase effective labour supply through 
earlier activation and more comprehensive activation of unemployed. These are 
also relatively uncontroversial as long as they are seen as improving the chances 
of the unemployed for gaining employment. Further tightening of eligbility rules 
74 In Ministry of Business et al. (1996) a thorough analysis of the impacts of an employment tax 
allowanve is provided. 
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also appear in the debate from time to time, also among members of Government, 
and it is possible that such measures could gain sufficient support. 
• Finally, it is likely that Danish unemployment policies will continue to include labour 
subsidy schemes, in the forms of private job offers, the Domestic Sen/ices scheme 
and other service jobs that targets low skill labour, because they create jobs 
without any obvious costs to any groups. 
However, as it appears from the previous sections, the other meaures discussed in 
the Denmark have poorer prospects of adoption. The resistance in core circles of the 
Social Democrats as well as the labour movement make it unlikely that these parties 
will come around on the issue of lower entry wages. And as outlined above, at this 
point, such crucial labour market legislation will not be passed without the 
parliamentary approval of the Social Democrats. The same is true of lowering the 
unemployment benefit. 
The debate on lower taxes for low income wages has recently gained 
momentum again, as the OECD unequivocally supported such a measure. In 
Denmark, an unusual alliance of the conservative-liberal opposition has tentatively 
joined forces with the Socialist People's Party, the main opposition party on the left, to 
push for low-income tax relief. But as outlined above, any low-income tax relief in a 
tax system like the Danish with relatively high marginal tax rates means that any tax 
relief on low incomes would probably be fairly small and the unemployment effect 
therefore rather minor. A sizable low-income tax relief would necessitate relatively 
high marginal tax increases for higher incomes to compensate for lost revenues on 
the low incomes, given that there appears to be little support in major public budget 
cuts. Green taxes, at their current level would hardly bring in enough revenue to make 
up for a low income tax cut and a significant increase in these is not in the cards. 
Therefore, it also does not seem likely that the current Danish government will choose 
this policy. 
One other scenario should be considered, though. Recent polls show great 
strides being made by the liberal-conservative party, Venstre, while the Social 
Democrats have lost so much electoral suppor that they would no longer be the 
biggest single party. If such a situation materializes after the next election, it is 
possible that Denmark could see a right-wing coalition government with the liberal 
and the conservative party and one of the extreme right-wing parties. Representatives 
for these parties have been among the standardbearers for some of the more radical 
proposals in the debate, including lower unemployment benefits and other incentives 
that would decrease wages. 
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It is questionnable, however, whether these parties would break away from 
the consensus tradition and pass important reforms in the labour market without the 
support of the Social Democrats. It is also important to keep in mind that there is a 
near-consensus of value across most sectors against allowing a group of working 
poor to develop. Consequently, it must be expected that even if these parties chose 
to attempt to act on their political agendas and implement more sweeping reforms 
these would most likely have to put these reforms together in such a way that low-
wage earners' net-income would not decrease significantly. Furthermore, such a 
government would have to take into account the potential for widespread resistance 
and disruption in the labour market if it were to pass major reforms without Social 
Democratic consent. 
In sum, only four instruments are likely to be applied to any higher extent in 
the future than presently in the attempt to lower structural unemployment further: 
• The activation of unemployed may become further extended. 
• Eligibility rules for unemployment benefits may become tightened. 
• Training and education of unemployed and employed persons may be be given yet 
a higher priority. 
• Earlier activation. 
The open question is whether these policy instruments are sufficient to solve 
Denmarks near-permanent problem of high and persistent unemployment. 
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Appendix Λ: Population and Labour Force Developments 
A.1 Demographic Trends: Changes in the Size and Structure of the 
Population and the Labour Force 
This Appendix contains a description of the main demographic trends in Denmark. 
The description focuses on persons in the labour force active age and on develop­
ments in the size of the population in the labour force active age. The first subsection 
provides a short description of the structure of the population. The second subsection 
focuses on the development in the labour force from 1980 to 1995. Finally, the third 
subsection projects the future development in the size of the labour force. 
A.1.1 Demographic Trends: The Size and Structure of the Population, 1980-
1995 
Figure A.1.1 illustrates the development in the size of the Danish population. The 
population has been fairly stable during the past 15 years. The slight increase in the 
population is mainly due to immigration. 








1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review, 1990 & 1995. 
The net fertility rate measures the number of female babies which 1000 women, who 
are reduced according to mortality, give birth to. Since 1980 this number has been 
below 1000, which means that the Danish population will not be able to maintain its 
present size in the long run without immigration. The low net fertility rate also means 
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that the relative weight of old and young people can be expected to change. In 1994, 
people above 60 years of age constituted 20 per cent of the whole population. This 
percentage is expected to increase to 25 per cent in year 2030. 
A.1.2 Age and Gender Distribution of the Population 
In Figure A.1.2 the age distribution of the population in 1980 and 1995 is displayed. 
No significant shifts between the different age groups have occurred in this period. 
This can be explained partly by the relatively brief observation period.1 
Figure A.1.2: The Age Pyramid for the Danish Population in 1980 and 1995. 
1980 1995 
Age 
θ β 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Male Female 
1 
fi 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
However, the figure reveals a low birth rate in the early and mid-1980s. The figure 
also indicates the growing weight of elderly people relative to young people, just as it 
is noticeable that females live longer than males. 
A.1.3 Regional Variations in the Development of the Population 
In table A.1.3 the Danish population has been divided according to counties. The 
number of citizens within the capital area has decreased during the past 15 years 
whereas the number of citizens in all of the counties of Jutland has increased. 
The increase in the population during the last 15 years has taken place in 
Jutland and in Funen only. This picture does not change if distinction between gender 
is introduced. 
The expected lifetime of males is 72.5 years and of females 77.8 years. 
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Table A.1.3: The Development in Danish Population by Region - January 1st 
















































































Copenhagen County does not include Copenhagen municipality. 
Capital Area includes Copenhagen Municipality, Frederiksberg Municipality, Frederiksberg 
Municipality, Copenhagen County and Roskilde County. 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 & 1995. 
A.1.4 The Impact of Migration 
The development of migration is shown in Figure A.1.4. Immigration has been larger 
than emigration, and net migration has been postive during the last 15 years. 
However, net migration has not exceeded 11,000 persons per year during the last 15 
years, and compared to the total Danish population net migration has been small. 
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] Emigration I Immigration •Net Immigration 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review, 1980 & 1995. 
The number of foreigners who have immigrated into Denmark has also been 
moderate. During the last ten years net migration of foreigners has not been more 
than 13,000 persons per year. 
A.1.5 The Size of the Population of Active Age in the Labour Force 
In Denmark, the labour force active age is the age between 16 and 66 years. As 
shown in figure A. 1.5 the population in the labour force active age has increased over 
the last 15 years. The total increase in the size of the population in the labour force 
active age has been about 180,000 persons corresponding to a 5.3 per cent increase 
from 1981 to 1994. The increase is mainly due to a natural increase in the population 
but can also to a certain extent be explained by immigration. 
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Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 & 1995. 
A.2 The Development of the Labour Force 1980 -1995 
The labour force is defined as the number of employed persons plus the number of 
registered unemployed persons. The labour force is highly affected by the size of the 
population in the labour force active age, by labour force participation rates and by 
the number of working hours agreed upon in collective agreements. 
A.2.1 The Size of the Labour Force 
Figure A.2.1 displays the development in the size of the labour force, in total and by 
gender during the last 15 years. The size of the labour force increased rather steadily 
during most of the 1980s, decreased slightly around 1990, and has stayed at a fairly 
constant level since then. The increase has mainly been due to an increase in the 
female labour force. The male labour force has been stagnating as a result of a slight 
decline in male participation rates, especially for men over 60 due to the Post 
Employment Wage scheme, cf. section A.2.2 below. 
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The ratio between the population and the labour force population is an 
indication of the number of people one person in the labour force has to support. This 
ratio has been fairly stable over time, although the Danish population has grown, cf. 
figure A.1. In 1980 the ratio was 1.9 which had fallen to 1.8 in 1994. The constancy of 
the ratio between the population and the labour force is mainly due to an increase in 
female labour force participation, cf. below. 
Figure A.2.1: The Labour Force in Total and by Gender 1980-1994, Number of 
Persons. 








Female - - - Male •Total 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review, 1991& 1995. 
A.2.2 Labour Force Participation Rates 
The labour force participation rate measures the ratio between the size of the labour 
force and the size of the population in the labour force active age. The larger the 
participation rate the higher the percentage of persons in the labour force active age 
are willing to hold a job. 
The increase in the labour force since 1980 has mainly been due to an 
increase in the female labour force with the female participation rate rising from 71 
per cent in 1980 to a constant level around 76 per cent since 1987. Male labour force 
participation rates were higher than those of women througout the period from 1980, 
but the male labour force participation rate has decreased during the last 15 years. As 
mentioned, the main reason for this decrease is a large increase in the number of 
persons receiving early retirement benefits. 
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Source: Statistical Ten-year Review, 1991 & 1995 
It is noticeable that the relationship between gender and labour market participation 
rates in Denmark virtually disappears when controlling for educational background. 
Thus, Bonke (1995) has identified a clear connection between educational back-
ground and labour force participation rate: The higher the educational level, the 
higher the labour market participation rate. At the same time, the differences between 
male and female labour market participation rates narrow considerably as the 
educational level increases. 
Table A.2.2.1: Labour Force Participation by Educational Background and 
Gender, 1994. 
Basic education 










Source: Bonke (1995). 
When dividing the labour force by age Table A.2.2.2 shows that the labour force 
participation rate is relatively high for people between 25-54 years of age. For older 
and younger people labour force participation is lower. 
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There are different reasons for the low labour force participation of the two 
age groups. For young people the low labour force participation is due to the fact that 
an increasing proportion of this group attends further education. For older people the 
main explanation for the low labour force participation rate is the fact that a large 
proportion of this group receives early retirements benefits. 
























Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995 
A.2.3 Changes in the Labour Force by Age and Gender 
From Table A.2.3 it appears that there has been a large decrease in the number of 
young and old people in the labour force from 1980 to 1994, whereas the middle aged 
group of the labour force has increased significantly. 







































Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995. Available data is not completely precise. 
The increase in the number of middle aged persons in the labour force is partly 
explained by growing female labour participation. The decreasing number of older 
persons in the labour force is to a high extent explained by an increase in the number 
of people receiving early retirement benefits. As mentioned, the decreasing number of 
young persons in the labour force is partly a result of a longer education period for 
this age group compared to earlier. 
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A.2.4 Regional Variations in the Development of the Labour Force 
In table A.2.4 below the labour force has been divided by counties. The largest 
increase in the labour force has taken place in the eastern part of Jutland (Århus and 
Vejle county). 
































































































Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995. 
On the contrary, the labour force has decreased in some of the peripheral regions in 
Denmark: Bornholms county and Storstrøms county. In the capital area as a whole, 
the labour force has only increased slightly since 1980. 
A.3 Labour Force Projections 1995 to 2005 
The Ministry of Finance has projected the future development of the labour force. This 
projection is shown in Figure A.3 below. It is expected that the labour force will grow 
from less than 2.85 million persons in 1995 to more than 3 milllion persons in 1995, 
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an increase of 188,000 persons during the next 10 years. The expected increase in 
the size of the labour force can be explained by two factors: 









1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Year 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 1995b. 
The first and most important is an increase in labour force participation. The Ministry 
of Finance expects a total increase of 4.3 per cent, from a level of 78.7 per cent in 
1995 to a level of 83 per cent in 2005. This is due to improved employment prospects 
in the period towards 2005, which will reduce the number of persons receiving early 
retirement benefit as well as the number of persons receiving temporary leave 
allowances. 
The second factor is an expected increase in the size of the population in the 
labour force active age. Thus, the population in the labour force active age will 
increase by 50,000 persons during the period from 1994 to 2005. 
Looking even further ahead, the Central Statistical Office has projected the 
size of the population in the labour force active age until 2040. This projection shows 
that the size of the population in the labour force active age will decline in the long 
run. A decrease of 3.4 per cent (118,277 persons) is expected until year 2040. Corre-
spondingly, a decrease in the size of the Danish labour force is expected as well. 
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A.4 Conclusions 
The descriptive analysis of the Danish population and labour force can be 
summarised in the following points: 
Population 
• The population has been fairly stable from 1980 to 1995. The impact of 
immigration and emigration has been very low. 
• The proportion of old people is expected to rise by 5 per cent during the next 40 
years. 
• Due to a low net fertility rate the Danish population will not be able to maintain its 
present size in the long run without immigration. 
• The size of the population in the labour force active age has increased slightly with 
about 180,000 persons corresponding to 5.4 per cent from 1981 to 1994. 
Labour force 
• The labour force has grown in the period from 1980 to 1994. This can to a very 
large extent be explained by an increase in female labour force participation, 
whereas male participation rates have decreased. 
• Throughout the period from 1980 to 1994 male labour market participation rates 
have been higher than female participation rates. However, the gap has narrowed, 
in particular in the period until 1989. Among persons with a high education there 
are virtually no gender differences in labour market participation rates. 
• There has been a decrease in the number of old and young people in the labour 
force. There are different reasons for the lower labour force participation rate for 
these two age groups. For young people lower labour force participation can be 
ascribed to the fact that a growing proportion of this group is currently receiving 
education. For old people the main explanation for the lower labour force 
participation is the fact that a large proportion of this group is currently receiving 
early retirement benefits. 
• The labour force is expected to increase in the short and medium term. This can 
be explained by an increase in the size of the population in the labour force active 
age and by an increase in labour force participation. 
• There have been few major changes in the relative size of the labour force in the 
Danish regions. Some counties in Jutland have experienced a strong growth in the 
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size of the labour force, whereas the size of the labour force in some capital 
regions and in areas affected by economic decline has decreased. 
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Appendix Β: The Structure of the Work Force 
This Appendix is divided into two main sections. The first section describes the 
development in the structure of employment in Denmark from 1980 to 1994. The 
second section describes the structure of unemployment and its development from 
1980 to 1994. 
B.1 Employment in Denmark 
Figure B.1 illustrates the development in total as well as full­time and part­time 
employment during the last 15 years.2 Full­time employment peaked in 1987, but has 
since then been decreasing. From 1981 to 1991 part­time employment was fairly 
stable, but since 1991 it has been decreasing. 
Figure B.1 : The Development in Full-Time, Part-Time and Total Employment, 
1981-1994 
Full time employed 
and total employed Parttime employed 
2.800.000 









•Total number of employed *'■ 
1989 






­+ 1 l· 300.000 
1993 
Parttime employed 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995 
2 The total number of employed is calculated as the number of full­time employed persons+ 
1/2*(the number of part time employed persons). 
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To some extent this decrease can be explained by the fact that some of the part-time 
employed have obtained full-time employment. Another explanation may be found in 
the fact that a part-time person's possibilities of obtaining supplementary unemploy-
ment insurance have been gradually limited during the 1990s. Most part-time 
employed persons are women employed in the public sector. Women constitute more 
than 65 per cent of all part-time employed. 
The decrease in employment since 1987 correlates to an increase in 
unemployment, as will be described in more detail in section B.2 below. 
B.1.1 Employment by Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Sector 
Table B.1.1 displays the development in the distribution of employment by sectors. 
The importance of employment in the primary and secondary sectors has decreased 
compared to the tertiary sector, i.e. the private and public service sectors. Today less 
than one third of all employment is located within the primary and secondary sectors. 
Table B.1.1: The Development in Employment in the Primary, Secondary, 
Private Service and Public Service Sector, 1980-1994. 
Primary sector 
Secondary sector 
Private service sector 
















Source: Statistical 50-year Review, 1995 
The decrease in relative employment in the secondary sector can to a certain extent 
be explained by a change in the demand for labour. Thus, increased import of goods 
from low wage countries has affected the industrial structure in Denmark. Enterprises 
competing with companies from low wage countries have two options: Substituting 
relatively expensive labour with new technology or moving production to lower wage 
countries. The development within the manufacturing of textiles, clothing apparel and 
leather products and footwear illustrates this dynamic as employment in these areas 
has decreased from 29,921 persons in 1984 to 21,198 in 1992 a decrease of 29 per 
cent. 
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Β.1.2 Employment by Occupational Structure 
Table B.1.2 illustrates that a significant change has occurred in the Danish 
occupational structure during the last 15 years. The number of self-employed people 
has decreased by 17 per cent. The number of persons employed in unskilled labour 
has also decreased significantly, and the number of assisting spouses has dropped 
dramatically. On the other side, the number of white collar employees has increased 
significantly. 
To a certain extent the decrease in the number of self-employed people can 
be explained by the decrease in the number of people working in the agricultural 
sector, but there has been a decrease in the self-employment in all sectors. 
Table B.1.2: The Population by Occupational Structure, 1981 and 1994, 
Thousand Persons and Per Cent. 
Self employed 
Assisting spouses 
White collar employees 
Skilled blue collar workers 
Unskilled blue collar workers 
Employees in employment, not further 
specified 
Unemployed 





















































Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995 
The decrease in the number of unskilled blue collar workers and the increase in the 
number of white collar employees must to a high extent be ascribed to a shift in the 
demand for labour, cf. section B.1.4 below. The decrease in the number of unskilled 
blue collar workers has taken place in the manufacturing and the construction sectors 
mainly. 
B.1.3 Employment by Qualification Levels 
Available data makes it possible to describe current employment by industry and 
qualification level. From Table B.1.3 it appears that the service sectors demand 
labour with a higher educational level than the manufacturing industry. In the 
industries of financial and business services, public services and other services 
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persons with a high or medium length education make up between 10 and 27 per 
cent of the total number of employed, which is significantly higher than for other 
industries. 
Table B.1.3: Employed Population by Highest Level of Education, 1992. 
Industry 
(november 1992) 







































































































Source: Statistical Yearbook 1995 
Furthermore, in section B.1.1 it was concluded that employment in the public and 
private service sectors has expanded since 1980 compared to the primary and 
secondary sectors. Together these data suggest that a shift is taking place in the 
demand for labour in the Danish labour market towards labour with a higher 
educational level. It appears that today new jobs created are more knowledge 
intensive than previously. 
B.1.4 Employment by Age and Gender 
The development in employment by age and gender is shown in Table B1.4. The 
employment rate for men has decreased. However, this decrease is offset by an 
increase in women's employment. Total employment has increased by 0.4 per cent 
from November 1980 to January 1994. 
The table also shows that there has been a decrease in the employment level 
of young and old people. However, this is offset by a large increase in employment in 
the age group 35-54. 
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Note: Calculations are based on employment figures from November 1980 and January 1994. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1982 and 1995. 
B.1.5 Job Creation by Firm Size 
Table B.1.5 shows the creation of new jobs by firm size. Job creation in Denmark has 
mainly taken place in small firms. Thus, small firms with less than 10 employees 
represent a net job creation corresponding to 194,000 employees. Firms with less 
than 100 employees represent about 82 per cent of total job creation. 
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Source: Ministry of Business Development 1995b. 
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Β.1.6 Employment by Regions 
Table B.1.6 displays the development in the number of employed persons broken 
down by region over a 15 year period. 






























































Note: Calculations are based on employment figures from November 1980 and January 1994. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1982 and 1995. 
The increase in the total number of employed persons has taken place in Jutland, 
more specifically in both the eastern part of Jutland (Århus and Vejle counties) and in 
the western part of Jutland (Ribe and Ringkøbing counties). Employment has also 
grown in Roskilde county west of the capital area. 
In general, there has been a change in the regional industrial structure in 
Denmark, as more and more manufacturing enterprises are located in the western 
part of the country. To a high extent this explains the growth of employment in the 
western parts of Denmark and the decreasing employment in the capital area. 
B.1.7 Conclusions 
This descriptive analysis of employment in Denmark can be summarized in the 
following points: 
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• Total employment in Denmark has increased slightly from 1980 to 1994, with a 
peak in 1987. Since 1987 a small decrease in employment has occurred. 
• Employment in the private and public service sectors makes up a growing share of 
total employment. Similarly, the relative importance of employment in the primary 
and secondary sectors is decreasing. 
• At the same time, a higher share of persons employed in the service sector has a 
medium length or a high education. 
• Together, these last two points suggest that on average newly created jobs today 
are more knowledge intensive than previously and that the demand for labour is 
shifting towards a more highly educated labour. 
• There is a clear trend that new jobs in Denmark are created by small firms with 
less than 100 employees. These firms account for 82 per cent of all new jobs 
created in the period from 1981 to 1989. 
• Employment has grown in the western part of the country whereas it has 
decreased in parts of greater Copenhagen area in the period from 1980 to 1994. 
B.2 Unemployment in Denmark 
This section gives a description of the structure and distribution of unemployment in 
Denmark. To provide information on patterns of the development of unemployment, 
the period from 1980 to 1995 is considered as far as is possible, due to availability of 
statistics. Considerable differences exist in unemployment according to age, gender 
and education, and between different industries, occupations and regions. These 
differences are examined in separate subsections. 
B.2.1 The Unemployment Rate 1980-1995 
In this section the development of unemployment since 1980 is described. The main 
emphasis is on figures from the national statistics. 
From Figure B.2.1 it can be seen that there has been considerable variation in 
the aggregate level of unemployment during the period 1980-1995, although the 
unemployment rate exceeded 7 per cent the whole time.3 The unemployment rate 
increased between 1980 and 1983, when it reached a level of 10.5 per cent. A rather 
sharp decline occurred between 1984 and 1986, but from 1987 the unemployment 
Since 1980 the labour force in the 16-66 age group has been taken as the denomin The 
participation rates are for the 16-66 age group. See Pedersen and Smith (1991). 
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rate started to climb again and in 1993 it reached a record-high level of 12.4 per cent. 
In most recent years there has been a rather sharp decline down to an unemployment 
rate in August 1996 of 8.9 per cent. This development is the result of changes in both 
the supply and the demand for labour, as described in Chapter 2.2, Section A.2 and 
Section B.1. 
The unemployment rate discussed in this section is based on registered 
unemployment, and it thus measures what is known as open unemployment. In 
addition to open unemployment, there may also be some un-registered 
unemployment, i.e. actively job-seeking persons who are involuntarily not registered 
as unemployed. 
Figure B.2.1: The Unemployment Rate in Denmark, 1980-1995. 
0 -I 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 ! 1 i 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995, Monthly Review of Statistics 1996:3. 
All the available evidence suggests that unregistered unemployment is low in 
Denmark and can be disregarded without inducing any significant error. The only 
significant group of unregistered unemployed is comprised of young jobseekers who 
still live with their parents but do not register as unemployed because they are not 
entitled to unemployment benefits or social welfare. On the other hand, registered 
unemployment includes some people who are registered as unemployed although 
they are not willing to accept a job or are in fact working already. Comparisons with 
Eurostat statistics on unemployment indicate that this is not negligible. 
B.2.2 Unemployment by Age 1980-1994 
Unemployment is unevenly distributed among age groups. The young groups, 16-24 
years and 25-34 years, had the highest incidence of unemployment during the first 
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half of the 1980s, as can be seen in Figure B.2.2. The fall in the unemployment rate 
for the youngest group in the mid­1980s is primarily a consequence of improvements 
in labour market policy which provided public employment programmes and education 
for the young. It does not thus indicate an improvement in the market employment 
situation of this age group. Furthermore, the statistics for the age group 16­24 years 
are hiding the full picture of youth unemployment. If the age group is split into 'under 
20 years' and '20­24 years' a quite different picture emerges. 
Figure B.2.2: Unemployment Rates by Age Groups in Denmark, 1980-1994 
y * 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
^ ^ ^ ­ Total 16­24 years 25­34 years 
~ " ~ 35­54 years ■""" ™~ 55­59 years 60­66 years 
Note: From 1984 the age grouping of unemployed is based on the age at the end of the year as opposed to 
previously the middle of the year. Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995. 
The 20­24 age group had the highest unemployment of all groups during the period 
1980­1993, but its leading position was almost taken over by the 25­34 age group 
during the period. This is of course a clear cohort effect, since to a large degree it is 
the same people who have now become older and entered another age group. 
This pattern indicates that the unemployment risk attaches to persons rather 
than age groups. Those entering the labour market during a recession have a higher 
risk of starting their labour market career as unemployed, and these initial conditions 
seem to determine their future employment possibilities. These aspects of labour 
market entry have been investigated for the Danish labour market by Jensen et al. 
(1992) and Ploug (1990), and both studies confirm the above hypothesis. 
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Source: Statistical Yearbook 1981, 1989, 1994, 1995. 
The oldest age group (60-66 years) had the overall lowest unemployment rate during 
the first half of the 1980s, but this was because several labour market policies were 
targeted at this group, especially as regards labour supply. The main explanation of 
the low unemployment rate for this group is thus that the labour supply (the labour 
force participation rate) is heavily influenced by the Post Employment Wage scheme 
which came into operation in 1979.4 
The unemployment rate for the two youngest age groups, the 16-24 year olds 
and the 24-34 year olds has decreased from 1993 to 1994, and unemployment for the 
very young is low. This development is explained by demographic developments, as 
the small generations born in the early 1980s are now entering the labour market. 
It can be seen that the difference in unemployment rates between various age 
groups has diminished over the period 1980-1993. There also seems to be some 
evidence that the difference is least in periods of low unemployment such as the mid-
1980s, primarily because the unemployment rates of the young groups are more 
sensitive to cyclical movements. However, the development in most recent years is 
markedly different. The upswing from 1994 causes the unemployment rates of the 
young and middle-aged groups to fall, whereas the 55-59 and the 60-66 age groups 
continue to have an increasing unemployment rate. This puzzling development does 
This may also explain the apparent lack of cyclical movements in the unemployment rate of 
this group. 
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not appear to be a consequence of any special labour market measures targeted at 
these groups. 
B.2.3 Unemployment by Gender 1980-1994 
The female unemployment rate has been higher than the unemployment rate for 
males ever since 1982, whereas for the first three years of the 1980s the two rates 
were roughly similar. This is reflected in Figure B.2.3, which shows the unemployment 
rates for males and females. It can also be seen that the male-female unemployment 
differential increased in the mid-1980s but has been almost constant since 1987. 
Figure B.2.3: Male and Female Unemployment Rates in Denmark, 1980-1995. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
" " " Female ^ ~ ^ ~ Male 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review, 1991 and 1995. 
The increasing difference between male and female unemployment should be 
considered in light of a rising female labour force participation rate and the weak 
growth in public sector employment since 1982. Since the public sector is the main 
sector for female employment, this combination of rising participation and weak 
growth in public sector employment has contributed to the increasing male-female 
differential. 
The development over the period has also been different for males and 
females. Male unemployment rate started to decline in 1983 and reached its lowest 
level in 1986 before it started climbing again. In contrast, female unemployment 
started to decrease a year later and did not reach its lowest level until mid-1987 
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before it started to increase again. This different development is explained by the fact 
that the main employment sectors for males are manufacturing and construction, i.e. 
sectors which are more sensitive to cyclical movements than the major female 
employment sectors: private and in particular public services. 
B.2.4 Unemployment by Skill Levels and Education 
Unemployment also differs substantially across different categories of skills and 
educational qualifications. In general, unemployment rates are negatively correlated 
with skill and qualification levels. 
Table B.2.4.1 shows how groups with different levels of education experience 
different unemployment rates. People with basic schooling have at least twice the 
unemployment rate as those with a higher education. Certain small groups with a 
higher education experience, (mainly in the humanities), some unemployment, but in 
general people with a higher education are in a situation close to full employment. 
The main component of unemployment in these groups is search unemployment, in 
connection with the transition from education to work. Those with a higher education, 
especially those with a medium higher education have a very low unemployment rate. 
People with a vocational education have an unemployment rate that is above that of 
people with a higher education but it is still below the average unemployment rate. 
This picture has been the same for the period 1984-1994. 
Table B.2.4.1: Unemployment Rates Distributed According to Education. 
Education 
Basic schooling only 
Vocational education 
Upper secondary school education 
Short higher education 
Medium higher education 


























Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1995. 
Tables B.2.4.2 and B.2.4.3 provide a more detailed analysis of these differences for 
1993. Table B.2.4.2 shows that 27 per cent of the labour force experienced 
unemployment in 1993. However, the proportion does vary significantly with age, from 
11 per cent in the 60-66 age group to 39 per cent for the 25-29-year-olds. When it 
comes to education the variation is also quite large; 30 per cent of those with basic 
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schooling only were affected by unemployment in 1993, whereas only 14 per cent of 
those with a medium higher education experienced unemployment in 1993. 
Table B.2.4.2: Proportion of the Labour Force Experiencing Unemployment by 
Age and Education, 1993. 
Basic schooling only 
Upper secondary school education 
Vocational education 
Short higher education 
Medium higher education 















































Source: Statistical News, Labour Market 1994:21. 
Within each educational category there is considerable variation between different 
age groups. For instance, 57 per cent of those with a short higher education between 
the ages of 16 and 24 experienced unemployment, while only 9 per cent of those 
aged 60-66 with an equivalent education had this experience. 
The average degree of unemployment among people who have experienced 
some unemployment shows less variation with age and education, cf. Table B.2.4.3 
The variation with age tends to be the opposite of what was found for the proportion 
experiencing unemployment: The oldest group has the longest total duration and the 
younger groups have shorter durations in all educational categories. An unemployed 
person aged 60-66 will on average be unemployed for more than six months, 
whereas a person under 30'will only be unemployed for slightly more than four 
months. 
The high unemployment rates for the younger age groups are thus caused by 
a higher risk of experiencing unemployment, but their unemployment periods are 
relatively short. Older people have a relatively low probability of experiencing 
unemployment, but if they are unfortunate enough to become unemployed their 
unemployment periods are long. The short durations for young people are to a large 
degree caused by public policy measures such as temporary job and training 
programmes, and cannot thus be regarded as an indication that jobs are relatively 
easy for young people to find. 
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Table B.2.4.3: Average Degree of Unemployment by Age and Education Among 
Persons Experiencing Unemployment, 1993. 
Basic schooling only 
Upper secondary school education 
Vocational education 
Short higher education 
Medium higher education 















































Source: Statistical News, Labour Market 1994:21. 
Table B.2.4.2 and B.2.4.3 show that age and education are both important factors 
influencing the risk of experiencing unemployment and the duration of this 
unemployment. People with basic schooling only are clearly worse off in both 
respects, since they have a higher risk of experiencing unemployment and a smaller 
chance of escaping from it again. No clear pattern can be observed for the other 
educational categories. 
However, the educational classification applied here is rather crude, grouping 
together very different types of education with very different levels and patterns of 
unemployment within each group. A more detailed analysis by types of education 
would show a more diversified picture. 
B.2.5 Unemployment by Occupation 
Unemployment is very unequally distributed by occupation. The unemployment rates 
for various selected occupational groups are shown in Table B.2.5 These figures only 
cover insured persons, as they are derived from unemployment data for the insurance 
funds covering each occupational group. Together with the unemployment rates the 
table also shows each occupational group's fraction of the total insured labour force. 
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Table B.2.5: Unemployment Rates for Different Occupational Groups, 1980 
and 1994 
Blue collar female workers (unskilled) 
Blue collar male workers (unskilled) 
Metal workers 
Commercial and clerical workers (skilled) 
Managerial workers and public servants 
Nurses 
Engineers (college/university educ.) 













































Source: Statistical Ten-year Review, 1991 & 1995. 
These figures show substantial differences between occupational groups, with 
unemployment rates ranging from 0.5 per cent to 22.5 per cent. Evidently unskilled 
blue collar workers are more prone to experiencing unemployment than other groups. 
B.2.6 Unemployment by Region 1980-1994 
Unemployment is unevenly distributed across geographical regions of the country. 
Figure B.2.6 shows the regional unemployment rates for the counties of Denmark in 
1980 and 1994. 
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It can be seen that the unemployment rates range from 8.7 per cent in West Jutland 
to 15.0 per cent in North Jutland, while the overall unemployment rate is 12.2 per cent 
(in 1994). The Copenhagen metropolitan area has a low unemployment rate, but it 
should be noted that the actual city of Copenhagen has an unemployment rate well 
above the average. During the period 1980-1994 there was a shift in the regional 
structure of unemployment rates, with some regions experiencing a fall and others a 
rise. 
Regional differences have increased over the period: the standard deviation of 
the unemployment rates increased from 1.2 percentage points in 1980 to 2.0 
percentage points in 1994. OECD (1990) points out, however, that by international 
standards the regional differences in Denmark are small. Regional mismatch has 
evidently not contributed to the creation of high unemployment in Denmark. 
The Danish labour market has traditionally been characterized by the very low 
geographical mobility of its workers. This alone could be expected to give a very 
skewed geographical distribution of unemployment. However, this is not the case, 
something which can perhaps be attributed mainly to regional shifts in demand. As 
mentioned in section B.1 above the westwards move of manufacturing industry, to the 
parts of Denmark which previously had a higher rate of unemployment, is among the 
most noticeable developments. 
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B.2.7 The Rate of Long-Term Unemployment 1980-1994 
A remarkable feature of Danish unemployment is that it is widespread through the 
labour force. More than one-quarter of the labour force is affected by shorter or longer 
spells of unemployment in any given year. Taken together with an unemployment rate 
of about 12 per cent, this indicates a relatively high degree of turnover among those 
registered as unemployed. 
In spite of this widespread experience of unemployment affecting more than 
25 per cent of the labour force, the heaviest burden of unemployment is borne by a 
much smaller group. Most of those who have been unemployed in a given year have 
experienced one or a few short spells of unemployment only, while another small 
group of people have been without jobs for most of the year. And if we consider a 
longer period than one year, we find that unemployment is even more concentrated. 
A very large proportion of the labour force never experiences unemployment, while 
another much smaller group consists of people who are unemployed year after year 
or who move frequently in and out of unemployment. 
The annual unemployment rates conceal important information about the 
distribution of unemployment in the short and long-term. Unfortunately, the Danish 
unemployment statistics do not contain a direct measure of long-term unemployment. 
However, they do allow a breakdown of the unemployment rate into the number of 
people experiencing unemployment in any given year and the amount of the 
unemployment experienced. 
Figure B.2.7.1 shows the breakdown of unemployment into these measures. 
The figure shows the numbers experiencing unemployment in each year (a measure 
of the risk), the number of unemployed persons in the year (in full-time unemployment 
equivalents), and the average weeks of unemployment per unemployed person. It 
can be seen that for most of the period 1980-1994 more than 700,000 people were 
experiencing unemployment each year, which corresponds to over 25 per cent of the 
stock of the labour force during the year. The average time spent in unemployment 
for people in this group was between 16 and 21 weeks per year. However, the 
average time spent in unemployment per person per year may consist of one or more 
spells. Consequently, the average duration of unemployment spells will generally be 
shorter than the average number of unemployment weeks per year. 
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Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995. 
The variations in unemployment over time are reflected in the numbers experiencing 
unemployment and in the average weeks of unemployment per unemployed person. 
The curves in Figure B.2.7.1 shows that the number of persons experiencing 
unemployment and the average weeks of unemployment move with the number of 
unemployed persons and hence the unemployment rate. Thus an increase in 
unemployment means that the numbers experiencing unemployment as well as the 
time they spend without work will both increase. 
An exception to this occurred in 1987 and 1988, when the increase in 
unemployment was accompanied by an initial decrease in the average weeks in 
unemployment and the number of people affected was what accounted for the 
increase; this was then followed by an increasing average time spent in 
unemployment, which accounted for the total subsequent rise in unemployment. A 
similar, but opposite situation occurred in 1994. 
The average degree of unemployment for all those experiencing it is around 
0.35 (corresponding to 18 weeks), but this single number does not reflect the rather 
large variation in the time spent in unemployment by those affected. More than 25 per 
cent of those experiencing unemployment in a given year have a total duration of 
unemployment of 5 weeks or less (and this need not even be in one spell, but may be 
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in two or more short spells). Figure B.2.7.2 shows a breakdown of total 
unemployment into the number of persons experiencing unemployment in each of five 
intervals for the degree of unemployment. 
Several definitions of long-term unemployment are used in Denmark, but as 
mentioned in Chapter 3 one of the definitions used by the Ministry of Labour (for 
international purposes) is to define a long-term unemployed person as someone 
whose annual degree of unemployment is over 0.8. This corresponds to at least 42 
weeks of unemployment during the year. 
Figure B.2.7.2: The Number of Persons Experiencing Unemployment 
Distributed by Degree of Unemployment, 1980-1995. 
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Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995. Monthly Review of Statistics no. 4, 1996. 
Using this definition it can be seen from Figure B.2.7.2 that more than 150,000 people 
(5.5 per cent of the labour force) were long-term unemployed in 1994. However, from 
1994 to 1995 there was a sharp drop in the number of long-term unemployed to 
113,000. It also appears that long-term unemployment has strong counter-cyclical 
movements, whereas very short-term unemployment (with a degree of unemployment 
between 0 and 0.2, corresponding to between 0 and 10 weeks) shows pro-cyclical 
movements. 
A breakdown of long-term unemployment into male and female unemployment 
shows that male long-term unemployment is much more sensitive to cyclical 
movements than female long-term unemployment. 
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B.2.8 Other Aspects of Unemployment 
A very large proportion of all unemployment spells in Denmark are due to temporary 
layoffs. The official Danish unemployment statistics do not give any information about 
the reason for the unemployment. However, it is possible to obtain some knowledge 
about this from other sources. Jensen and Westergård-Nielsen (1990) report 
estimates of the size of temporary layoffs in the period 1979-1984. They found that 40 
per cent of all unemployment spells are due to temporary layoffs. Because these 
spells are generally shorter than the unemployment spells following from permanent 
layoffs, this amounts to only 16 per cent of the total unemployment.5 The results do 
not show any significant cyclical variation in the amount of temporary layoffs over the 
studied six-year period. 
Jensen and Westergård-Nielsen (1990) also found that temporary layoffs are 
concentrated in short spells of unemployment. Temporary layoffs constitute about 70 
per cent of all unemployment spells lasting less than two weeks. Unemployment due 
to temporary layoffs is also unevenly distributed, depending on occupation and 
industry. Unskilled workers and skilled construction workers are the two occupational 
groups suffering the highest relative level of temporary layoff unemployment. Among 
industries it is fishery, manufacturing and construction which are particularly prone to 
unemployment due to temporary layoffs. The municipal public sector also has a high 
proportion of this kind of unemployment. 
B.2.9 Conclusions 
This descriptive analysis of Danish unemployment given in the previous subsections 
could be summarized as follows: 
• The period 1980-1996 has been characterised by high and persistent 
unemployment, with some cyclical variation resulting in a peak in 1983 and with an 
increase from 1987 that led to a record-high level of unemployment in 1993. In the 
recent years unemployment has started to decline again. 
• Unemployment is very unevenly distributed according to age, gender, education, 
and occupation. Women, young people, low-skilled workers, and those with very 
5 However, because of the technique used, this is a very conservative assessment. Another 
Danish source using a different data set and including work sharing, suggests that 20 per 
cent of total unemployment is due to temporary layoffs in a broader sense 
187 
little or no education exhibit higher unemployment rates than other groups. The 
male-female differential has increased significantly during the period 1980-1995. 
• The unemployment rate of the 60-66 age group has been kept down artificially 
during the 1980s by an early retirement scheme. This suggests that there is a 
considerable amount of disguised unemployment. However, recently this age 
group as well as the 55-59 age groups have seen a remarkably increase in 
unemployment rates. 
• Temporary layoffs are quite common in Denmark. They constitute 40 per cent of all 
unemployment spells and 16 per cent of total unemployment. The main reason for 
the high volume of temporary layoff unemployment is the unemployment insurance 
system, which subsidizes this type of unemployment. 
• On the one hand unemployment is very widespread in the labour force; on the 
other it is very concentrated to a small group of people. Almost half of all 
unemployment may be considered long-term unemployment. 
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Appendix C: Wage and Salary Trends 
This appendix describes the wage development from 1980 to 1992. Underlying the 
aggregate wage development are differences between different labour market 
groups. The description therefore focuses on different occupational groups: unskilled 
blue collar workers, skilled blue collar workers, white collar workers in the private 
sector and white collar workers in the public sector.6 
C.1 The Development in Nominal Wages 
The development in nominal wages for the four occupational groups of employees 
appears from Figure C.1 below. The figure shows the relative development in wages 
for the groups based on an index where 1980=100. 
Figure C.1: Development in Nominal Wages by Occupational Status 1980-1992. 
1980=100. 
--I ι —I 1--
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Skilled blue collar 
Private white collar 
Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995 
Unskilled blue collar 
Public white collar 
From 1980 to 1986 white collar workers in the private sector experienced the highest 
nominal wage increases, whereas skilled blue collar workers experienced the lowest 
increases, but in general the relative increases of the four groups were not very 
different. From 1986 to 1988 all groups experienced a higher level of wage increase 
In this section the word wage covers both wage and salary. 
189 
than earlier In 1987 there is a pronounced increase in wages for all groups, especially 
for skilled and unskilled blue collar workers. 
Since 1987 white collar workers have had relatively lower wage increases 
than blue collar workers. Within the group of blue collar workers there is an internal 
shift in 1989, as unskilled workers have since then had higher relative wage increases 
than skilled workers. 
Among the most pronounced changes in wages in Denmark over the last 15 
years are the exceptionally high wage increases that resulted from collective 
bargaining in spring 1987. These increases should been seen in the light of the 
employment situation in Denmark at the time. From the mid-1980s the unemployment 
rate had been falling significantly, creating problems of labour shortages for some 
categories of employees. These problems resulted in high wage increases for these 
groups which then rubbed off on other groups. 
C.2 The Development in Real Wages 
In contrast to nominal wages, real wages have been adjusted for price changes.7 
Figure C.2 below displays the development in real wages in Denmark over the period 
from 1980 to 1992 for the same four occupational groups as in figure C.1 above. 
In the early 1980s blue collar as well as white collar workers experienced a 
constant decrease in real wages. This did not change until 1984 where real wages 
strarted to increase slightly. The decrease in real wages in the early 1980s was to a 
high extent a consequence of policy measures aimed at limiting private consumption 
in a light of a large balance of payments deficit. 
The above mentioned large increases in nominal wages that resulted from 
collective bargaining in 1987 also led to an increase in real wages for all occupational 
groups. However, this increase lasted only until 1988 where real wages decreased 
again. From 1989 there has been a small increase in real wages for most groups. 
7 In this section the real wage is computed as the nominal wage deflated with the GNP-deflator 
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Figure C.2: Development in Relative Real Wages by Occupational Status 1980-
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Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995 
Unskilled blue collar workers have experienced the largest increase in real wages 
from 1980 to 1992. In particular, this group has experienced a larger increase in real 
wages than other groups since 1986. 
In spite of the changes that have occurred real wages have remained quite 
stable since 1980, indicating that the general wage increase level in society to a high 
extent corresponded to the overall changes in prices. For instance, Table C.2 shows 
that real wages for privately employed white collar workers have increased less than 
10 per cent during the last 12 years. 
Table C.2. Development in the Relative Real Wage from 1980 to 1992 
(1980=100) 
Real wage skilled blue collar 
Real wage unskilled blue collar 
Real wage private white collar 











Source: Statistical Ten-year Review 1991 and 1995 
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C.3 The Development in Wages by Gender 
When it comes to wage differences between men and women in Denmark a very 
uniform picture emerges for blue collar as well as for white collar workers. In the very 
early 1980s there is a slight narrowing of wage differences between men and women, 
but since then women's wages have not improved relative to those of men. 
Wage differences between men and women are not equally large for all 
occupational groups. The lowest differences are found within unskilled blue collar 
workers, where women's wages are about 90 per cent of those of men. For white 
collar women employed in the private sector wages constitute only 76 per cent of the 
wages of men. White collar women employed in the public sector earns an average of 
86 per cent of their male colleagues wages. 
The wage differences between men and women do not necessarily, however, 
reflect open discrimination on behalf of employers. Rather they may express 
structural differences between the male and the female parts of the labour force. 
Although there is a change in male and female roles in the labour market, 
some occupations remain female occupations, e.g. nurses and teachers. Most of 
these occupations are also low pay occupations. This in particular explains the wage 
differences in the public sector. For the private sector other contributing factors to 
differences in wages may be education and position within the company. These 
factors do not have any significant impact on the wages of unskilled workers which 
explains the smaller wage differences between the sexes in this occupational group. 
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